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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Vast numbers of people across the globe suffer acute deprivation. The numbers have
become familiar. The number of people living on less than US$2.00 per day has remained
constant at around 2.5 billion since 1981. That number represents more than a third of the
current global population.1 Every year, 12 million children die before their fifth birthday,
4.5 million due to diarrhoea and pneumonia alone;2 less than 100,000 of these deaths occur
in developed countries.3 1.2 billion people lack access to an adequate water supply. In
2009 alone, 23.5 million children were orphaned due to AIDS.4 From 1998–2007, 216,500
people died from civil conflict; 60,000 people died from violent campaigns perpetrated by
a government or other formally organized group.5 37.4 million people are refugees or
internally displaced from their homes, many as a result of conflict or systematic human
rights violations.6
What do we owe these global poor? Specifically, what do the residents of places
like Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States owe to the residents of
places like Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, the Congo, Haiti, Libya, Myanmar, Sudan, Yemen,
1. World Bank, World Development Indicators, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
2010. Dollar figure reported in US 2005 dollars at purchasing power parity.
2. World Health Organization, World Health Statistics, World Health Organization, 2010.
3. UNICEF, State of the World’s Children – Statistical Tables, United Nations Children’s Fund, 2011.
4. Ibid.
5. Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report, Simon Fraser University, 2009/2010.
6. UNHCR, 2009 Statistical Yearbook, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010.
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and Zimbabwe? My answer assumes two basic commitments:
The cosmopolitan commitment: All human beings enjoy equal status as the fundamen-
tal units of moral concern and the interests of each should thus be extended equal
concern and respect by all other human beings. Accordingly, national affiliations or
state borders are irrelevant for determining the content and scope of our duties of
justice.
The institutional commitment: At minimum, cosmopolitan justice requires that we work
toward the establishment of international institutional arrangements that are consis-
tent with individuals’ status as moral equals and create the conditions under which
each individual is capable of living a minimally decent life.
I do not argue for these commitments here. Instead, I begin to explore the implications of
these commitments. Specifically, how should we design the international system to fulfill
cosmopolitan moral principles?
A burgeoning literature has emerged to answer this question. The generality of these
two commitments leaves much room for disagreement. Cosmopolitans differ with respect
to the moral theory they take to generate cosmopolitan duties — from utilitarianism,7 to
social contract theories,8 to rights-based theories.9 Cosmopolitans also differ with respect
to the moral objectives they take as fundamental: to promote welfare,10 to promote indi-
vidual autonomy,11 to promote capabilities,12 to fulfill human rights,13 or to satisfy basic
needs.14
Finally, cosmopolitans disagree on the depth and breadth of international institutional
7. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229–
243.
8. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1999); Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Darrel
Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002).
9. Luis Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmoplitan Case for the World State (New York:
Routledge, 2004); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence,
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
10. Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.”
11. Held, Democracy and the Global Order.
12. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).
13. Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002); Shue, Basic
Rights.
14. Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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integration required to fulfill cosmopolitan principles. At one end of the spectrum are
those who reject the need for international institutional reform or propose only modest
ad hoc changes to address specific issues.15 At the other end are those who advocate a
centralized global political authority modeled on the modern federal state.16 In between
these extremes, we find advocates for institutional restructuring at varying levels of depth
and breadth. Closer to the middle, we find intermediate proposals such as Gillian Brock’s
suggestion of global taxation schemes, Darrel Moellendorf’s proposal to democratize the
World Trade Organization, or Allen Buchanan’s plan to institutionalize the preventive use
of interstate military force.17 Between this “limited institutional cosmopolitanism” and the
world state, we find cosmopolitan democrats, who propose the creation of a network of
interconnected and overlapping agencies, with authority being dispersed both vertically
(from local bodies through to global bodies) and horizontally (dispersing issue-specific
policy-making authority among a plurality of distinct organizations).18
Underlying these differences are three commonalities. First, regarding their moral ob-
jectives, cosmopolitans are ultimately concerned with human flourishing, broadly defined.
The fundamental cosmopolitan objective is to see individuals everywhere live decent and
worthwhile lives.19 Second, regarding their institutional proposals, nearly all cosmopoli-
tans advocate an institutional order that includes at least some authoritative suprastate
institutions. Institutional cosmopolitanism prescribes at least some institutions that have
15. Singer’s or Shue’s calls for greater foreign aid are examples of the latter; see Singer, “Famine, Afflu-
ence, and Morality”; Shue, Basic Rights.
16. Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice.
17. Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008);
Darrel Moellendorf, “The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian Justice,” Metaphilosophy 36, nos. 1/2
(2005): 145–162; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal,” Ethics & International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004): 1–22; Allen Buchanan, “Institution-
alizing the Just War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, no. 1 (2006): 2–38.
18. Held, Democracy and the Global Order; cf. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political
Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, ch. 7. The
term “limited institutional cosmopolitanism” comes from Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice, 2.
19. Cf. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, ch. 1.
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mandatory global jurisdiction with respect to some issues and are granted authority to
constrain the activity of states in pursuit of cosmopolitan objectives.20
Finally, cosmopolitans’ arguments for their favored institutional proposal follow the
same general schema.
1. The cosmopolitan commitment generates an obligation to realize the cosmopolitan
objective.
2. Cosmopolitan institutional arrangements are required to realize the cosmopolitan
objective.
Therefore,
3. The cosmopolitan commitment generates an obligation to establish cosmopolitan
institutional arrangements.
The salient feature of this schema is that it employs instrumental reasoning; cosmopolitans
prescribe some particular institutional form as required to fulfill cosmopolitan objectives.
Reducing institutional cosmopolitan arguments to the foregoing schema permits us to
evaluate these arguments as a class. Naturally, questions arise regarding the causal con-
nection between cosmopolitan institutional forms and the realization of cosmopolitan ob-
jectives. Are cosmopolitan institutional forms required to realize cosmopolitan objectives?
Could they could even do so effectively? Institutional cosmopolitans present a variety of
reasons to support their case: global institutions are required to ensure compliance with
cosmopolitan principles; global institutions are required to ensure adequate provision of
global public goods; global institutions can reliably prevent states from depriving their cit-
izens.21 Intuitively, these support the claim that cosmopolitan institutional arrangements
are indeed required to realize any worthwhile cosmopolitan objective.
Premise 2 in the aforementioned argument schema reveals that questions of global in-
stitutional design crucially turn on facts about social causal processes. By what causal
20. Cf. Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, ch. 5.
21. Cf. ibid., 159–160.
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processes have so many people become so severely deprived? By what processes could
cosmopolitans’ proposed institutional forms be implemented? How would the proposed
institutions affect the processes that lead to severe deprivation? Would they alleviate the
deprivation or exacerbate it? Given the centrality of these questions to the global institu-
tional design project, it is surprising to discover that global political theorists pay so little
attention to the relevant causal processes. We can classify this general neglect more pre-
cisely. Corresponding to the preceding questions, we can charge global political theorists
with three methodological flaws: they ignore the causal processes that generate depriva-
tion; they fail to rigorously evaluate the processes required to implement their proposals;
and they fail to anticipate the consequences of implementing their proposals. As I demon-
strate in chapter 2, these flaws are both widespread and consequential. They put extant
cosmopolitan institutional design proposals in doubt.
These flaws are not limited to cosmopolitan political theory; they emerge from philos-
ophers’ general approach to institutional design. Philosophers’ institutional prescriptions
fall under one of two broad categories. Ideal prescriptions identify institutional principles
that would characterize a fully just system of global institutions. Nonideal prescriptions
specify institutional arrangements that purport to eradicate or at least mitigate various ac-
tual injustices. The conventional wisdom is that ideal theory must precede nonideal theory.
Even if we are ultimately interested in proposing feasible institutional solutions, our first
task is to identify the principles that constitute an ideal institutional structure. We iden-
tify these ideal principles by reflecting on the institutional principles that best fulfill our
considered moral judgments under ideal social and political conditions, conditions that
abstract away from empirical complications, such as humans’ motivational and cognitive
limitations, acute deprivation, and frequent inter- and intrastate violence. These abstract
conditions more or less permit moral considerations to take center stage in decisions about
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how to organize our collective life. The principles that emerge from this exercise subse-
quently guide and constrain our attempts to prescribe institutional solutions for our de-
cidedly nonideal world. I call this conventional approach to institutional design the ideal
guidance approach.22
The ideal guidance approach has considerable intuitive appeal if one takes the institu-
tional design objective to be the realization of “a more just state of affairs.” This broad
objective suggests the need for a target at which to aim. Since our selection of targets is
primarily guided by moral concerns, and since assuming ideal conditions abstracts away
from empirical complexity so as to give moral considerations primacy, ideal theory seems
to be the place to start. Without ideal theory to define the principles that would constitute
institutional arrangements in a fully just state of affairs, we can’t know which institutional
arrangments count as “more just” than the current ones. In A. John Simmons’s words,
“We can hardly claim to know whether we are on the path to the ideal of justice until we
can specify in what that ideal consists. [. . . ] The requirement that nonideal policies be
‘likely to be successful’ requires that we know how to measure success; and that mea-
sure makes essential reference to the ultimate target, the ideal of perfect justice.”23 So the
conventional wisdom goes.
Philosophers’ inattention to causal processes arises from this ideal guidance approach
to institutional design. Put simply, the ideal guidance approach places emphasis on moral
analysis at the expense of social scientific analysis. In terms of the aforementioned argu-
ment schema, the ideal guidance approach places emphasis on premise 1 at the expense of
premise 2. Not surprisingly, much of the global justice literature focuses on debates be-
tween cosmopolitans and their nationalist and statist rivals: Should we endorse cosmopoli-
22. The locus classicus for this view is John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999), 7–8, 215–216.
23. A. John Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 5–36,
at 34.
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tan moral claims? On what grounds should we do so? What moral objectives should we
pursue? These are, of course, important issues. What we ought to do depends on how
we answer these questions and philosophers have made important progress in answering
them. But the above schema shows that progress on institutional design questions depends
not only on progress with respect to moral considerations, but on progress with respect
to the relevant social scientific issues as well. If we are to prescribe feasible, stable, and
effective institutional solutions, we must attend to the relevant causal processes.
The preceding recommends development of an alternate methodology for institutional
design, one that takes both moral analysis and social scientific analysis seriously. I lay the
groundwork for such an alternative in chapter 3. Against the ideal guidance approach, I
propose that philosophers adopt an institutional failure analysis approach. This alternative
takes its design task to be obviating or averting social failures (as opposed to approximat-
ing an ideal).
The failure analysis approach promises to fulfill the aim of nonideal theory more ef-
fectively than does the ideal guidance approach. Ostensibly, political philosophers are
motivated to shift from ideal theorizing to nonideal theorizing by a desire to propose in-
stitutions that are (1) capable of bringing about a state of affairs that is more just than
the current state while (2) operating in the midst of current injustice. The ideal guidance
approach to nonideal theory has failed to deliver proposals that can meet these desiderata,
in large part due to its neglect of social science. The central innovation of the failure anal-
ysis approach is to give social scientific analysis a central role in our moral evaluation of
institutions; it urges philosophers to attend equally to the issues involved in both premises
1 and 2 of the preceding argument schema. Failure analysis thus enables global political
theorists to prescribe more effective solutions to injustice because its focus is squarely on
understanding the injustice, rather than focusing on trying to understand an ideal of jus-
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tice. In so doing, failure analysis better fulfills the objective of nonideal political theory,
namely, to think about how, in the midst of current injustice, we might bring about social
conditions that are more just than our current conditions.
Abstract reflections are insufficient to justify methodological innovation; methodolog-
ical principles are vindicated through fruitful application. Hence, with the failure analysis
framework in hand, the remaining chapters begin the substantive task of proposing insti-
tutional reforms to address widespread deprivation. Specifically, I address a phenomenon
that development political economists call “the resource curse.” Counterintuitively, many
countries with abundant natural resource wealth, such as the Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria,
and Venezuela, suffer serious development failures. These “resource-cursed” countries
tend to have stagnant economies and authoritarian governments, and often experience pro-
tracted violent civil conflict.24 On its face, the resource curse is a moral disaster. Nearly
a quarter of the global poor live in resource-cursed countries. They are ruled by dicta-
tors who are infamous for their brutality, corruption, and thievery; examples include Sani
Abacha, Omar al-Bashir, Mobutu Sese Seko, Teodoro Obiang, and Than Shwe.
Chapter 5 develops a detailed explanation of the resource curse. To do this, I use
game theory as a tool for analyzing important aspects of the strategic interaction between
a country’s political leaders and its citizens. Building on previous work by (among oth-
ers) Robert Bates and Charles Tilly, I argue that states undergo successful political and
economic development when domestic institutions constrain state leaders to attend to cit-
izens’ interests. This occurs when citizens’ bargaining leverage vis-a`-vis state leaders is
sufficient to compel the latter to enact policies that advance citizens’ general interests in
secure rights and material well-being.25 The resource curse arises when resource revenue
24. For good surveys of the relevant literature, see Michael L. Ross, “The Political Economy of the Re-
source Curse,” World Politics 51 (1999): 297–322; Andrew Rosser, “The Political Economy of the Resource
Curse: A Literature Survey,” IDS Working Paper, no. 268 (2006).
25. Robert H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development, 2nd ed. (New York
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enters a country with domestic institutions that are too weak to constrain the leader to
attend to citizens’ interests. Moreover, the flow of resource revenue into a country with
weak institutions undermines leaders’ incentives to carry out positive institutional reforms,
thereby perpetuating the resource curse.
Chapter 6 considers the normative implications of this explanation for international in-
stitutional design. Extant prescriptions focus exclusively on institutional reforms that tar-
get state leaders’ use of resource revenue. In light of the explanation offered in chapter 5,
there are two problems with these proposals. First, mechanisms that merely limit the flow
of resource revenue into resource-cursed countries are insufficient to improve citizens’
bargaining position vis-a`-vis their leaders.26 In addition to decreasing state leaders’ access
to resource revenue, the explanation presented in chapter 5 shows that citizens’ bargaining
leverage depends on having credible “exit threats,” opportunities to avoid absorbing the
harmful consequences of remaining in their resource-cursed situation. Second, extant pre-
scriptions neglect the extent to which the persistence of institutions that foster the resource
curse is endogenous to the curse itself. Curse-engendering institutions are endogenous to
the curse if the incentive structure that generates overconsumption and underinvestment,
corruption and patronage, unaccountability and repression also inhibits voluntary estab-
lishment of the accountability and transparency mechanisms required to avoid these ills.
If this endogeneity thesis is true, then it is futile to first identify (e.g.) underinvestment
in human capital accumulation or lack of accountability to citizens as key causes of the
resource curse and then prescribe that the state invest more in human capital or establish
and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2009); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–
1992, Revised ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992). Clark, Golder, and Golder present a helpful formalization
of the reasoning; see William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Golder, “The Balance of Power Between
Citizens and the State: Democratization and the Resource Curse” (University of Michigan and Penn State
University, unpublished manuscript, 2008).
26. Cf. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights; Leif Wenar, “Property Rights and the Resource Curse,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, no. 1 (2008): 2–32.
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mechanisms to ensure citizen oversight of resource transactions.27
I highlight the need to incorporate a focus on citizens’ exit options into our prescrip-
tions to address the resource curse. The importance of exit options cannot be overstated.
State leaders who lose access to resource revenue can still neglect citizens’ interests if
those citizens have no where else to go or no alternate leadership candidates to turn to.
For any prescription to effectively improve citizens’ bargaining leverage vis-a`-vis their
leaders, it must also provide citizens with exit options. Focusing our prescriptive efforts
on exit options has a second advantage. Since increasing leaders’ reliance on citizens is
incredibly difficult so long as resource revenue continues to enter the domestic political
economy, providing certain types of exit options might permit resource curse victims to
escape the curse even where it cannot be overcome.
The prospects for providing resource curse victims with credible exit options appear
unfavorable at first glance. Nevertheless, I tentatively propose a strategy that could mit-
igate the resource curse in a limited number of cases. My strategy has two components.
The first aims to increase state leaders’ fiscal reliance on citizens by conditioning official
development aid and sovereign loan disbursements on achieving a minimum level of fiscal
reliance on non-resource tax revenue. Eligible revenue should derive from taxes on in-
come earned domestically by individual citizens and profits earned by businesses outside
the resource sector. In implementing this rule, we induce state leaders to make investments
that advance citizens’ interests in an effort to increase his eligible tax base. Second, we
should establish international peer-to-peer lending networks that could facilitate opportu-
nities for citizens to invest their limited resources abroad. This could enable citizens to
reduce the amount of their income that is eligible for taxation that meets the rule, thereby
providing them with leverage in bargaining with their leaders over taxation. To keep his
27. Cf. Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Escaping the Resource Curse
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
10
citizens’ investments in the country, the leader may have to concede oversight of taxation
and public spending to citizens, which would further advance citizens’ interests.
Together, chapters 5 and 6 present a resolutely pragmatic approach to nonideal insti-
tutional design. My approach eschews high-minded analysis of political ideals in favor of
sustained reflection on the causal processes that generate stubborn problems amidst decid-
edly nonideal conditions. Successful remedies must work within the constraints defined
by humans’ motivational and cognitive limitations, resource scarcity, and technological
and environmental limitations. Only careful diagnostic work can yield insight regarding
the boundaries and possibilities that determine available solutions. Political philosophers
risk irrelevance when they forgo rigorous diagnosis and proceed directly from moral phi-
losophy to institutional design.
Before I end this introduction, I must address a worry that I am exhorting philosophers
to engage in a project that is not at all philosophical in nature. If conventional political
philosophy is not cut out to provide effective institutional prescriptions, why not enjoin
philosophers to abstain from undertaking such work altogether? Why not follow G.A.
Cohen in affirming that “the question for political philosophy is not what we should do
but what we should think, even when what we should think makes no practical differ-
ence”?28 On Cohen’s view, there is a fundamental distinction between basic principles
and principles of regulation. Principles of regulation are the principles that constrain in-
stitutional design; they are “device[s] for having certain effects.”29 Basic principles are
statements of our ultimate normative convictions; they are the standard by which we judge
the consequences of principles of regulation. Importantly, basic principles are supposed
to be fact-free; they are true independent of facts about the world. I’m exhorting philos-
ophers to attend to facts when reflecting on principles of regulation. But, Cohen objects,
28. G.A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003): 211–245, at 243.
29. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 38, quoted by Cohen.
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philosophers ought not attend to principles of regulation (and so need not attend to facts).
Political philosophy’s primary task is to assess basic principles; we need not attend to facts
to do this.
I have two replies. First, whether or not philosophers should attend to principles of reg-
ulation is irrelevant at this point. Philosophers have taken it upon themselves to prescribe
principles of regulation and are wading deep into the territory of institutional design. This
seems particularly true of the global justice literature. Insofar as this trend is irreversible,
it is sensible to be clear about how this sort of inquiry should proceed. The failure analysis
approach speaks to this issue.
Second, and more deeply, the objection assumes that we can sensibly separate our as-
sessment of basic principles from our assessment of facts about the social world. This
assumption is mistaken. Suppose we concede to Cohen that basic principles of justice do
nothing other than set out a framework for morally evaluating states of affairs; they say
nothing about what we ought to do given our evaluations. Even still, whether some prin-
ciple P is a sound principle of justice (a sound principle for evaluating states of affairs)
depends on the practical requirements of realizing states of affairs that fulfill P. This is
because our assessment and selection of evaluative principles is always informed by our
judgments about which states of affairs could possibly be realized and the consequences
of their realization. P is only a legitimate evaluative principle if it exhorts us to adopt ap-
propriate evaluative attitudes with respect to the pursuit or failure to pursue states of affairs
required by P. Failing to pursue states of affairs required by P is blameworthy or other-
wise regrettable only if those states could possibly be realized or their realization would
not have unwelcome consequences. If fulfilling a basic principle requires implementing
principles of regulation that would have perverse consequences (according to the basic
principle), then we would have reason to revise our basic principle. Contrary to Cohen’s
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thesis, our judgments regarding basic principles necessarily attend to (causal) facts about
our world.
So global political theorists must attend to facts about the world when prescribing
international institutional arrangements. But don’t they do this already? If not, where are
they going wrong? What sort of facts must they attend to? I answer these questions in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
The Importance of Causal Analysis
Global political theorists pay scant attention to a particular type of fact, namely, facts
about social causal mechanisms. This inattention is consequential. Causal claims are
important for assessing the moral quality of institutions, as well as prescribing effective
solutions to injustice; for evaluating the extent to which particular agents’ relationships to
particular social outcomes generate moral duties; even for presenting an adequate analysis
of important political concepts, such as power, freedom, or self-determination. Failure
to rigorously analyze the relevant causal mechanisms puts these causal claims — and the
arguments on which they are based — in doubt.
To preempt any misunderstanding, my claim is not merely that philosophers ought to
attend to, and avoid sloppy reasoning about, the facts, insofar as their arguments depend
on facts. Although true, that claim is too obvious to be interesting. Nor do I merely claim
that philosophers fail to put forward the requisite causal claims; such claims pervade the
literature. Instead, I claim that political philosophers must rigorously analyze the causal
mechanisms on which their causal claims depend; they fail to do so to the detriment of
their arguments.
In the abstract, my thesis might still seem uncontroversial. Yet I show that philosophi-
cal practice does not adhere to the implications of this uncontroversial claim. This is why
14
I do not argue for my thesis in the abstract. To dispel any notion that philosophers can
maintain the status quo, my argument consists of two illustrative surveys. The first can-
vasses global political theorists’ typical appeals to empirical information. This is meant
to draw the distinction between analysis of causal mechanisms on the one hand and other
sorts of empirical analysis on the other; it also illustrates the ways in which philosoph-
ical arguments go astray when they are inattentive to causal mechanisms. The second
survey divides theorists’ claims into three broad types — normative, applied, and concep-
tual — and takes stock of the ways in which rigorous analysis of causal mechanisms is
required for each type of claim. Perhaps most surprisingly, I show that causal analysis
is required in at least some straightforward cases of conceptual political philosophy. The
central lesson is that analysis of social causal mechanisms must play a more central role in
political philosophical argument than is typical. This is not a “simple methodological les-
son”; the flaw exposed here is both widespread and consequential. If right, my argument
implies that numerous debates in the global political theory literature must be revisited
with an eye toward analyzing causal mechanisms.
Two more words of clarification before I continue. First, my claim is not that political
philosophers must ground their arguments on true causal analyses as opposed to false ones
(although true claims are obviously desirable). I recognize that analyses of social causal
processes are matters of ongoing debate among social scientists. My claim is rather that
philosophers’ causal claims must be based on analyses of causal mechanisms as opposed
to other types of empirical analysis, such as statistical correlations or historical narrative.
Analyzing causal mechanisms forces philosophers to lay bare the causal logic presupposed
by their arguments to a greater extent than other types of empirical analysis; this, in turn,
facilitates more rigorous scrutiny of the argument.
Second, my discussion of particular arguments is critical throughout. Hence, one
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might get the impression that this chapter is primarily concerned to make a substantive
point about global justice. Lest anyone misunderstand, I stress that my objective through-
out is to expose methodological rather than substantive flaws. Of course, methodological
flaws have important substantive implications; thus, I often challenge or reject substantive
conclusions to make my point about the need for increased attention to causal analysis.
However, a rejection of any particular substantive position I take with respect to any par-
ticular dispute is not a rejection of my argument here. To reject my thesis, one must show
that the sorts of arguments philosophers make frees them from any requirement to attend
to causal analysis or that increased attention to causal mechanisms would not significantly
alter the substantive conclusions philosophers draw from their arguments.
2.1 Causal Analysis
To fix terms, say that empirical information describes the social world — it tells us
how the social world is and how it came to be that way or how it could come to be some
other way, rather than how it ought to be or how it ought to come to be some way. This
definition admits a variety of types:
• Data points: points of fact demonstrable by empirical methods; for example, that 2.6
billion people live on less than US$2 per day, or that Angola achieved independence
in 1975.
• Correlation: the demonstration of a statistical relationship between two or more
variables; for example, that democratic governance is statistically associated with
higher levels of economic development.
• Narrative: a descriptive ordering of events according to some organizational prin-
ciples (typically time, but also topical relevance or causal salience); for example, a
chronology of European diplomatic affairs following the Congress of Vienna.
• Taxonomy (classification): a partition of objects (including states of affairs) accord-
ing to shared characteristics; for example, a classification of countries into regime
types.
• Interpretive: an account of the meaning or significance (symbolic, cultural, or nor-
mative) attributed (or attributable) to particular practices or events; for example,
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Clifford Geertz’s claim that cockfights are “fundamentally a dramatization of [Bali-
nese] status concerns.”1
• Causal: statements regarding a process that generates some empirical regularity or
a particular state of affairs.
Let’s focus on the last item for a moment (we will return to the others later). The definition
of causal information I have offered is consistent with the claim that a set of true causal
statements constitutes causal information. For example, on this definition, the statement
“inclement weather causes a decrease in attendance at outdoor sporting events” counts as
causal information. Political philosophers use this sort of information all the time. To
more precisely specify my claim that philosophers are inattentive to causal analyses of the
relevant phenomena, I need to distinguish causal information from causal analysis. We
do causal analysis when we identify the salient components of a process that generates an
outcome and specify their interrelationships. This latter part includes specifying how the
components interact and how changes in one part of the process affect (the operation of)
other components.
This definition has two notable features. First, it is compatible with various concep-
tions of social explanation, including holism (the view that an individual’s behavior is
explained as a function of her position or functional role within a social system2), func-
tionalism (the view that the occurrence of a social causal process that generates outcome O
is explained by the [beneficial] consequences O has for some entity3), and methodological
individualism (the view that “all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in
principle explicable only in terms of individuals — their properties, goals, and beliefs”4).
1. Clifford Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New
York: Basic Books, 1973), 437.
2. Cf. J.W.N. Watkins, “Methodological Individualism: A Reply,” Philosophy of Science 22, no. 1 (1955):
58–62, at 58.
3. Cf. G.A. Cohen, “Marxism and Functional Explanation,” in Analytical Marxism, ed. John Roemer
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 223.
4. Jon Elster, “Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism,”
Theory and Society 11, no. 4 (1982): 453–482, at 453.
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Second, the emphasis on analyzing a causal story into its component parts and specify-
ing their interrelationships privileges a mechanistic view of social explanation. Identifying
a (social) causal mechanism is a matter of “opening up the black box” and identifying the
“cogs and wheels” that connect a cause C with its effect E.5 Less metaphorically, a state-
ment of a causal mechanism provides a detailed account of the connection that enables
C to generate E. Continuing with the earlier example, a mechanistic explanation of at-
tendance at outdoor sporting events identifies the components of the causal link between
inclement weather and attendance; for example, that the weather changes some individu-
als’ recreation preferences, or that the weather blocks some travel routes.
Appeal to mechanisms is especially appropriate for social explanation, for several rea-
sons. First, social scientists are reluctant to grant the status of a law to any empirical social
regularity. Those that are sometimes called “laws” — the “law” of demand in microeco-
nomics; Duverger’s “law” in political science — are at best what Jon Elster calls “weak
laws”: for any change in an explanatory variable, they permit us to predict the direction of
the change in the dependent variable, but not the magnitude of the change.6 Second, law-
based explanations do not permit us to discriminate between genuine causal connections
and spurious correlations. Relatedly, law-based explanations do not tell us the process by
which a set of causes generates its outcome. These last two are important because one of
the things in which political philosophers are interested is prescribing effective solutions
for averting or mitigating morally problematic outcomes. To give us a sense of which
5. The “black box” phrase comes from Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for
the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 2; the “cogs and wheels” phrase
comes from Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 3. For more detailed discussion of causal mechanisms and their role in social explanation, see the
essays in Peter Hedstro¨m and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social
Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
6. Elster, Explaining Social Behavior, 36. We should be careful here with respect to the law of demand;
for, contrary to this law, price increases can lead to increased consumption of some luxury goods — so-
called “Veblen” goods, after the economist Thorstein Veblen. See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the
Leisure Class (New York: Penguin Books, 1994) for his classic statement of the point.
18
interventions are likely to be effective, we must know how an outcome was generated; a
mechanistic story grants such insight.
I can now make my thesis more precise. Despite substantial attention to empirical in-
formation of all sorts — including causal information — global political theorists are often
inattentive to causal mechanisms; that is, they often fail to identify the salient components
of the causal process generating the outcome(s) of interest and specify these components’
interrelationships. This inattention vitiates their arguments. To help further distinguish
causal analysis from other types of empirical information, I use the next section to present
some examples of philosophers using different types of empirical information when they
should be engaging in causal analysis. Along the way, I show how such misuse of empiri-
cal information often leads philosophers astray.
2.2 Conventional Modes of Engagement: A Catalog
Philosophers typically treat social science as providing ready-made, “off-the-shelf” an-
swers to their empirical questions. This encourages the practice of simply citing the social
scientific results that support the empirical premises one wishes to employ. This type of
passive reliance is problematic. To begin with, it is bad practice. Not all social scientific
studies are equal in quality. Many have poorly specified or misinterpreted statistical mod-
els or specious formal models, which bias the results of the research.7 Citing biased results
vitiates an argument that presupposes the state of affairs portrayed by the biased results.
Moreover, a body of social scientific literature is not necessarily relevant to a particular
7. Two examples. Brambor, Clark, and Golder document the pervasive misspecification and misinterpre-
tation of interactive statistical models in the top political science journals; see Thomas Brambor, William
Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses,” Po-
litical Analysis 14 (2006): 63–82. Poast shows how using dyadic data to analyze multilateral events — the
dominant mode of statistical analysis in international relations scholarship — generates significantly biased
statistical estimates; see Paul Poast, “(Mis)Using Dyadic Data to Analyze Multilateral Events,” Political
Analysis 18, no. 4 (2010): 403–425.
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philosophical debate simply because the former addresses the broad topic dealt with in the
latter. There are two general pitfalls here. One is that the data used in the cited empirical
literature might be poor measures of the phenomena with which the normative literature
is concerned.8 The other is relying on an empirical literature that speaks to the effect
of some intervention on one type of outcome — for example, the effect of foreign aid on
economic growth — when the normative debate is concerned with that intervention’s effect
on another type of outcome — for example, the effect of foreign aid on poverty reduction.
Any argument that succumbs to either of these dangers is thereby discredited. Passive
reliance on social scientific results decreases the likelihood that philosophers are sensitive
to the relevance of the studies they cite.
More importantly for my purpose here, passive reliance perpetuates a division of labor
whereby causal analysis is left for social scientists so that philosophers can “attend to
the philosophical issues.” Maintaining this division makes it less likely that philosophers
will become attentive to causal explanations of the outcomes that concern them and more
likely to rely on other types of empirical information where causal analysis is needed. To
illustrate this danger, consider the following examples of misused empirical information.
2.2.1 Mere correlations
Mathias Risse is concerned to defend an account of our “duty to increase the level
of prosperity of the global poor.”9 Risse claims that “it will be an empirical question of
how actually to discharge that duty and any answer to this question must be informed
8. For example, Sanjay G. Reddy and Thomas W. Pogge, “How Not to Count the Poor,” in Debates on the
Measurement of Global Poverty, ed. Sudhir Anand, Paul Segal, and Joseph Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009) criticize extant measures of poverty for failing to adequately capture certain normatively
salient features of poverty. For rebuttal, see Martin Ravallion, “How Not to Count the Poor? A Reply to
Reddy and Pogge,” in Anand, Segal, and Stiglitz, Global Poverty.
9. Mathias Risse, “What We Owe to the Global Poor,” The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 81–117, at 96; cf.
ibid., 89.
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by our understanding of the sources of prosperity.”10 So far, so good. But the empirical
literature on which Risse relies to make his case is concerned with “what makes countries
do well.”11 The problem this poses comes out clearly in the following reconstruction of
Risse’s argument.
1. We have a duty of assistance to increase individual prosperity.
2. The practical content of this duty is given by our understanding of the determinants
of prosperity.
3. Domestic institutional quality is the key to increased country prosperity.12
4. Therefore, our duty of assistance involves providing aid to improve the quality of
domestic institutions (where possible).
Put this way, the argument is clearly invalid; it only goes through if the italicized terms
match. We can make the argument valid if we add a premise (one which Risse never
acknowledges).
1. We have a duty of assistance to increase individual prosperity.
2. The practical content of this duty is given by our understanding of the determinants
of prosperity.
3. Domestic institutional quality is the key to increased country prosperity.
(∗) Increases in country prosperity cause increases in individual prosperity.
4. Therefore, our duty of assistance involves providing aid to improve the quality of
domestic institutions (where possible).
The argument is now valid. But (∗) is not obviously true. Although there is some evidence
that poverty reduction is correlated with economic growth, this is by no means a settled
question.13 Nor is it sufficient to show a mere correlation between poverty reduction and
10. Risse, “What We Owe,” 89.
11. Ibid., 84, note 5, emphasis added.
12. On this point, Risse appeals primarily to Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi,
“Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,”
Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2004): 131–165. Rodrik et al’s dependent variable is country income per
capita.
13. For evidence to support a correlation between economic growth and poverty reduction, see David Dol-
lar and Aart Kraay, “Growth is Good for the Poor,” Journal of Economic Growth 7 (2002): 195–225; for
evidence to the contrary, see Martin Ravallion, “Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Looking Beyond Aver-
ages,” World Development 29, no. 11 (2001): 1803–1815.
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aggregate growth. Whether economic growth leads to poverty reduction depends on the
causal foundations of the growth — for example, the sectoral composition of the econ-
omy and the number of people employed in growing sectors; the extent to which growth
generates demand for skilled labor and, hence, stimulates investment in human capital.
In particular, whether aggregate growth reduces poverty depends on how the gains from
growth are distributed, and the gains are not always distributed evenly.14
To illustrate the point, compare Botswana’s record with that of Indonesia. From 1986–
1993, Botswana averaged 8.9% aggregate growth and 5.8% per capita growth, while re-
ducing the percentage of its population living on less than $1.25/day from 36% to 31%. In
contrast, during roughly the same time period, Indonesia averaged 7.1% aggregate growth
and 5.3% per capita growth, while reducing the percentage of its population living on less
than $1.25/day from 63% to 43%.15 Clearly, poverty reduction depends on more than just
economic growth.
Risse’s argument is in trouble because it relies on a mere correlation rather than anal-
ysis of the relevant causal mechanisms. It is either invalid or it relies on a controversial
premise. If the empirical debate on (∗) comes down in his favor, fine. But, importantly,
this is insufficient to save his argument. In addition to needing to identify the causal
mechanisms linking aggregate growth with poverty reduction, Risse needs to identify the
causal mechanisms that generate strong domestic institutions, as well as those that link
domestic institutional quality with increased prosperity. The claim that we have a duty to
provide assistance to countries with weak domestic institutions hinges on the claim that
we are capable of helping countries strengthen their domestic institutions. Whether this is
so depends on the causal mechanisms underlying institutional development. More subtly,
14. World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (New York: World Bank /
Oxford University Press, 2001).
15. Data from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2009 update.
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whether we are able to help countries strengthen their domestic institutions in ways that
lead to increased prosperity depends on the mechanisms that link domestic institutional
quality to increased prosperity. Thus, despite initial appearances, Risse’s appeal to corre-
lations instead of causal explanations is inadequate to establish the desired conclusion.
2.2.2 Taxonomy
As an example of taxonomic information standing in where causal analysis is required,
consider a familiar dispute between statists — who claim that egalitarian duties of dis-
tributive justice are owed only to co-citizens — and cosmopolitans — who argue that such
duties extend beyond state borders. Some statists argue that equality arises as a distribu-
tive concern only among individuals who live under common institutions that coercively
enforce compliance or where compliance is otherwise nonvoluntary. Such institutions re-
quire special justification to those who are subject to them because requiring compliance
against an individual’s will violates her autonomy. Only egalitarian principles of distribu-
tive justice are able to meet this special burden of justification, since those who fare worst
under the shared institutional arrangements can reasonably reject nonegalitarian principles
as a basis for institutions with which they are required to comply. Since the state is con-
stituted by a coercive or otherwise nonvoluntary institutional apparatus, equality arises as
a distributive concern among co-citizens. Moreover, the state is unique in being consti-
tuted by a coercive or otherwise nonvoluntary institutional apparatus. Statists claim that
international institutions consist in voluntary associations for mutual benefit; those who
are unhappy with their fate under international institutions can opt out and look elsewhere
for a better deal.16
16. For an argument along these lines that emphasizes the uniquely coercive nature of the state, see Michael
Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 30, no. 3 (2001):
257–296; for an argument that the state is uniquely constituted by citizens’ joint authorship of a system of
rules, compliance with which is nonvoluntary, see Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philos-
ophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005): 113–147. See Andrea Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and
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A common cosmopolitan response to this argument is to marshal empirical information
to show that international institutions are also coercive or nonvoluntary in the ways that re-
quire egalitarian principles of justice. The argument runs the same as above. International
institutions are coercively imposed or compliance with the rules is otherwise nonvoluntary;
coercive or otherwise nonvoluntary institutions must meet a stringent standard of justifi-
cation, namely, that the principles that regulate the constitution of such institutions not be
reasonably rejected by those who are subject to the institutions; the global poor can rea-
sonably reject principles that leave them relatively deprived vis-a`-vis the global rich; thus,
the constitution of international institutions must be regulated by egalitarian principles.17
Suppose we grant the cosmopolitan’s classification scheme: domestic and international
institutions are similarly coercive or otherwise nonvoluntary in the relevant ways. Without
showing how domestic and international institutions figure into causal accounts of eco-
nomic and political development, this taxonomic information is insufficient to license the
cosmopolitan’s conclusion. Suppose domestic institutions mediate the developmental ef-
fect of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization. More specifically,
suppose countries with strong domestic institutions — institutions that constrain state lead-
ers to be responsive to citizens’ demands for economic growth — are able to capture the
developmental gains from international trade facilitated by WTO rules, whereas countries
with weak institutions fail to benefit or are even harmed by WTO rules.18 The following
two mechanisms can plausibly explain this variation. First, strong institutions constrain
leaders to provide good trade policy, whereas weak institutions permit leaders to imple-
ment trade policies that enable a small elite to capture rents from trade but do not benefit
the State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no. 1 (2007): 3–39 for a discussion of these “coercion-based”
arguments and an alternative, “reciprocity-based” argument for statism.
17. See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pt. 3; Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, chs.
2 and 3; Pogge, Realizing Rawls, ch. 6.
18. The statistical evidence adduced by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, “Institutions Rule” suggests
such a story.
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citizens in general. The other is that strong institutions constrain leaders to invest in eco-
nomic sectors that are able to benefit from WTO rules, whereas weak institutions permit
leaders to fail to invest at all or to invest in sectors that may benefit a small elite despite
being unable to benefit from WTO rules. If such mechanisms were in operation, then
underdevelopment occurs not because poor states are unable to extract enough resources
from rich states, but because poor states’ institutions grant leaders discretionary control
over the flow of resources into the country and permit them to use these resources without
regard for citizens’ interests. If this causal analysis were true (I have made no claim that it
is), what would be the effect of, for example, increasing poor states’ bargaining leverage
vis-a`-vis rich states in negotiating WTO rules?19 Without fundamentally altering domes-
tic institutions, restructuring international institutions in this way would permit the leaders
of poor states to control a greater share of global resources without having much of an
effect on global inequality. Indeed, holding domestic institutional quality fixed, making
international institutions more egalitarian could exacerbate underdevelopment rather than
mitigate it.
It might be the case that domestic institutions are profoundly shaped by international
institutions.20 At the limit, we might find that international institutions determine domestic
institutional quality and that more egalitarian international institutions produce stronger
domestic institutions that hold state leaders more accountable. Under these conditions, the
developmental effect of international institutions is such that we would be inclined to say
that egalitarian principles apply to international institutions in the first instance, since this
subsequently determines whether domestic institutions bring about outcomes that satisfy
19. See Moellendorf, “World Trade Organization” for such a proposal.
20. As Pogge has so frequently argued; see, e.g., Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. Joshua Cohen
is skeptical about the truth of this claim, as am I; see Joshua Cohen, “Philosophy, Social Science, Global
Poverty,” in Thomas Pogge and His Critics, ed. Alison M. Jaggar (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010). David
Miller is skeptical about its relevance for allocating responsibility for global poverty; see David Miller,
National Responsibility and Global Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 240.
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egalitarian principles.
My point here is not to adjudicate this dispute between statists and cosmopolitans; nor
do I wish to defend any particular causal story at this point. (I stake my claim in chapter
5.) Instead, my point is that simple taxonomic information is insufficient to demonstrate
whether egalitarian principles properly constrain the design of either domestic or interna-
tional institutions. To draw out the institutional implications of our commitment to the
moral equality of individuals, we must analyze the causal consequences of different insti-
tutional arrangements.
2.2.3 Crude causal information
Perhaps the most telling case for my argument is one where the argument appeals to
causal information but neglects to conduct causal analysis. Thomas Pogge’s argument
that the international resource privilege harms the global poor is just such a case.21 The
story he wants to tell is straightforwardly causal. The resource privilege grants the power
to effect legally valid resource transfers to any person or group holding a monopoly of
effective force in a territory. This privilege generates incentives to acquire and wield
power violently. It generates a stream of revenue for oppressive dictators, who can use
that revenue to buy guns and political support to keep themselves in power, even against
widespread opposition. Even well-intentioned reformist rulers, if they want to stay in of-
fice, are compelled to divert resource revenue to the private fortunes of the political elite
or to keeping potential rebels at bay. This incentive structure is supposed to explain the
widely-noted negative correlation between aggregate economic growth and high levels of
resource wealth (as a percentage of GDP). According to Pogge, the resource privilege
partly explains this so-called “economic resource curse” and its associated deprivation.
21. The most cogent formulation — the one recounted here — is found in Pogge, World Poverty and Hu-
man Rights, 113–114, 163–165. I say more about Pogge’s discussion of the resource privilege in chapter
6.
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Exactly how the resource privilege explains the resource curse is never made clear by
Pogge. This is because, despite employing causal claims throughout, Pogge’s argument
fails to specify the operative causal mechanisms at crucial points of the argument. As far
as I can tell, the argument goes something like this.
1. The economic resource curse: Resource abundance causes low (or negative) aggre-
gate economic growth rates.
2. Resource abundance encourages civil conflict and authoritarian rule — resource rents
constitute a big prize for anyone who can gain control of the state apparatus and the
revenue stream enables dictators to buy enough guns and political support to put
down leadership challenges.22
3. The international resource privilege explains the effect of resource abundance on
the incidence of civil conflict and authoritarian rule — the resource privilege incen-
tivizes violent acquisition of power and enables authoritarians to use force to con-
solidate their rule.
4. Resource-induced civil conflict and authoritarian rule reduce aggregate economic
growth.
5. Therefore, from 3 and 4, the resource privilege explains the economic resource
curse.
The argument’s failure to identify specific causal mechanisms in 1 and 4 is problematic,
not least because Pogge’s insistence that the resource privilege harms the poor is based on
his claim that the resource privilege causes the deprivation associated with the economic
resource curse.23 There are causal explanations of the relevant phenomena on offer.24 But
Pogge never concerns himself with sketching, or even citing an account of the operative
causal mechanisms. Such an account is what Pogge needs to infer 5 from 1–4. Whether
22. As evidence, Pogge cites Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Ox-
ford Economic Papers 50 (1998): 563–573; Michael L. Ross et al., “Does Resource Wealth Cause Au-
thoritarian Rule?” (University of California, Los Angeles, unpublished manuscript, 2000); Ricky Lam
and Leonard Wantchekon, “Political Dutch Disease” (Yale University, unpublished manuscript, 2002); and
Leonard Wantchekon, “Why do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?” Journal
of African Finance and Economic Development 5, no. 2 (2002): 57–77.
23. There’s another problem with the argument, viz., that 3 is entirely speculative. As Joshua Cohen notes,
for 3, and thus 5 to hold, it must be true that domestic institutional quality is sufficiently sensitive to changes
in the relevant global rules (the resource privilege in this case) (see Cohen, “Philosophy, Social Science, and
Global Poverty”). Pogge offers no evidence to support this. Pace Pogge, there is good reason to think that
changes to the resource privilege would not break the resource curse. I discuss this at length in chapter 6.
24. See the discussion in chapter 5.
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and how economic stagnation is causally linked to resource wealth and resource-induced
civil conflict and authoritarian rule matters for whether the resource privilege — and those
of us who are alleged to uphold it — is responsible for generating the severe poverty Pogge
wants to attribute to it.25 For 5 to follow from 1–4, the causal logic that links resource
wealth with civil conflict and authoritarianism must be of a piece with the causal logic
that links resource wealth with reduced economic growth. This is certainly not satisfied if
the two causal stories are incompatible, but neither is it satisfied if we merely show that
the two causal stories are consistent. To wit, the “lucrative prize and money-for-guns”
mechanism that Pogge uses to link resources with civil conflict and authoritarianism is
consistent with at least three causal stories linking resources with reduced growth, only
the third of which could plausibly connect the resource privilege to the resource curse.26
• Resource exports could increase demand for a country’s currency, causing its foreign
exchange rate to rise, thereby making its other exports uncompetitive and diminish-
ing economic diversification, which is important for growth (the so-called “Dutch
Disease”).27
• Resource dependent economies might suffer from volatile commodity prices. Dur-
ing boom times, high prices facilitate government spending on expensive “white
elephant projects,” which prove politically difficult to cut during subsequent busts.
As a result, spending cuts most often target politically vulnerable projects, which
results in underinvestment in development.
• Resource revenue might facilitate clientelism. Rather than attract political support
by providing the public goods that foster economic development, political leaders
can use resource revenues to provide key civilian leaders with private goods in ex-
change for political support, thereby diminishing investment in productive activity.
To substantiate Pogge’s claim that the resource privilege causes the deprivation associated
25. Of course, even if the resource privilege is not responsible for generating severe poverty, it might still
be the case that those of us who uphold the resource privilege harm others by incentivizing civil conflict and
authoritarian rule, both of which constitute harms. But concluding this requires getting a firm grip on the
causes of the resource curse.
26. For an accessible overview of the following mechanisms, see Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, Escap-
ing the Resource Curse, ch. 1.
27. Pogge often uses “Dutch Disease” and “resource curse” interchangeably, suggesting a failure to under-
stand that Dutch Disease is but one potential explanation for the correlation between low economic growth
and resource wealth. If Dutch Disease were the right explanation, it would be hard to see how the resource
privilege is responsible for the curse.
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with the resource curse, what we need is an explanation that incorporates both stories as
part of a single, coherent, unified causal analysis. But Pogge has yet to meet that burden.
Until he does, Pogge’s argument gives us little reason to accept his claim that the resource
privilege harms the poor.
The point of the foregoing survey is to catalog the different ways in which global po-
litical theorists typically incorporate empirical information and distinguish these typical
(mis)uses from genuine causal analysis. The discussion in each case has also shown that
philosophical arguments often go awry as a result of employing these different sorts of
empirical information when causal analysis is required. But there remains the question of
when philosophers are required to engage causal analyses. Political philosophers carry out
multifarious tasks and it might be intuitively plausible that attention to causal mechanisms
is important for only a subset of those tasks. The aim of the next section is to deny this
claim.
2.3 When Is Causal Analysis Required?
For my purposes here, we can group the tasks undertaken by political philosophers un-
der three general headings. Normative political philosophy concerns itself with questions
about how our social world should be arranged. This includes: examining fundamental
political principles and employing these principles to normatively evaluate social states of
affairs; allocating moral responsibility for outcomes among political agents; and discern-
ing the nature and stringency of the rights and duties agents have. Applied political philos-
ophy concerns itself with investigating the concrete practical implications of our normative
judgments. Thus construed, applied philosophy has a problem-solving impetus. This in-
cludes elucidating the practical content of our duties, as well as proposing measures to
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resolve, avert, or mitigate morally problematic states of affairs. Finally, conceptual politi-
cal philosophy concerns itself with analyzing and explicating key political concepts, such
as autonomy, equality, representation, and self-determination. The question in this section
is whether at least some arguments of each type require attention to causal mechanisms.
Notice that I am not here asking whether all particular arguments must attend to causal
mechanisms. Nor am I asking whether there are only certain broad topics that require such
attention. There is no general answer that can be given a priori to these questions. Whether
an argument should attend to causal mechanisms depends on the particular claims it makes.
In light of the survey in the last section, I would conjecture that philosophers should engage
in causal analysis more often than not, and certainly more often than they currently do.
In this section, I provide additional reasons for thinking that causal analysis should play
a central role in political philosophical arguments by presenting another series of case
studies. Whereas the survey in the last section was organized by type of information
misuse, the following survey is organized by type of philosophical claim. Whereas my
aim in the last section was to show how different types of empirical information cannot
safely substitute for causal analysis, my aim in this section is to show that there is no
general type of argument that can safely ignore causal mechanisms.
2.3.1 Normative political philosophy
Normative political philosophy primarily concerns itself with adjudicating among po-
litical principles and using these principles to assess our social world. Plausibly, many
normative claims need not attend to causal mechanisms — whether individuals or col-
lectives should be taken as the fundamental units of moral concern; whether individu-
als should be treated with equal respect; whether moral principles apply universally or
are context-relative. Yet, normative political philosophy is not wholly unconstrained by
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causal considerations. At the very least, whether we ought to pursue some moral objective
M — for example, a distribution of goods according to our favored distributive principle,
or the protection of some set of rights — at least depends on whether we can, in principle,
realize M.28 And whether M is in principle realizable requires knowing something about
how agents like us might realize M in a world like ours. Moreover, assessing the desir-
ability of M requires understanding whether realizing M enhances or detracts from our
capacity to realize other important goals. For example, if the realization of global equal-
ity of opportunity requires the establishment of a world government and the latter would
entail unacceptable costs (moral or otherwise), then we would be inclined to reconsider
the desirability of global equality of opportunity as an action-guiding moral aim. Finally,
determining who has which duties to whom will depend to some extent on causal con-
siderations. Whether A can be justifiably morally condemned for harming B depends on
how A’s conduct is causally related to B’s suffering. Whether A can be justifiably obliged
to alleviate B’s suffering depends on A’s causal relationship to B’s suffering, as well as
both A’s absolute capacity to alleviate B’s suffering — whether A can cause the reduction
of B’s suffering — and A’s capacity to alleviate B’s suffering relative to C’s capacity to do
so — whether A is better positioned than C to cause the reduction of B’s suffering. (To
illustrate this last point, we might find that a dictator is morally condemnable for causing
his citizens’ suffering and capable of alleviating their suffering, but his unwillingness to
do the latter might entail that those who are capable of doing so have a duty to aid the
28. Note that this is not a point about feasibility; it is more general in the following way. Let φ denote,
e.g., bring about global equality of opportunity. If moral theory says we ought to φ , φ -ing can fail to be
feasible at present without invalidating the judgment that we ought to φ ; if φ is presently infeasible, the
judgment implies that we should take steps to overcome the practical barriers to φ -ing. However, if φ -ing
were in principle impossible for some reason, that fact would violate the “ought implies can” principle and
invalidate the judgment that we ought to φ . Of course, how we distinguish between what is ruled out in
principle and what is merely infeasible depends on which features of the actual world we take as parametric.
I am inclined to stay “close to the ground” in the sense of taking a greater number of, e.g., individuals’
cognitive, rational, motivational, and moral limitations as parametric than some (perhaps most famously,
Rawls). This is a complex issue; I discuss it in some detail in appendix B.
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suffering citizens.) All this suggests that at least some normative claims must be attentive
to causal mechanisms.
To illustrate my point here more fully, consider again the global equality of opportu-
nity example. As Simon Caney construes it, global equality of opportunity (GEO) requires
that “persons (of equal ability and motivation) have equal opportunities to attain an equal
number of positions of a commensurate standard of living.”29 Caney argues that our com-
mitment to equality of opportunity is grounded on the conviction that it is unfair if the
opportunities available to individuals are determined by morally arbitrary characteristics,
characteristics that should not be taken as reasons to treat individuals differently. Paradigm
examples here include social class or ethnicity. But national or civic identity are morally
arbitrary in the same way that class or ethnicity are morally arbitrary. Thus, if it is unfair
for individuals’ opportunities to be determined by class or ethnicity, it is also unfair for
their opportunities to be determined by national or civic identity. This implies that GEO is
a global principle of distributive justice.
Whether we should take GEO (among other principles30) to govern the constitution of
international institutions surely depends on the institutional implications of adopting such
a principle as regulative.31 For a full assessment of GEO, we need to know (at least) which
institutional mechanisms are required to realize GEO and the effect that such institutions
would likely have on other important values, such as autonomy or self-determination.
If the institutional mechanisms required to realize GEO unduly limit or undermine our
29. Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities,” Metaphilosophy 32, nos. 1/2
(2001): 113–134, at 120. It’s important that the principle is put in terms of standard of living rather than
the value individuals place on the opportunities. This formulation enables Caney to avoid straightforward
versions of the objection that there is no cross-cultural way to assign value to opportunities; thus, GEO is
not an attainable objective (see Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 62–68). Other defences
of a global equality of opportunity include Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice; Thomas W. Pogge, “An
Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 23, no. 3 (1994): 195–224.
30. See Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, ch. 3, sec. 6.
31. Institution I is “implied” by a principle P when I is (causally) necessary to bring about realization of
the outcome or procedure mandated by P.
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capacity to pursue other objectives, then the desirability of GEO as a regulative principle
is diminished.
Caney’s positive cosmopolitan institutional proposal can be summarized by the fol-
lowing recommendations.32
• Democratically-elected global and regional bodies that exercise authority over states
(e.g., an elected assembly at the United Nations).
• Democratization of the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund,
and World Bank.
• Creation of a new global economic institution to coordinate existing economic insti-
tutions such as the IMF and World Bank and insure that these organizations adhere
to cosmopolitan principles. (Presumably, this new institution should be composed
of elected officials, although Caney does not say.)
• A permanent UN volunteer military force to facilitate swift military response to
humanitarian crimes within states.
• Expanding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice beyond interstate
disputes, as well as making its jurisdiction mandatory.
Why should we adopt such an institutional framework? Caney claims that global institu-
tions employ four types of mechanisms to realize cosmopolitan objectives, GEO in partic-
ular.33
1. Global institutions “enable agents to act on their just intentions” by solving col-
lective action problems, allocating responsibilities, and resolving jurisdictional dis-
putes.34
2. Global institutions thwart agents’ attempts to realize their unjust intentions by en-
forcing compliance with cosmopolitan principles and allocating duties on a fair ba-
sis.
3. Global institutions “empower vulnerable actors to protect their fundamental inter-
ests” by establishing enforcement mechanisms that they can use to hold powerful
actors accountable.35
4. Global institutions “transform actors’ intentions” by creating a common framework
of rules and thereby “socializing” global agents.36
32. See Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 161–162. For further details, see Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan
Justice and Institutional Design: An Egalitarian Liberal Conception of Global Governance,” Social Theory
and Practice 32, no. 4 (2006): sec. 2.
33. See ibid., sec. 3.
34. Ibid., 742, emphasis added.
35. Ibid., 742.
36. Ibid., 743.
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Despite initial appearances, Caney eschews creation of a world state. Instead, he advo-
cates an institutional scheme wherein the political units hold neither supreme nor compre-
hensive authority; no political unit holds final authority over any issue within a territory
and no unit holds authority over all issues relevant to a territory.37
How we should assess a commitment to GEO in light of this institutional proposal?
Caney’s discussion here — although more attentive to causal considerations than most — is
too general to facilitate further assessment. He never really considers the institutional
mechanisms required to enable global institutions to operate as he speculates they would.
The most basic questions concern the organization of (coercive) power. To have the de-
sired effects — to enable global institutions to solve collective action problems, enforce
compliance, or transform agents’ preferences — must (coercive) power be centralized at
the global level, or can it remain decentralized? Must global institutions have mandatory
jurisdiction, or is voluntary cooperation between states sufficient?
We can pose the problem as a dilemma. Consider Caney’s second rationale for es-
tablishing a cosmopolitan institutional order — to enforce compliance. Either centralized
authority is practically required to insure compliance with cosmopolitan principles or it
is not. If it is, then Caney is advocating something closer to a world state than he admits
and his proposal encounters familiar objections. Indeed, his proposal to establish a perma-
nent global military force to police humanitarian crimes is evidence that he acknowledges
some practical pressure to centralize rather than disperse law enforcement authority in the
face of coordination problems and jurisdictional disputes. Sovereign states face severe
coordination and jurisdictional problems when it comes to policing human rights; Caney’s
preferred way to overcome these problems is to establish a global agency with supreme
37. Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 163; see ibid., 149–150 for Caney’s discussion of supremacy and
comprehensiveness.
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authority to address humanitarian crimes.38
If centralized authority is not practically required to ensure compliance — there is some
evidence that it is not, at least on some issues39 — then the need to secure compliance no
longer provides a reason to create global political agencies that reside “above the state,”
vested with enforcement authority. Voluntary cooperation among sovereign states should
suffice. In fact, Caney’s discussion of compliance concedes this. When discussing avail-
able enforcement mechanisms, Caney points to the ability of international organizations
to require compliance with certain rules as a condition for membership; this enables or-
ganizations to exchange membership benefits for compliance. Caney further appeals to
Chayes and Chayes’ “managerial” model of international cooperation, which argues that
non-compliance should be viewed as a management problem rather than an enforcement
problem. On this model, states are assumed to have a propensity to comply; compliance
problems can hence be adequately handled by establishing dispute resolution procedures,
improving states’ capacity to comply through technical and financial assistance, and in-
creasing the determinacy of treaty requirements.40 Suppose the managerial model is ac-
curate.41 Then there is no need to establish authoritative suprastate institutions; voluntary
38. For objections to a world state, see Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, in Practical Philosophy,
ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 311–352; John Rawls, The
Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) provides a contemporary example. Notice
that the objection that a world state would be tyrannical does not require that it hold supreme authority in
all issue areas, only that it hold supreme authority over the legitimate use of force; presumably the latter is
required to effectively insure compliance with law. But see Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice, ch.
6 for a defence against the objection that a world state would be tyrannical.
39. See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International
Institutions,” International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 761–799, as well as other essays in the same
journal issue.
40. Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993):
175–205.
41. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom persuasively argue that when we observe high treaty compliance rates
in the absence of coercive enforcement mechanisms, this is because the treaty does not require states to
deviate much from what they would have done in the absence of the treaty. In short, high compliance
indicates relatively shallow levels of cooperation. When deep cooperation is required — when the gains
from defection are high — coercive enforcement mechanisms must be established to secure compliance. See
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good
News about Cooperation?” International Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 379–406.
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cooperation among states is sufficient to handle management problems.
(Notice that we can press similar dilemmas with respect to Caney’s first and third
mechanisms. Either centralized authority is required to overcome collective action prob-
lems or reliably check powerful states, or it is not. If it is, Caney advocates something
close a world state, which diminishes his proposal’s appeal. If it is not, then overcoming
collective action problems or checking states’ power no longer provide reasons to establish
a cosmopolitan institutional order.)
Let’s return to the central point of this section: at least some arguments for norma-
tive claims must attend to causal mechanisms. To illustrate this point, I have shown that
a prominent argument for adopting global equality of opportunity as a principle of dis-
tributive justice is incomplete because it fails to consider the institutional implications of a
commitment to GEO. This is important because our judgments about the desirability of the
institutions implied by a commitment to GEO inform our judgments about the desirability
of endorsing GEO as a regulative principle. In examining Caney’s positive institutional
proposal, I have not argued that we should reject GEO as a regulative principle. Instead,
I have shown that Caney’s case for a cosmopolitan institutional scheme — which is pre-
sumably motivated by a desire to realize outcomes that conform to GEO, among other
principles — neglects important tensions in his own thought because he fails to undertake
a causal analysis of the institutional mechanisms on which his case relies. Were he to do
so, he might find the appeal of his own institutional proposal diminished, thereby weaken-
ing his case for adopting GEO as a principle of distributive justice.
As an important sidepoint, note that my argument here shows that causal analysis
is important not only for nonideal theory — that is, theorizing about what to do under
conditions of persistent injustice — but also for ideal theory.42 Caney is definitely doing
42. I discuss the ideal-nonideal theory distinction at greater length in chapter 3.
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ideal theory; he means GEO to be among the regulative principles for a fully just global
institutional order. But, as the preceding shows, doing ideal theory does not free us from
having to undertake a full institutional analysis, which includes examining the operation
of the institutional mechanisms that would be in place under ideal conditions as well as
attempting to discern the effects ideal institutions would have (or would be likely to have)
under the conditions in which they are intended to operate.
2.3.2 Applied political philosophy
Applied political philosophy concerns itself with the concrete practical implications
of our normative political principles, to “put these principles to work in the world,” so to
speak. Applied prescriptions aim to tell us which courses of action we have most reason
to take in light of our normative judgments about actual states of affairs and our reasoning
about how to address social problems. Accordingly, our reasoning about concrete prescrip-
tions is properly constrained by non-moral considerations, including feasibility, stability,
and efficiency considerations. Whether we have reason to undertake a particular course of
action or implement a particular policy or institutional reform will depend on the causal
consequences of that action, policy, or reform; in particular, whether the action, policy, or
reform in question is likely to actually bring about the state of affairs we seek to realize.
This suggests that attention to causal mechanisms is key for applied work.
To illustrate this point, consider Peter Singer’s work on global poverty.43 For nearly
40 years, Singer has argued that the residents of affluent developed countries have a moral
duty to direct a substantial portion of their income to global poverty relief and advocated
43. See, e.g., Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”; Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Global-
ization (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002); Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting
Now To End World Poverty (New York: Random House, 2009). Contrary to my thesis here, Singer expresses
skepticism regarding the extent to which social sciences like political economy and political sociology “of-
fer a relevant ‘body of knowledge’” for political philosophers (Peter Singer, “Achieving the Best Outcome:
Final Rejoinder,” Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 2 (2002): 127–128, at 127).
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humanitarian aid as an effective concrete means to discharging that duty. Singer’s argu-
ment is motivated by his oft-repeated “drowning child” thought experiment: You’re on
your way to an important meeting wearing a nice suit and shoes; you see a child drown-
ing in a shallow pond; the child’s life is vastly more important than your suit and shoes;
you ought to wade into the pond and save the child. A key feature of this scenario is that
we do not know how the child came to be drowning in the pond in the first place. Such
information might be unnecessary when determining what to do in this case because it is
immediately obvious that the way to save the child is to pull her out of the pond.44 But
global poverty is not nearly so easy to figure out. This is where the analogy to the drown-
ing child breaks down. The drowning child scenario is an isolated emergency; most cases
of severe deprivation are chronic. Isolated emergencies are relatively easy to solve: if
possible, remove the immediate threat.45 Chronic cases are embedded in complex causal
webs involving not only physical and geographical factors (as in the drowning child case),
but also important political, cultural, and economic factors that interact with each other in
complicated ways (unlike the drowning child case). Individual cases of severe deprivation
are thereby much more difficult to diagnose and solve. If we are to figure out who has
duties to relieve poverty, we need to know how people became impoverished. If we are to
determine the content of such duties, again, it matters how people became impoverished.
This is why causal analysis is key, but Singer offers us no such analysis. Without a diag-
nosis, we cannot know whether Singer’s prescribed solution intervenes at the right place
44. But maybe not. What if the child’s trip into the pond resulted in a neck injury? Then we would want to
exercise appropriate caution instead of simply yanking the child from the pond. The point here is that, even
in Singer’s toy example, the specifics about what to do are not as obvious as Singer implies.
45. As Jennifer Rubenstein notes, emergencies often have identifiable “event-like” features, meaning that
emergencies are often precipitated by shocks, be they environmental (e.g., an earthquake or flood), economic
(e.g., the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis), physical (e.g., armed conflict), or political (e.g., a coup). See Jen-
nifer Rubenstein, “Distribution and Emergency,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 15, no. 3 (2007): 296–
320. This definition doesn’t deny that the shocks themselves might have long, complicated causal stories;
it simply states that shocks are the proximate causes of emergency outcomes. In light of this, the claim
“remove the immediate threat” amounts to saying “mitigate the consequences of the identifiable shock”.
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in the causal process (if at all), whether it exacerbates poverty, or whether it generates new
problems altogether.46
Relatedly, Singer never really engages the debate about the efficacy of humanitarian
aid programs as a means to relieving global poverty.47 His general answer to the efficacy
question is two-fold. First, if there are more effective means than humanitarian aid, then
we should participate in those too; the more general conclusion is that affluent people
should be making significant sacrifices to relieve global poverty. But, second, there is no
intuitively plausible reason to think that humanitarian aid is ineffective (even if not the
most effective) for relieving poverty, so (other things equal) we should be giving to hu-
manitarian organizations.48 Singer does posit that humanitarian aid is ineffective because
the allocation of official aid dollars is dominated by irrelevant political considerations.49
He then claims that if aid dollars were allocated according to the morally relevant criteria,
aid would be effective. Rather than give up on humanitarian aid, we should reform aid
allocation to make aid more effective. But Singer overlooks numerous reasons why his
proposal might not work and so ignores the evidence either way. One prominent reason
is that current official aid practices might actually be effective at achieving their primary
aim, which is not to relieve poverty but to advance participants’ strategic interests.50 If
46. Nevermind the fact that Singer’s analogy ignores the thorny issues regarding the victims’ role in bring-
ing about their impoverished conditions. As Dale Jamieson notes, many of the victims of the Ethiopian
famine of 1983–1985 were involved in a civil war, and many of the Hutus dying in refugee camps in the
Eastern Congo in the mid-90s participated in the 1994 genocide of Rwandan Tutsis. See Dale Jamieson,
“Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World,” Journal of Ethics 9
(2005): 151–170, at 156. The point is not that we should leave those responsible for bringing about their
suffering to their fate, but that we may be unwittingly (and perhaps unjustifiably) taking sides in a much
larger issue if we fail to understand the causal process that generated the suffering.
47. For an accessible introduction to the relevant issues, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Eco-
nomic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin, 2005) on the pro-aid side and William Easterly, The
White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York:
Penguin, 2006) on the critical side.
48. This reply is expressed most clearly in Singer’s later work. See, esp., Peter Singer, “Poverty, Facts, and
Political Philosophies: A Reply to ‘More Than Charity’,” Ethics and International Affairs 16, no. 2 (2002):
121–124; Singer, “Achieving the Best Outcome.”
49. Singer, One World, ch. 5.
50. Cf. Jamieson, “Duties to the Distant,” 161. For a model of aid-for-policy transactions that supports
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aid was never meant to relieve poverty in the first place, there will be little incentive to
reform the system to insure that it does so more effectively. The general problem here is
that Singer prescribes an intervention without doing due diligence on the efficacy question,
which requires rigorous analysis of the causal effects of foreign aid as well as the ways in
which aid causally interacts with successful development trajectories.
The main lesson is this: we generally require doctors to offer a diagnosis of the problem
and assess the efficacy of the prescribed intervention before we place any confidence in
their prescriptions. Insofar as they are keen to prescribe solutions to moral problems, we
should require as much from applied political philosophers too.
2.3.3 Conceptual political philosophy
Conceptual political philosophy specifies the content of political concepts, such as
equality, representation, and self-determination; it also specifies the rules for determining
which objects fall into the concept’s extension. Sometimes this conceptual work is done
for its own sake; often, it is interwoven with and undertaken in service of normative or
applied objectives. In any case, this conceptual work aims to help us “get a grip” on the
social world. Concepts constitute the framework within which we think and talk about the
world. Conceptual political philosophy thus aims to construct a framework that facilitates
our attempts to understand the world. So conceived, we seek a tight connection between
our concepts and the world so as to improve our grasp of the latter; we want our concepts to
“carve the world at its joints,” so to speak. This suggests that our examination of political
concepts would do well to attend to the causal structure of the social world, to be sensitive
to the ways in which the things in the world to which our concepts refer are causally related
to other things in the world.
this conclusion, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 (2007): 251–284; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “A
Political Economy of Aid,” International Organization 63, no. 2 (2009): 309–340.
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Consider David Miller’s examination of the concept of national responsibility.51 Miller
argues that developed countries and their residents are not required as a matter of global
justice to relieve poverty abroad when responsibility for the poverty falls to a subgroup in
society or to the society as a whole. Thus, national responsibility is key for his argument.
On Miller’s view, a group G is collectively outcome responsible for a state of affairs
S if the gains or losses associated with S properly accrue to a sufficient proportion of the
members of G.52 An individual I shares in G’s outcome responsibility under one of two
conditions. In the like-minded group model, I shares in G’s outcome responsibility for S
insofar as I provides support for a collective activity that leads to S. I need not causally
contribute directly to S; for example, I need not lob a hand grenade to share in G’s outcome
responsibility for the razing of a village. I need not even be present at the village. All that
is required is that the members of G “share aims and outlooks. . . [and] recognize their
like-mindedness”; further, “individual members act. . . in the light of the support they are
receiving from other members of the group.”53 Importantly, I can provide such support by
merely participating in the community, even if I opposes the actions.54
In the collective practice model, I shares in G’s outcome responsibility for S if I ben-
efits from a cooperative practice that results in S and that practice treats I fairly. This will
be true when, for example, I is given a fair chance to influence the rules governing the
practice or to shape G’s decision with respect to the action that led to S.
How can I can avoid sharing in G’s outcome responsibility for S? For Miller, I “must
take all reasonable steps to prevent the outcome occurring.”55 Here, “reasonable” is de-
termined by the expected harm of the outcome and I’s expected cost of dissenting. But
51. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice.
52. See ibid., 87 for further discussion of outcome responsibility.
53. Ibid., 117.
54. See ibid., 118.
55. Ibid., 121.
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what Miller makes clear is that mere abstention from the activity or practice in question or
simply voicing opposition — even voting against undertaking the action — is not sufficient
to avoid sharing in the group’s responsibility.
The final step of the analysis is to show that the concept of “collective responsibil-
ity” applies to nations. Miller defines a nation as a group whose members share a com-
mon identity and public culture, who recognize special obligations to fellow members,
who aspire to be self-determining, and for whom persistence of the group constitutes a
good. Nations can be said to act collectively in at least two senses. First, the group’s
practices and individual members’ conduct are expressions of their common identity and
culture; second, the political decisions will “embody to a greater or lesser extent the ar-
ticulated beliefs and attitudes of the nation in question.”56 To the extent that a nation is
self-determining — that is, not ruled by a colonizing power or by an authoritarian dicta-
tor — the nation can be said to exhibit features of the like-minded group model. But there
are some cases where the like-minded group model applies even if the nation is ruled by an
autocrat. This will be the case if an autocratic leader’s policies derive from beliefs and atti-
tudes that are aligned with the public culture at large. Under these circumstances, national
responsibility will be shared by individual members, even when they simply voice dissent.
To the extent that the individual members benefit from and are treated fairly by collective
decision-making procedures or distributive practices, the nation will exhibit features of the
cooperative practice model.
How can attention to causal mechanisms improve Miller’s analysis? Let’s focus on
Miller’s claim that passive forms of resistance such as abstention or casting a dissenting
vote are insufficient to absolve an individual I from sharing in a nation N’s collective
outcome responsibility for its underdevelopment. I expresses tacit consent to N’s de-
56. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 126.
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velopment policy when I fails to take “all reasonable steps” to avert underdevelopment.
Whether we should accept this claim must surely depend on I’s capacity to influence N’s
development policy by taking “all reasonable steps” (beyond mere dissent) to prevent un-
derdevelopment.
One way to put this is in game theoretic terms. Suppose I receives a payoff of U
from the status quo policy, which leads to underdevelopment, and a payoff of D from an
alternate policy that leads to successful development, with U < D. Suppose further that I
incurs a cost C > 0 from actively opposing the status quo policy, which will be effective
with some probability p. Under these conditions, I will only undertake action to oppose
N’s policy if she expects to receive a net payoff from opposing the status quo that is at
least as much as the net payoff she expects from not opposing the status quo. In symbols,
I opposes the status quo if
pD+(1− p)U−C ≥U,
which simplifies to
D− 1
p
C ≥U. (2.1)
From (2.1), we see that the likelihood that I actively opposes the status quo policy de-
pends on the probability that I’s opposition will successfully influence policy in a positive
direction and I’s cost for undertaking such action. Holding D and U fixed, we see that I
becomes less likely to actively oppose the status quo as p decreases or C increases.
The foregoing shows that I’s failure to actively resist N’s status quo policy need not
imply consent of any kind to the policy, tacit or otherwise. Instead, under these condi-
tions, we might more accurately interpret I’s failure to resist as resignation to her lack of
capacity to influence policy. To the extent that renouncing communal norms is costly to
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I — for example, because I is relegated to the margins of the community — I’s continuing
participation in the community will be a rational response to her circumstances despite
her (potentially vehement) disagreement. This complicates the claim that I can be held
responsible for underdevelopment if the relevant policy was chosen on the basis of beliefs
and attitudes aligned with “the public culture.” I might prefer to alter the public culture
with which the policy is aligned but recognizes her own incapacity to do so. Moreover,
such incapacity might be sustained by collective action problems. Suppose it is true that
the number of people who are opposed to the status quo policy or the public culture is suf-
ficient to change the policy or culture through concerted collective action. Nevertheless,
dissidents might not be able to come together to effect the desired changes because they
are not aware that there are a sufficient number of dissidents in their midst,57 or even if
everyone knows that a sufficient number of dissidents exist, incentives might be structured
so as to generate a free rider problem.
Many of the conditions under which individuals will be tempted to resign themselves
to their deprived circumstances hold in underdeveloped countries. The global poor are
typically unable to hold their political leaders to account, electorally or otherwise, and the
government’s capacity to suppress dissent makes it costly to oppose government policy.
As a result, many of the global poor are often observed to passively accept their lot. If the
mechanism at work in the model more or less accurately depicts one of the mechanisms at
work in the actual world, then this passive acceptance should not necessarily be interpreted
as tacit consent, as Miller is inclined to do, but might signal resignation. Whether we can
properly allocate a share of collective outcome responsibility to the global poor for their
own deprivation depends in part on the mechanisms that explain their observed passivity
57. Kuran explores the phenomenon of “preference falsification,” where people publicly “falsify” their
genuine preferences because publicly revealing the latter is believed to be too costly. See Timur Kuran,
Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
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in the face of that deprivation.
Of course, the foregoing considerations are not sufficient to ground any particular
claims about an individual’s share of her nation’s collective responsibility for its under-
development, nor any claims about the global affluent’s (lack of) responsibility to under-
take actions to mitigate underdevelopment, for that matter. We sometimes do require that
individuals undertake risky actions against their own rational interest. We must also ask
whether the poor individual or the global rich are in a position to stimulate collective ac-
tion that could overturn the deleterious development policy, and whether the affluent are in
a position to help alter development outcomes. So simple game-theoretic reasoning is not
enough to show that the individual or the affluent avoid responsibility or condemnation.58
But it does show that Miller cannot straightforwardly reason from observed behavior to an
analysis of national responsibility, nor to attributions of individual responsibility.
The upshot here is that any specification of the concept of national responsibility must
be attentive to the bargaining dynamic from which group decisions arise and individual
members’ location in that dynamic vis-a`-vis the group’s power brokers. Failing to attend
to the structure of this dynamic means that our specification will be overly reliant on the
behavior we observe. But, as my simple model shows, observed behavior often belies im-
portant features of the situation. To determine whether I is properly held responsible for
N’s underdevelopment, we must know not only what I does under actual conditions, but
what I would do were conditions different. In game theoretic terms, we need to discern
what happens “off the equilibrium path,” not just the behavior we observe in equilibrium.
Such counterfactual reasoning is constitutive of causal analysis. Since causal mechanisms
are supposed to be general causal patterns that explain the causal link between initial con-
ditions and outcomes, engaging in causal analysis prompts us to attend to counterfactual
58. Thanks to Elizabeth Anderson for pressing this point.
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scenarios in search of causal mechanisms. It also enables us to make hypotheses about
counterfactual scenarios. I take both of these advantages to show how causal analysis can
enrich our specification of political concepts such as national responsibility.
2.4 Practical Implications
The general line I have been pushing is that analysis of social causal mechanisms is
crucial for a wide range of arguments in global political theory. Our moral analysis and
subsequent prescriptions are only as good as our understanding of the causal structure of
our social world. We need to understand both the causal process generating the outcomes
about which we are concerned and the causal consequences of potential remedies.
The preceding points are likely obvious to many when stated in the abstract. But
the foregoing surveys show that political philosophers run afoul of them often enough
to warrant explicitly highlighting the importance of causal analysis. Moreover, previous
discussions that have sought to motivate more effective interaction between philosophy
and the social sciences have located the problems elsewhere — for example, reliance on
insufficient data59 or appeals to the wrong kind of data.60 To be sure, data problems exist.
But effective incorporation of empirical information does not merely adduce enough of
the right kind of data. Ultimately, effective political philosophy relies on credible expla-
nations of the data. Compelling political philosophy must proceed from — be informed
and constrained by — compelling social scientific theorizing about causal mechanisms.
This is not to say that political philosophers should become full-time social scientists.
We divide the labor for a reason — there are gains to be had from specialization. Normative
and conceptual considerations have their rightful place and philosophers are well-placed to
59. Leif Wenar, “What We Owe to Distant Others,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 2, no. 3 (2003):
283–304.
60. Nicole Hassoun, “Making the Case for Foreign Aid,” Public Affairs Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2010): 1–20.
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give them their due. But morally evaluating states of affairs requires knowing something
about their causal antecedents; making effective prescriptions requires understanding the
causal logic of the situations we seek to redress. Such insight does not require that philos-
ophers produce novel explanations, but it does require analytically taking apart the causal
process and scrutinizing the role played by each of the moving parts, as well as their inter-
connections. Doing this with adequate rigor requires critically engaging social science on
its own terms.61
Several important methodological questions remain. Should a focus on causal mech-
anisms replace political philosophers’ traditional focus on normative issues? If not, how
should global political theorists integrate causal analysis with normative analysis? Where
does causal analysis fit in a coherent approach to morally progressive institutional design?
I address these questions in the next chapter.
61. I stress “on its own terms” because philosophers sometimes lapse into meta-level discussions about
the limits of social scientific research methods when what is called for is ground-level criticism of an ex-
planation’s capacity to account for the relevant data. For example, when considering the limitations of the
institutional view of development he favors, Risse mentions philosophical worries about the capacity of so-
cial science to predict the likely consequences of future actions on the basis of observations of the past and
the difficulty of applying cross-country statistical evidence to the development policy of specific countries
(Risse, “What We Owe”). These are certainly issues, but they are irrelevant given that Risse’s objective in
the section in question is to pick out one view of development from among several as able to best account
for the data. What Risse should be doing here is adjudicating between competing explanations of develop-
ment instead of raising worries that apply to any social scientific explanation. In picking out the institutional
view as providing grounds for a particular duty of assistance, Risse presupposes favorable answers to his
philosophical worries.
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CHAPTER 3
Institutional Failure Analysis
Much recent work in global political theory prescribes ways to design the international
institutional system so as to eradicate or at least mitigate severe and systematic depriva-
tion.1 The conventional wisdom is that such prescriptions are the province of nonideal
theory but that ideal theory is required as a guide for nonideal theory. Rawls captures the
conventional wisdom well:
Nonideal theory asks how [a] long-term goal might be achieved, or worked
toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for policies and courses of action
that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be ef-
fective. So conceived, nonideal theory presupposes that ideal theory is already
on hand. For until the ideal is identified, at least in outline — and that is all
we should expect — nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference
to which its queries can be answered.2
On this view, our first task is to specify fully just principles of regulation, those principles
that regulate the constitution of fully just institutional arrangements.3 Nonideal theory
seeks to work out the application of these just principles of regulation to conditions of
actual injustice. Call this the ideal guidance approach.
1. This chapter is forthcoming in The Journal of Political Philosophy under the title “Prescribing In-
stitutions Without Ideal Theory.” It is reproduced here with minor revisions by permission of Blackwell
Publishers.
2. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 89f; emphasis added. Cf. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 7–8, 215–216.
3. My use of the term “principle of regulation” is due to Cohen, “Facts and Principles,” 241. For Cohen,
principles of regulation are distinguished from basic principles, the latter of which are statements of our fun-
damental normative convictions. Basic principles are the standard by which we evaluate the consequences
of different principles of regulation.
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The ideal guidance approach uses idealizing assumptions to identify just principles of
regulation and then proceeds to apply these moral principles to the practical question of
institutional design. Detailed analyses of the causal processes required to implement the
the prescribed institutions play a peripheral role at best. Simply put, granting ideal theory
priority in our evaluation of institutions emphasizes the moral aspects of institutional de-
sign at the expense of causal analysis. This is mistaken. The preceding chapter showed
that causal analysis must play a central role in our theorizing about global institutional
design. We need a new approach to institutional design that gives causal analysis a central
role.
Recent debate on the relationship of ideal theory to nonideal theory is unhelpful for
characterizing an appropriate alternative to the conventional wisdom. On the one hand,
those who reject the notion that ideal theory is required as a guide for nonideal theory reject
ideal theory altogether as “normatively useless” without offering any alternative method
for prescribing institutional reforms.4 On the other hand, those who defend ideal theory
against this charge claim that ideal theory properly understood is still useful as a guide for
nonideal theory despite the limitations noted by critics, in part because there appears to be
no other way to go about prescribing morally progressive institutional reforms.5
4. See Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2008); Colin Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” Political Studies 55, no. 4 (2007): 844–864;
Charles W. Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Hypatia 20, no. 3 (2005): 165–184. Amartya Sen is a
partial exception here. He joins the others in rejecting ideal theory — or “transcendental” theory, as he calls
it — as being neither necessary nor sufficient for nonideal purposes, but goes beyond the others in offering a
vaguely developed “comparative” methodological alternative. See Amartya Sen, “What Do We Want From
A Theory of Justice?” Journal of Philosophy 103, no. 5 (2006): 215–238 and Amartya Sen, The Idea of
Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
5. Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008):
341–362; Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory”; Zofia Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?”
Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008): 319–340; Adam Swift, “The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal
Circumstances,” Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008): 363–387; Laura Valentini, “On the Apparent
Paradox of Ideal Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2009): 332–355.
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Identifying a viable methodological alternative requires that we pay less attention to
characterizing the ideal-nonideal distinction and focus squarely on the salient method-
ological question: how should we approach the task of prescribing institutional solutions
to address actual injustice? The issue here is identifying the relevant inputs as well as
the appropriate procedure for turning those inputs into institutional design prescriptions.
Although this issue is clearly related to debate concerning the ideal-nonideal theory dis-
tinction, I do not want to engage that debate directly. The main problem here is that
“nonideal theory” is ambiguous between three different conceptions: (1) theorizing that
identifies intermediate institutional reforms that help us transition from actual institutional
arrangements to fully just institutional arrangements; (2) theorizing that identifies insti-
tutional arrangements that we should aspire to implement under actual conditions; and
(3) theorizing that prescribes feasible institutional solutions to actual injustice.6 Given the
multifarious philosophical controversies surrounding that distinction, retaining the term
“nonideal theory” allows this ambiguity to persist and potentially obscures my central
question.7 Hence, to maintain focus on the aforementioned methodological question, I
will refer to theorizing that prescribes feasible institutional solutions to actual injustice as
clinical institutional theory, or clinical theory for short. To reiterate: the central issue here
is how, methodologically speaking, we should approach the task of clinical theory.
6. We might call these (1) transitional theory, (2) nonideal aspirational theory, and (3) clinical theory
respectively. Failing to disambiguate “nonideal theory” has had the effect of conflating the various con-
ceptions. So, e.g., it’s not uncommon to find philosophers who think that doing clinical theory amounts to
doing transitional theory. Indeed, this is what the ideal guidance approach suggests. My discussion of Allen
Buchanan in section 3.2 below illustrates this confusion.
7. Here’s a sample of the controversies I want to avoid: Is the difference between ideal and nonideal
theory a matter of function, where the former specifies an ideal of justice and the latter specifies how to
proceed in the here and now? (Relatedly, how are we to understand this function of nonideal theory given
the aforementioned ambiguity?) Or is the distinction simply a matter of the former employing idealizing
assumptions to derive principles of justice whereas the latter assumes a more realistic picture of the world?
Related to the latter issue, is the difference a matter of the number of idealizing assumptions or the degree
to which the assumptions employed are ideal? Is the difference between the two sorts of theorizing one of
kind or degree? Settling these questions is beside the issue here.
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Against the ideal guidance approach, I propose that clinical theorists should adopt an
institutional failure analysis approach, which takes its design task to be, first and foremost,
one of obviating or averting social failures (as opposed to approximating an ideal). The
key innovation of this approach is to give causal analysis a central role in our evaluation
of institutional arrangements. Failure analysis enables clinical theorists to prescribe more
effective solutions to injustice because it focuses squarely on understanding the problem,
rather than focusing on trying to understand an ideal of justice. In so doing, failure analysis
better fulfills the objective of clinical theory, namely, to think about how, in the midst of
current injustice, we might bring about social conditions that are more just than our current
conditions.
3.1 Architecture and Engineering in Institutional Design
Institutions are, in Douglass North’s familiar words, “the rules of the game in a society
or, . . . the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”8 More specifically,
institutions are sets of (formal or informal) rules that establish roles and stabilize behav-
ioral norms and expectations for occupants of those roles; these norms and expectations
subsequently regularize patterns of interaction among individual agents.9 Since social out-
comes arise from the aggregation of particular interactions, institutions are important for
shaping social outcomes and their consequences for individuals’ lives. For this reason,
institutions are morally significant. Of course, an institution’s effect on outcomes is not
deterministic. An institutional structure sets the range of possible outcomes and makes
8. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1990), 3.
9. Note that the inclusion of informal rules somewhat broadens the definition of an institutional structure
beyond the familiar Rawlsian focus on the “basic structure of society.” Rawls limited his consideration of
institutional structures to the “major social institutions,” which comprise “the political constitution and the
principal economic and social arrangements” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 6). Given that informal institu-
tional arrangements can have just as much impact on individuals’ lives as formal institutions, I see no reason
to restrict our attention to the latter.
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some outcomes more probable than others. Thus, when assessing institutional arrange-
ments, we don’t only care about the observed outcomes actually realized by institutions,
but also the range and likelihood of outcomes they make possible.10
To the extent that we make choices over alternative sets of rules to regulate interactions,
we design institutions. The task of clinical institutional design comprises two distinct sets
of problems: architectural problems and engineering problems. To get some traction on
this distinction, consider it in reference to a material structure such as a skyscraper or
a bridge. The architect’s objective is to design a structure that creatively organizes its
components using mass, space, form, texture, light, shadow, and so on, in a way that
embodies some set of values (often functional, economic, artistic, and aesthetic values).11
The engineer’s task is to apply mathematical and scientific principles to solve technical
problems involved in the design of the structure within the constraints set by physical,
technological, economic, environmental, and ethical considerations.12 To be sure, the
two tasks intersect — there is a discipline called “architectural engineering” — but, on the
whole, architects understand their task as more closely aligned with art whereas engineers
uniformly understand themselves as doing “applied science.”
Analogously, the architectural problems comprised by institutional design concern the
ways in which different configurations of institutional components embody different sets
of values. Here the salient values are likely to be functional, economic, and (of primary
importance to moral philosophers) moral values. The engineering problems comprised by
institutional design concern the application of social scientific principles to the design of
10. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for The Journal of Political Philosophy for bringing this point to
my attention.
11. Cf. Francis D.K. Ching, Architecture: Form, Space, and Order, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007),
ch. 1; Leland M. Roth, Understanding Architecture: Its Elements, History, and Meaning (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1993), ch. 1; and Simon Unwin, Analysing Architecture, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003), ch. 1.
12. Cf. Gerhard Pahl et al., Engineering Design: A Systematic Approach, 3rd ed., ed. Ken Wallace and
Lucie¨nne Blessing (London: Springer, 2007), ch. 1 and Mark T. Holtzapple and W. Dan Reece, Foundations
of Engineering, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), ch. 1.
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institutions with an eye to making them capable of withstanding the pressures to which
they will be subject.
A key feature of the analogy is that the architectural and engineering problematics are
mutually constraining as a result of their interdependence. A generic example from the
world of residential construction serves to illustrate the point. For any particular house
we build, the architect gives us a set of drawings specifying the characteristics of the
house — the location of the interior walls, the size of the window and door openings, the
pitch and shape of the roof. For the most part, the architect confines herself to specifying
the way the house is to look. When it comes to specifying the required structural features to
make the architectural design work, the drawings are turned over to an engineer. Whereas
the architect specifies the size of the openings, an engineer specifies the requirements
for the “header” (a beam-like support placed above a window or door opening) to carry
the load to be placed above the opening. The architect specifies the pitch and span of
the roof, but it is a roof truss engineer who makes sure that the roof trusses are able to
span the distance between load bearing points. If it is ever the case that a house can’t be
made to work structurally as the architect designed it — for example, the openings are too
wide to accommodate adequate load bearing support — the drawings are sent back to the
architect for modification. So the engineer specifies the structural limits within which the
architect’s design must work. But the engineer doesn’t have a carte blanche when it comes
to devising structural solutions; these are to be consistent with the architect’s design aim
as far as possible. If the architect’s drawings call for large, wide open living spaces, the
engineer is not free to unilaterally add interior walls to accommodate a simpler roof truss
design. Hence, the architect and engineer each set limits on the other’s set of possible
solutions for achieving their objective.
One way to characterize where conventional clinical theorizing has gone awry is to
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say that it has ignored the engineering issues comprised by the task of institutional design.
Conforming to my earlier distinction, clinical theorizing has largely focused on moral
analysis and paid insufficient attention (intentionally or not) to causal analysis. This is not
to say that moral analysis is unimportant. Theorists have made some important progress
in thinking about the sorts of moral values we want our institutions to embody and how
different institutional configurations might embody different values. But to make progress
on the problem of designing institutions solutions for unjust conditions, we must make
progress on both the architectural problems and the engineering problems. If the analogy
I have drawn is apt, then progress on the architectural problem is insufficient. This is
because a structure that effectively embodies a chosen set of values but is incapable of
withstanding the pressures to which it is subject ceases to embody the chosen values once
it ceases to exist as designed.
Focusing almost entirely on the architectural issues has had the unfortunate effect of
recommending an institutional design procedure that limits the extent to which clinical
theorists pay attention to the relevant engineering problems. Since philosophers have
traditionally treated institutional design as a predominantly moral problem, their design
projects have typically focused on the application of principles of justice to the design of
actual institutions. This is why ideal theory has been thought to guide and constrain clini-
cal theory. The idea is that we want our actual institutions to bring about more just states
of affairs. The “more just” here intimates a target ideal according to which the justice of
states of affairs can be measured, which suggests that clinical theory must seek ways to
close the gap between current states of affairs and ideally just states of affairs. We require
ideal theory to characterize a fully just institutional order, which serves as a regulative
ideal, a guide to insure that our clinical theorizing is aimed in “the right direction.” If a
candidate proposal violates one or more of the principles of regulation identified by ideal
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theory, or if it does not deliver institutions that more closely approximate the ideal, it is
discarded. This ideal guidance approach leads us to judge design proposals according to
their fit with the principles that regulate ideal institutional arrangements. Accordingly, we
acquire a tendency to ignore the engineering question: how will the proposed institution
fare in the face of the pressures to which it will be subject? The issue here is not simply
that clinical theorists are insufficiently attentive to important feasibility considerations.
Feasibility considerations are but one set in the class of engineering considerations, which
also includes stability, effectiveness, and efficiency considerations. Moreover, even if we
simply pay increased attention to feasibility, the ideal guidance approach leads our consid-
eration of this issue to be circumscribed by the principles of regulation identified by ideal
theory. We surely want our designs to be feasible, but our approach to design leads us to
be primarily concerned with the extent to which our designs comport with ideal principles
of regulation. This leads us to give short shrift to the engineering problems comprised by
institutional design and, hence, to causal analysis.
3.2 Unpacking The Ideal Guidance Approach: A Case Study
Allen Buchanan’s proposal to reform the international practice of recognition among
sovereign states nicely demonstrates the ideal guidance approach in action.13 Buchanan’s
proposal is an especially illuminating case study for two reasons. First, he clearly intends
to prescribe a feasible solution to actual injustice.14 This is important because once we are
assured that Buchanan intends his proposal to be so, we can ask whether he succeeds in
prescribing reforms that are likely to “produce moral improvement in the particular system
13. Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
14. “[W]e should eschew speculation about what constitutes a comprehensive set of ideal substantive in-
stitutional principles and concentrate on nonideal theory. . . . [W]e should focus on ascertaining which prin-
ciples, if implemented, would produce moral improvements in the particular system that now exists” (ibid.,
67).
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that now exists.”15 Second, he self-consciously adopts the ideal guidance approach:
The task of ideal theory is to set the most important and most distant moral
targets for a better future, the ultimate standards for evaluating current inter-
national law. Nonideal theory’s task is to guide our efforts to approach those
ultimate targets. . . .16
This results is clinical theorizing that is deliberately and assiduously constrained by ideal
theoretic principles, which enables us to investigate the effect of this approach on Buchanan’s
nonideal prescription.17
The structure of Buchanan’s book reflects his methodological orientation. Part one
constitutes Buchanan’s ideal theory. This comprises two basic theses concerning the de-
sign of the ideal international system.
1. Institutions — in particular, the international legal system — must be designed to
protect and promote basic human rights. In Buchanan’s words, basic rights are
“rights that, if respected, protect those interests that are most crucial for a [sic] hav-
ing a good human life.”18 These include a right to life, a right to physical security,
a right against enslavement, a right to the means of subsistence, and a right against
systematic racial, ethnic, or sexual discrimination.
2. International law ought to require nation-states to satisfy a minimal constitutional
democracy condition.19
These theses undergird a justice-based conception of political legitimacy: a state exer-
cises political power legitimately only if it respects basic human rights and is minimally
15. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 67.
16. Ibid., 60f.
17. Buchanan’s characterization of nonideal theory here clearly resembles what I’ve called transitional
theory. Given that I’ve suggested that we should distinguish between transitional and clinical theory, how
can I now claim that Buchanan is doing clinical theory? The quote in footnote 14 suggests that Buchanan
also conceives of his proposal as part of clinical theory. In light of footnote 6, my point here implies that
Buchanan has failed to distinguish between the different conceptions of nonideal theory and, thus, identified
the task of clinical theory with the task of transitional theory. Since this is in effect what the ideal guidance
approach recommends, this is further evidence that Buchanan has adopted that approach.
18. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 129.
19. Ibid., 142–147. The arguments presented to support this second thesis derive it from the first thesis.
Thus, (2) is, strictly speaking, a derivative thesis. But, as Buchanan notes, ideal theory comprises not only
basic principles of justice that are to be satisfied by any institutional structure, but also “concrete principles
that specify the institutional arrangements common to all systems. . . that satisfy the constraints laid down by
the most basic principles of justice” (67). Buchanan says that we are largely ignorant about principles of the
second type with respect to the international legal system, with “one notable exception”: that nation-states
should be minimally constitutionally democratic. Hence, (1) is a basic ideal theoretic principle of the first
type, while (2) is a basic ideal theoretic principle of the second type.
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democratic.20
In part two, Buchanan applies his ideal theoretic account of political legitimacy to re-
forming the institutionalized practice of sovereign recognition. The problem posed by the
current practice is that it permits human rights-violating states to enjoy all the prerogatives
of sovereign states, including “support for their territorial integrity and. . . noninterference
in their internal affairs,” as well as the capacity “to participate (in theory as equals) in the
basic processes of international law.”21 Hence, the current practice prevents us from ade-
quately protecting individuals’ human rights within the borders of rights-violating states.
To preempt future rights-violators from using sovereignty as a shield against external in-
terference, Buchanan proposes that international law be reformed to make a new polity’s
recognition as sovereign conditional upon satisfying four conditions22:
1. Internal Justice Condition: the state must protect (or must not violate) the basic
human rights of its citizens.
2. External Justice Condition: the state must not violate the basic human rights of
citizens of other states.
3. Nonusurpation Condition: the state must not come about by usurping a legitimate
state.
4. Minimal Democracy Condition: the state must be minimally democratic.
These conditions are both necessary and sufficient. Each and every state that meets these
conditions must be granted recognitional legitimacy; no state that fails to meet these con-
ditions should be recognized.
To philosophers, Buchanan’s argument looks just fine. He identifies a morally-problem-
atic feature of international law and suggests a solution that at least plausibly addresses the
problem. So what is my objection to this approach? It is not that the ideal guidance ap-
proach yields the wrong verdict about the (in)justice of the current practice of recognition
20. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 234.
21. Ibid., 266.
22. On the first two, see ibid., 269–272; on the third, see 275f; on the fourth, see 278f.
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or identifies the wrong reasons for thinking that this practice is unjust. An alternative
approach might ultimately arrive at the same verdict. Instead, the problem is that this ap-
proach at best arrives at an incomplete analysis, not least by emphasizing only a subset of
the salient considerations for institutional design. Since international law issues from the
activity and resolutions of states (as represented by the relevant government officials),23
the feasibility and effectiveness of Buchanan’s proposal hangs on its sensitivity to a host
of considerations concerning both the likelihood and the depth of international coopera-
tion on reforming the practice of sovereign recognition in a way that will drastically limit
states’ control over their internal affairs. Here I raise several considerations that Buchanan
neglects and their implications for his proposal.
For Buchanan’s proposal to have any effect on human rights performance, states must
be willing to enact a binding resolution with enforcement provisions.24 States are usually
willing to bind themselves in this way only if the institutional mechanism is necessary to
coordinate their activity to achieve a key policy objective.25 One question, then, is whether
states take human rights protection abroad as a foreign policy objective that overrides
competing policy objectives. This seems implausible given even a cursory examination of
the historical record. For example, US foreign policy history is checkered with support
23. I use “state” as shorthand for “the government officials who are taken to represent a polity in interna-
tional affairs.” Consequently, the interests that matter are those of the state officials. Officials’ decisions are
influenced by their constituents’ policy preferences via the domestic institutional mechanisms in place for
holding state officials accountable. Where such mechanisms are robust, officials’ policy decisions largely
reflect the interests of the people at large. Where those mechanisms are weak, officials have more latitude in
their policy decisions. Cf. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2003); Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Re-
lations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008).
I discuss this in more detail below in chapter 5.
24. See Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human
Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007): 407–425; Oona A.
Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 111, no. 8 (2002): 1935–
2042; Oona A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 51 (2007): 588–621.
25. Cf. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005); Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and
Information (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); McGillivray and Smith, Punishing the Prince.
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for rights-abusing dictators who were otherwise amenable to US foreign policy objectives,
as well as operations to overthrow democratically elected governments who were deemed
hostile to US interests.26 In addition, rights-abusing states with great natural resource
wealth continue to find support despite their human rights record, such as China’s (among
others’) continued support for the Burmese military junta.
Rights-abusing states in particular will have little incentive to sign on to reforms that
will effectively prevent them from recognizing new rights-violating states. To comply with
the norm would only draw greater public attention to their own rights-violating practices
and endanger any perceived legitimacy they will have attained. Although Buchanan’s
proposal is not supposed to threaten a currently recognized rights-violator’s legal status,
they will certainly fear that the new norm could arouse domestic opposition that would
be sufficient to drastically limit their ability to achieve their objectives. And given that
some of the most internationally influential states are among the worst rights-abusers or
most prominent supporters of rights-abusers (most notably, China and Russia), Buchanan’s
proposal is likely to meet stiff resistance among this crowd.
Moreover, many states that are relatively rights-respecting at home support rights-
violating states abroad for a variety of reasons. Prominent among these reasons is the
gains accrued from cooperation with such states. For example, 41% of China’s merchan-
dise exports go to the US and EU, while Australia, Canada, and the US all count China
as both a top-five source of imports and a top-five destination for exports.27 In addition,
many states with significant natural resource wealth turn out to be authoritarian, rights-
abusing regimes.28 This means that otherwise rights-respecting states must cooperate with
26. Examples of the former include Fulgencio Batista, Mobutu Sese Seko, Pol Pot, and Saddam Hus-
sein (before the late-1980s). Examples of the latter include Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Democratic
Republic of Congo in 1960, and Nicaragua during the 1980s.
27. See country trade profiles for Australia, Canada, China, and the US, found in the WTO’s Statistics
Database, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=, accessed July 2008.
28. I discuss this so-called “resource curse” in detail in chapters 5 and 6.
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rights-abusing states to meet their substantial natural resource needs.29 Given that similar
benefits would accrue to states who cooperate with future rights-abusing regimes seeking
recognition, states have little incentive to withhold recognition. Were they to do so, they
would forego the substantial gains from cooperating with rights-abusing regimes.
Summing up: Buchanan’s proposal neglects several considerations that are important
for assessing the feasibility and effectiveness of his proposal. This is because he takes
“justice. . . as the fundamental vantage point from which to evaluate the existing interna-
tional legal system and to formulate proposals for improving it.”30 In other words, the set
of considerations to which Buchanan gives adequate attention is restricted by the primacy
he gives to his ideal principles of justice. He thereby fails to acknowledge where our
interest in actually improving human rights protection might require us to make tradeoffs
between our moral ideals on the one hand and feasibility and effectiveness on the other. To
the extent that Buchanan’s ultimate objective is to prescribe reforms that “would produce
moral improvements” in our world, this is a serious blindspot. To overcome this blindspot,
our institutional design prescriptions must aim at more than simply approximating ideal
principles of justice. We must prescribe solutions that are capable of overcoming social
problems as we find them in the actual world.
3.3 The Failure Analysis Approach to Institutional Design
We need an alternate approach to clinical theory that integrates moral analysis with
causal analysis. Put another way, we need an approach that pays sufficient attention to
29. Perhaps most important among these is the need for oil. Roughly 36% of the world’s oil is produced
by unquestionable human rights abusers (Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, and China), and of the other top-15
producers, Amnesty International reported serious human rights concerns in seven of them (US, Mexico,
Venezuela, Kuwait, UAE, Nigeria, and Iraq). Oil data from “Rank Order – Oil Production,” The CIA World
Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008. Human rights information from Amnesty International, Report
08: The State of the World’s Human Rights, London: Amnesty International, 2008.
30. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 73.
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engineering concerns in addition to the architectural concerns. In this section, I develop
an approach to clinical institutional design that draws on insights from an engineering
approach to design called “failure analysis,” which takes obviating failure, rather than
approximating an ideal, to be the primary design aim. A failure analytic approach to
institutional design avoids the shortcomings of the ideal guidance approach by dispensing
with the need for ideal principles of regulation to guide the design process. In the place of
ideal theory, institutional failure analysis is guided by a process of hypothesis formulation
and evaluation. This places the design emphasis on overcoming actual social problems
rather than on closing some gap between the actual and an ideal. Importantly, detailed
analysis of causal mechanisms plays a central role throughout.
The motivating insight of failure analysis is well-stated by Henry Petroski:
Desire, not necessity, is the mother of invention. New things and the ideas
for things come from our dissatisfaction with what there is and from the want
of a satisfactory thing for doing what we want done. More precisely, the
development of new artifacts and new technologies follows from the failure
of existing ones to perform as promised or as well as can be hoped for or
imagined. Frustration and disappointment associated with the use of a tool or
the performance of a system puts a challenge on the table: Improve the thing.
Sometimes, as when a part breaks in two, the focal point for the improvement
is obvious. Other times, such as when a complex system runs disappointingly
slowly, the way to speed it up may be far from clear. In all cases, however,
the beginnings of a solution lay in isolating the cause of the failure and in
focusing on how to avoid, obviate, remove, or circumvent it.31
We can see here a thumbnail sketch of failure analysis as a design process. The process
starts first with dissatisfaction, with a sense that some designed artifact does not work
as well as we might like. It then proceeds to diagnose the problem: In what does the
failure consist? What caused it? Upon analyzing the failure, the designer seeks to design
something that will avoid the same fate by improving its capacity to withstand similar
pressures, by removing exploitable weaknesses, or by constructing a design that is not
31. Henry Petroski, Success Through Failure: The Paradox of Design (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2006), 1, emphasis added.
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subject to the same causal mechanisms. Once the new design is complete, the designer
tries to anticipate ways in which the new design might fail and, if any potential weaknesses
are found, tries to improve the design to avoid these shortcomings.32
From this sketch, we can isolate three main phases of the failure analysis design pro-
cess: (1) identification of a failure, such as a flawed product or service; (2) diagnosis, that
is, analysis of the character and cause of the failure; (3) designing an artifact to overcome
identifiable failures, including potential future failures. The design objective is, quite sim-
ply, to create artifacts that avoid failure as far as is feasible. Developing the institutional
failure analysis approach involves elaborating on each of the three phases as they pertain
to clinical institutional design. I now discuss these in turn.
3.3.1 Identifying failure
An institutional design project is motivated by an initial sense of dissatisfaction with
some feature of the social world, whether this be an observed undesirable outcome or so-
cial arrangements that impose an undue risk of realizing some undesirable outcome. How-
ever, an apparent disanalogy between engineering design and institutional design arises
immediately. Failure analysis (in the context of artifacts) presupposes a well-defined de-
sign objective, which includes a set of general specifications that an artifact must meet.
This well-defined objective makes it easy to identify failure. For example, a bridge should
hold its intended load across the length of its span while withstanding environmental pres-
sures, such as wind load or earthquakes. Bridges that fail to meet this design objective, or
can only do so by incurring unacceptable costs, are readily identifiable as failures.
In contrast, social and political institutions do not come with well-specified design
objectives. Indeed, politics is the process of contesting which ends are to be pursued by
32. Cf. Henry Petroski, To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York:
Vintage Books, 1992), 44. A problem arises here for the analogy, viz., that the intended “use” of institutional
arrangements is usually much more contested than that of engineered artifacts. I address this difficulty below.
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institutions. Consequently, social failures seem identifiable only by reference to some par-
ticular perspective. For example, asymmetric bargaining power in trade negotiations is a
failure for those who inhabit a weak bargaining position, but the asymmetry rarely dis-
turbs those who benefit from it. In general, this means that social failures are notoriously
difficult to identify. The institutional failure analysis approach appears to suffer from an
early setback.33
This apparent difficulty gives life to the ideal guidance approach. How can we know
when some feature of the social world counts as a failure unless we know how the social
world should be constituted? It is natural to think that ideal theory is helpful here. Ideal
theory yields a well-defined design objective; it identifies principles that serve as a general
specification any institutional order must meet to count as just. With ideal principles of
regulation in hand, failure identification becomes a simple matter: institutional arrange-
ments whose principles of regulation fall short of or otherwise differ from the ideal count
as a failure. Since ideal theory derives principles of justice from a putatively impartial
perspective, we need not worry about any particular perspective tainting our judgment.
Ideal principles of justice give us the requisite impartial critical edge.
A clarification is in order before responding to this worry. “Ideal” ordinarily con-
notes something like “that to which we (ought to) aspire.” Paradigmatic examples of
ideals in this sense include equality, individual liberty, human flourishing, and national
self-determination. With this in the background, my rejection of the ideal guidance ap-
proach is apt to be interpreted as the claim that clinical theory ought not appeal to ideals
in this ordinary sense. Such an interpretation misunderstands my claim. Ideal theory has
come to signify something very particular since Rawls introduced the term. Ideal theory
is not “a theory of ideals,” but a way of theorizing about political principles that focuses
33. Thanks to Peter Railton for identifying this disanalogy and to Bill Clark for pressing me on the
“politics-as-end-contestation” point.
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on specifying the principles of regulation that undergird an ideal institutional structure.
These principles are arrived at by reflection on how to best express our moral ideals (in
the ordinary sense) under ideal conditions, where “ideal conditions” denotes social and
political circumstances that more or less permit moral considerations to take center stage
in decisions about how to organize our collective life. For example, Rawls’s difference
principle is supposed to be the principle that best expresses our collective commitment to
an ideal of society as a system of fair cooperation among citizens conceived as free and
equal.34 But the derivation of that principle makes idealizing assumptions to avoid com-
plicating the moral analysis too much. These include, among other things, that society is
self-sufficient and closed to transactions with outsiders; that citizens accept and know that
others accept a common set of principles; and that citizens fully comply with the demands
of the principles of justice.35
The ideal guidance approach subsequently takes the principles specified by ideal the-
ory as regulative when theorizing about the principles that ought to guide institutional
design under actual conditions. My rejection of the ideal guidance approach denies that
the principles of regulation that express our commitment to our moral ideals under ideal
conditions can or should offer any guidance for clinical theorizing. Importantly, this does
not entail that clinical theorizing ought to refrain from appealing to moral ideals in the
ordinary sense, or values as I will call them. In particular, it is open to the failure an-
alyst to appeal to moral values when discussing the (in)justice of any particular social
arrangements. To continue the above example, my rejection of the ideal guidance ap-
proach denies that Rawls’s difference principle can or should offer any direction for our
thinking about the justice of institutions that affect distribution under actual conditions.
This is consistent with appealing to the underlying value of society as a system of fair co-
34. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, secs. 1, 3, 4.
35. Ibid., 4, 8, 216.
64
operation among citizens conceived as free and equal when assessing the institutions that
are actually responsible for distributive outcomes. This is because the difference principle
is not a conceptual truth; we do not arrive at the difference principle by simply analyzing
the concepts expressed by the value. The difference principle is a particular expression
of that value, which follows from our reflection on that value given a certain simplified
conception of the political world. To the extent that the derivation of that principle is sen-
sitive to changes in initial conditions, its service as an expression of an important value
under different conditions will be in question.36 But this problem affects only particular
principles qua expressions of values, not the abstract values themselves. Thus, the latter
remain available to the failure analyst when assessing institutional arrangements.
I now turn to a development of the failure analysis approach to identifying social fail-
ures. My point of departure draws on Sen’s distinction between “comparative” and “tran-
scendental” — that is, ideal theoretic — approaches to justice.37 The central question for
the comparative approach to justice is “How might we advance justice (or mitigate in-
justice) in a society?” A comparative assessment focuses on ranking alternative social
arrangements with respect to some moral dimension(s). This differs from what Sen calls
the “transcendental” approach to justice, which takes as its central question “What con-
stitutes a just society?” Not surprisingly, then, the transcendental approach focuses on
identifying the principles that govern ideally just social arrangements.
36. This point clearly echoes the basic idea expressed in the “general theory of second best”: an institu-
tional arrangement that is optimal under ideal conditions is unlikely to be so once we deviate from any of
those conditions. The optimal arrangements under nonideal conditions are likely to require (perhaps drastic)
alterations to the principles of regulation identified by ideal theory; see R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster,
“The General Theory of Second Best,” The Review of Economic Studies 24, no. 1 (1957): 11–32. In Bruce
Talbot Coram’s words, “radical alterations in institutions may be required to accommodate small shifts in
initial conditions” (Bruce Talbot Coram, “Second Best Theories and the Implications for Institutional De-
sign,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert E. Goodin [New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996], 91). For further discussion of the application of the general theory of second best to nonideal political
theory, see Robert E. Goodin, “Political Ideals and Political Practice,” British Journal of Political Science
25, no. 1 (1995): 37–56.
37. Sen, The Idea of Justice, introduction and pt. 1.
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Although Sen identifies the crux of this distinction as being one of distinct objectives,
the key difference between the two approaches is more accurately described as one of
method.38 Transcendental theory employs the ideal guidance approach to identify prin-
ciples to govern our selection of institutional arrangements. The comparative approach
identifies these principles by examining and reflecting on our comparative judgments of
actual or feasible states of affairs. My development of the failure analysis approach ex-
plores this difference in method. In particular, I propose that taking comparative judgments
about alternative social conditions as the starting point for clinical theorizing leads to more
effective institutional design proposals.
Failure is identified by examining the particulars of the state of affairs that initially
motivates the design project and then comparing this state to alternative feasible states of
affairs. The contrast cases can be actual or counterfactual; the key is that their realization
be feasible. If we take actual cases, we can be confident that the contrast class presents
us with alternatives that are in some sense feasible, since they present states of affairs that
are already realized. We need to be a little cautious when including counterfactual cases
in the contrast class, since the fact that they are not currently realized leaves us uncertain
38. On the one hand, Sen associates the transcendental approach with the objective of identifying per-
fectly just institutional arrangements that are “themselves [the] manifestations of justice” (Sen, The Idea
of Justice, 82). On the other hand, he associates the comparative approach with the objective of identi-
fying “institutions that promote justice” (82), which requires giving due attention to “the actual societies
that would ultimately emerge” from the “actual behaviours of people and their social interactions” (6).
This way of putting the distinction is mistaken. Sen’s exemplars of the transcendental approach — Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, Kant, as well as contemporaries such as Rawls, Dworkin, Gauthier, and Nozick — are not
uniformly concerned with identifying perfectly just institutions; Hobbes and Locke come immediately to
mind here. Moreover, transcendental institutionalists seem no less concerned with “social realizations” than
comparativists. Rawls — Sen’s primary transcendentalist target — was eminently concerned with the social
conditions that would be realized under alternative principles of justice. In Rawls’s words, “one conception
of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are more desirable” (Rawls, A Theory
of Justice, 6, emphasis added). In fact, practitioners of the transcendental approach seem to have the same
objective as practitioners of the comparative approach — viz., that of identifying principles that should gov-
ern the selection of institutional arrangements that promote justice in our world. These points were made
to clear to me by participants in an online reading group on Sen’s book, organized by Blain Neufeld at
http://www.publicreason.net.
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about the extent to which their realization is feasible. However, this should not preclude
our making comparisons with counterfactual alternatives. We do not want our sense of
which states of affairs are practically possible to be limited by what is actual. The general
point is that we should be judicious in selecting our contrast cases, since these are going
to determine which conditions to take as problematic and which to take as moral goals.39
A case about which there is reasonable disagreement will work best to illustrate my
point here, so say we are dissatisfied with health care provision in the United States. For
our set of contrast cases, we might select Canada, Cuba, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Swe-
den, and Tanzania. (I stick with actual cases for simplicity.) We then start by making a
rough intuitive ordering of these cases according to the relative justice of their health care
provision schemes — for example (from best to worst): Canada, Sweden, United States,
Cuba, Mexico, Russia, Tanzania, and Nigeria. This first cut ordering will be relative to
some particular interpretation of justice, is likely to focus on some dimensions of health
care provision at the expense of others, and is almost certain to be contested. This is fine
for now; all we need is some set of orderings to serve as the raw material for the next step
of failure identification.
The next step is to justify any particular ordering as capturing morally salient differ-
ences between the cases. To do this, one reflects on the considerations motivating any
particular ordering and offers reasons for thinking that these considerations are (among)
the morally salient ones when it comes to judging health care regimes. Example consid-
erations include performance along objective health benchmarks (life expectancy, infant
mortality rates, disease rates, and so on), health care spending efficiency, scope of access
to health care, and source of health care provision (public vs. private provision). Sup-
39. More needs to be said about how to select counterfactual cases. Since feasibility is a workhorse concept
here, its definition is crucial. To avoid interrupting the flow of this dissertation, I relegate a detailed analysis
of feasibility to appendix B.
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pose one’s ordering is primarily driven by a country’s performance according to objective
health benchmarks, as the above ranking is,40 while another’s ranking is primarily driven
by access-related considerations. On behalf of the above ranking, one might say that health
outcomes are key when judging health care regimes because a society should be primarily
concerned with the objective well-being of its citizens and positive health outcomes are
important markers of well-being. On behalf of access-related considerations, one might
say that citizens, in virtue of their common status as citizens, are entitled to equal treat-
ment when it comes the allocation of health care resources. This is far from a complete
characterization of what takes place at this point, but the picture being painted is sufficient
to illustrate the point. Once we have a set of first cut orderings, we set about justifying
an ordering as authoritative, which leads us to reflect upon the moral values we endorse
and our reasons for endorsing them, as well as identifying the principles that best express
those values. Moral justification requires us to engage in the process of supporting the
moral authority of an ordering with impartial reasons — reasons that do not appeal to any
particular person’s situation or interests. Such a process will include appeals to abstract
moral values. Importantly, this is not the same as identifying the principles of regulation
that govern the ideal health care regime (or, the health care regime of the ideal society).
At some point, this moral debate will lead us to some shared judgments (although we
are unlikely to arrive at complete consensus). For example, all parties to the debate might
agree that health outcomes and access-related considerations are both important, although
they might disagree on their reasons for thinking so or the relative weight assigned to each.
No matter. This rough agreement still permits us to make judgments of the following sort:
improving objective health outcomes in Nigeria and Tanzania constitutes an improvement
in health care provision; increasing access to health care provision in the United States
40. The above ranking is according to life expectancy at birth, 2009 estimates. Source: 2009 CIA World
Factbook.
68
constitutes an improvement in health care provision. These judgments imply judgments
of failure. When we judge that some state of affairs S can be improved upon, we are
committed to the claim that S is not as good as it could be. But not just that. Since our
comparative judgments issue from our reflection on the moral values that underpin our
judgments, our reasons for taking any ordering as morally authoritative imply that S is not
as good as it should be. In Sen’s words, these judgments identify “remediable injustices.”41
On the failure analysis approach, a failure just is a remediable injustice.
One might object that this makes “failure” an overly capacious concept, which under-
mines its critical edge. Perhaps “failure” should be reserved for social conditions we deem
severe injustices requiring urgent remediation. But failure need not be constituted by utter
inability to meet design expectations. Instead, a failure is constituted by the presence of a
remediable design flaw.42 We can comfortably acknowledge that instances of failure will
differ along a number of dimensions, including ease of identification, severity, and (moral)
urgency. A bridge collapse constitutes a greater failure than an unwieldy water bottle.
Similarly, avoidable famine, genocide, total breakdown of the rule of law, and arbitrary
detention and torture are more grievous and more urgent than, say, disparities in educa-
tional quality or employment opportunities.43 It is true that the generosity of the failure
concept will preclude the identification procedure from generating fine-grained distinc-
tions among failures, which could help us set “remediation priorities.” But that’s not the
job of the identification procedure. The identification procedure simply seeks to identify
41. Sen, The Idea of Justice, vii.
42. For example, Petroski spends a great deal of energy illustrating the failure analysis approach to engi-
neering using the development of presentation pointers as an example. Before laser pointers (the design flaws
of which Petroski points out), presenters used long wood pointers — sometimes up to 7 or 8 feet long — that
enabled them to point at items on a screen without having to walk in front of the screen. But these pointers
became unwieldy and caused some presenters to fatigue. Although not a particularly urgent problem, this, in
Petroski’s mind, counted as a failure in virtue of these design flaws. See Petroski, Success Through Failure,
ch. 1.
43. I certainly don’t mean to trivialize the injustice of the latter two. It just seems to me that the ability to
remediate the latter injustices are luxuries afforded by having eradicated the former.
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the members of the set of failures. Once we have identified (some of) the members of this
set, we engage in further reflection and debate about our remediation priorities, debate that
will and should appeal to considerations generated by our diagnosis of the failure and our
anticipation of the effects of various intervention possibilities.
The preceding has exposed an important difference between the ideal guidance and
failure analysis approaches. On the former, a social process or outcome is identified as
a failure because it diverges from the processes or outcomes that would arise from ideal
institutional arrangements identified in the abstract. For example, an actual distribution of
some good is a failure because it deviates from the distribution that would result from fully
just institutional arrangements. Failure is thus constituted by a gap between the state of
affairs produced by the actual institutional order and the state of affairs that would result
from an ideal institutional scheme.
On the failure analysis approach, there is no comparison with an ideal institutional
order because there is ex ante target institutional order. As a result, there is no preexisting
blueprint from which actual institutions could diverge. Instead, failures are identified by
making comparisons between actual and feasible states of affairs and finding that some
actual states are not as good as they could (and should) be. Consequently, we don’t need
a blueprint of ideal institutional arrangements to tell us which social conditions constitute
failures and which institutions should be established to overcome the problems.
In fact, such a blueprint is liable to bias our identification of failures because it pre-
judges what counts as a problem and thereby restricts our attention to certain features of
the social world. Take Dewey’s criticism of laissez-faire liberalism (i.e., libertarianism) as
an example.44 Libertarianism identifies individual liberty with individual economic enter-
prise more or less unconstrained by government regulation. The concomitant institutional
44. What follows draws from John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (Amherst, NY: Prometheus
Books, 2000), ch. 2, passim.
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ideal consists of an unregulated market for all goods in which people could have an in-
terest.45 When a libertarian assesses the justice of an institutional order, her attention is
restricted by her expectation that a just institutional order includes (at least) an unregulated
market. The problem, in Dewey’s words, is that libertarians have “put forward their ideas
as immutable truths good at all times and places.” Accordingly, libertarian principles have
become reified: “they [hold] that beneficial social change can come about in but one way,
the way of private economic enterprise, socially undirected, based upon and resulting in
the sanctity of private property.” This is due to a lack of “historical sense”; libertarians
have been “blinded. . . to the fact that their own special interpretations of liberty, individ-
uality and intelligence were themselves historically conditioned, and were relevant only
to their own time. . . .” Once the sought-after reforms were accomplished, what was once
a force for social change thus became a force in favor of the status quo. Consequently,
adherence to the laissez-faire ideal blinds libertarians to the obstacles to effective liberty
brought about by an unregulated market. Since their attention is directed by their favored
institutional ideal, these liberals have failed to see the ways in which liberty is restricted
by that very ideal.
The general lesson here is this: One does not need to know what the ideal institutional
order looks like to be able to identify social failures. The ideal guidance view locates the
blueprint at the wrong place, prior to the failure identification phase. But the creation of
the blueprint is a result of the design process. There is no blueprint prior to the design
phase, let alone the identification phase.
45. See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, ch. 7, especially the section titled “How Liberty Upsets Pat-
terns.” See also Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
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3.3.2 Diagnosing failure
Once we have identified a social problem, we set about diagnosing that problem. This
diagnostic phase incorporates both moral and causal analyses. A return to the architec-
ture/engineering analogy is useful here to get a grip on how the normative and empirical
are intertwined. Architectural failures and engineering failures differ in virtue of the dis-
tinct design aims of architecture and engineering. Architectural design fails when space
is poorly organized, or when component textures, materials, colors, etc. are poorly juxta-
posed, or when the structure is a poor fit — functionally, artistically, aesthetically — with
the surrounding environment. As examples, consider the structures that often show up on
“ugly building” lists, such as Boston City Hall, the Experience Music Project (Seattle), and
the Scottish Parliament Building (Edinburgh).46 Engineering design fails when structural
elements are unable to withstand environmental pressures, or when the object functions
poorly or not at all under the conditions for which it was designed, or when the object
is unsafe for use. Examples of engineering failures include bridge collapses (Tacoma
Narrows Bridge, 1942), building collapses (Hyatt Regency walkway, Kansas City, 1981),
nuclear accidents (Chernobyl, 1986), and space accidents (Columbia, 2003). From the dif-
ferent lists of examples, it should be clear that architectural and engineering failures have
distinct characters. Accordingly, the two require different sorts of diagnoses. When diag-
nosing architectural failures, we aim to identify the features of the object that deviate from
accepted standards or norms of architectural design, to characterize the ways in which the
design contravenes design values. On occasion, architecture that was initially criticized
is later seen as pushing the field in a positive, innovative direction. Hence, architectural
analysis also involves re-evaluating the standards by which we evaluate architecture. In
46. Sources: “The World’s Ugliest Buildings” (www.forbes.com/2002/05/03/0503home.html; edition.cnn.
com/2008/WORLD/europe/10/22/ugliest.buildings/; members.virtualtourist.com/vt/t/1c7/).
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contrast, when diagnosing engineering failures, we aim to identify the causal processes
that generated the failure, to identify the weaknesses in a structure or process and the
pressures that were able to exploit that weakness.
Given that institutional design comprises both architectural and engineering problems,
our diagnosis of institutional failures requires two types of analysis. Moral analysis aims to
identify the features of an institutional structure that deviate from widely-accepted norms
and values, but also to re-evaluate those norms and values. Causal analysis aims to identify
the causal mechanisms generating the social conditions we seek to alter. In practice, the
tasks of moral and causal analysis are rarely separable. Our evaluation and selection of the
moral principles by which we assess institutional arrangements will be informed by our
causal analysis of current conditions. If, for example, income inequality is an unavoidable
feature of collective economic life and we think collective economic life is important (or
inevitable), then we might reduce the weight we give to particular egalitarian moral princi-
ples when morally assessing institutions. But if income inequality is a result of institutions
that unnecessarily and unjustifiably restrict the economic opportunities of an underclass,
we might retain those same egalitarian moral principles as important standards for institu-
tional assessment.
Moral considerations also play an important role in identifying the mechanisms to
which our causal diagnoses pay attention. For example, commodity price volatility almost
certainly plays a causal role in generating the resource curse.47 Thus, the independent
market decisions of investors and consumers that are responsible in the aggregate for this
price volatility are, at least in part, causally responsible for the misery associated with the
resource curse. However, we don’t typically identify these independent market decisions
as causes of the curse and not simply because it is unlikely that we could adequately
47. See Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse, ch. 1.
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coordinate those decisions to avoid price volatility. In addition, we take it for granted
that the market freedom that generates price volatility is a value that we should protect.
Consequently, we turn our attention to other causal mechanisms. In the case at hand, we
hold the fact of price volatility fixed and turn our attention to the mechanisms that make
the economic performance of resource dependent states vulnerable to price shocks. All
this is to say that moral and causal analyses are practically inseparable. Nevertheless, it
can be useful to think of moral and causal analyses as analytically distinct. With this in
mind, I now elaborate on my sketch of the diagnostic task.
Moral diagnosis is prompted by a desire to understand the ways in which a social pro-
cess or outcome constitutes a moral problem. This involves considering which values we
want our social life to embody, why these values are important, and which moral principles
best express those values. Do we prize equality? What about equality is important? Is in-
dividual liberty a key value? How is liberty restricted under current conditions? Is human
flourishing an important social goal? Why? How should we understand “flourishing”?
Although these questions inquire about abstract moral values and principles, on the fail-
ure analysis approach, we do not settle these questions solely in the abstract. Instead, our
reflection on the moral principles we want our social life to realize is guided by reflection
on actual social conditions.
Consider Mill’s vigourous criticism of Victorian marriage contracts as the sort of moral
diagnosis I have in mind.48 Mill begins his criticism in earnest by examining “the condi-
tions which the laws of this and all other countries annex to the marriage contract.”49 Such
contracts left a woman effectively propertyless and thereby without economic security
should her husband die or divorce her. Within marriage, a woman had little say over the
48. John Stuart Mill, “The Subjection of Women,” in The Subjection of Women, ed. Dale E. Miller (New
York: Random House, 2002), esp. chs. 2 and 3.
49. Ibid., 153.
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disposal of her husband’s property. Without any property of her own, she was financially
dependent on her husband and without any credible exit threat should her husband abuse
her. The marriage contract precluded any notion of marital rape, leaving a woman as little
more than a sex slave. Women had no legal rights over their children; these were granted
only to men. What’s more, women were compelled to this position of servitude because
they were banned from pursuing the means to independence, such as an education or a
career. Even as she had no property, the law forbade her to sell her labor. Mill compares
the position of women to that of a slave:
I am far from pretending that wives are in general no better treated than slaves;
but no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as
a wife is. Hardly any slave, except one immediately attached to the master’s
person, is a slave at all hours and all minutes; in general he has, like a soldier,
his fixed task, and when it is done, or when he is off duty, he disposes, within
certain limits of his own time, and has a family life into which the master
rarely intrudes. . . . But it cannot be so with the wife.50
The implicit argument here is that the Victorian marriage institution subjected women to
a position that was deemed unfit for slaves and that the continued subjection of women to
such conditions was inconsistent with earlier judgments against subjecting slaves to such
conditions. In other places, Mill compares marriage to political tyranny, implying that the
marriage contract subjected women to a position relative to their husbands to which no
man would have consented in relation to a political ruler.
Mill’s strategy involves enumerating the conditions that result from a particular insti-
tution and then exposing the conflict between these conditions and the moral principles
we might justifiably endorse upon reflection. This results in both moral criticism of the
conditions of marriage and a re-assessment of the convictions that keep those conditions in
place. What is striking about Mill’s strategy from the perspective of conventional political
theory is what he doesn’t say. Mill does not argue for a set of ideal principles of justice
50. Mill, “The Subjection of Women,” 155.
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and then employ them to justify treating women as equals. He does not say “It will be well
to commence the discussion of gender discrimination by considering which principles of
justice would regulate the constitution of the marriage institution in the ideal society and
then apply these principles to the marriage institution as it stands.” Starting with abstract
principles of justice permits us to rationalize concrete social conditions, to point to the
ways in which the status quo is consistent with the requirements of these principles, which
often requires minimizing (or altogether leaving out) inconvenient facts. By starting with
concrete conditions, we cannot be let off the hook. We must come face-to-face with the
details of our social reality and try to reconcile those details with our convictions. Often
times, we cannot.
One might turn around and press this claim against the failure analysis approach,
namely, that failure analysis has a conservative bias. After all, on my view, coming face-
to-face with social reality only leads to judgments of injustice (and thus a need to prescribe
interventions) if we find features of that reality dissatisfying. Accordingly, we might fol-
low G.A. Cohen in claiming that “the question for political philosophy is not what we
should do but what we should think, even when what we should think makes no practical
difference.”51 But Cohen’s claim is consistent with my rejection of the ideal guidance ap-
proach and gives me a way to reply to this “conservative bias” charge. The failure analysis
approach rejects the claim that ideal principles of justice are useful for guiding clinical
institutional design. But it need not reject the claim that ideal theory can be useful for
guiding our evaluative attitudes toward our social reality, including actual institutional ar-
rangements. Indeed, this seems to be the appropriate role for ideal theory within the failure
analysis approach. Finding gaps between actual institutional arrangements and ideal insti-
tutional arrangements motivates acute dissatisfaction with current arrangements, thereby
51. Cohen, “Facts and Principles,” 243.
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initiating the design process. Thus, ideal theory can be important for motivating design
prescriptions. This is consistent with the claim that the principles it yields ought not guide
clinical institutional design.52
Importantly, on the failure analysis view, the diagnostic phase involves not only iden-
tifying the ways in which current conditions undermine important values, but also re-
evaluating the standards by which we assess social conditions. Moral principles are
adopted in light of particular social conditions. Under conditions of inequality, particu-
lar egalitarian principles come to the fore; under conditions of slavery or tyranny, liberty
is championed. But social conditions are in continual flux: “old principles [might] not fit
contemporary life as it is lived, however well they may have expressed the vital interests
of the times in which they arose.”53 The diagnostic phase demands that we reconsider our
moral principles in light of our social reality to avoid adopting principles that are ill-suited
to current conditions and to prevent principles of justice from becoming reified.
Keeping in mind the purely analytic distinction between moral and causal analysis,
our causal diagnosis is an entirely empirical task. We are interested in explaining the
outcome, not in assessing it according to normative criteria. As noted above (section
2.1), causal analysis involves identifying the salient components of the causal process(es)
that generate an outcome and specifying their interrelationships. This latter part includes
specifying how the components interact and how changes in one part of the process affect
(the operation of) other components.
It is important to note exactly what sort of work causal analysis is doing here. To
explain, let’s distinguish between two types of causal analysis. Speculative causal analysis
specifies the mechanisms by which an institutional prescription could bring about some
52. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for The Journal of Political Philosophy for pressing me to address
this issue.
53. John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1954), 135.
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desirable outcome; explanatory causal analysis specifies the mechanisms that generate
the outcomes we observe.
To illustrate how speculative causal analysis proceeds, consider Simon Caney’s dis-
cussion of global institutional design. As discussed earlier (section 2.3.1), Caney argues
that there should be a layer of suprastate institutions that have authority to constrain the
activity of states in pursuit of cosmopolitan objectives. He discusses four mechanisms by
which suprastate institutions can realize cosmopolitan objectives.54
1. Suprastate institutions can help solve collective action problems.
2. Suprastate institutions can enforce compliance with cosmopolitan principles and
hold powerful agents accountable.
3. Suprastate institutions can empower weak agents to protect their interests.
4. Suprastate institutions can transform powerful agents’ incentives.
The important thing to note is that Caney does not discuss the mechanisms by which
cosmopolitan objectives fail to be realized in the actual world. Put differently, Caney’s
discussion of mechanisms is not a diagnosis of any social failure; it is a list of the ways
in which authoritative suprastate institutions might bring about cosmopolitan objectives
if implemented. I call this “speculative” causal analysis because it implicitly depends
on a particular diagnosis of our failure to realize cosmopolitan objectives. Whether the
operation of the specified mechanisms would bring about cosmopolitan objectives depends
on the mechanisms operating to inhibit their realization. I find it intuitively plausible
that collective action and compliance problems mitigate the realization of cosmopolitan
objectives, but this is beside the point. What we need here is to explicitly examine the
causal process(es) that inhibit our fulfillment of cosmopolitan objectives. This is what
diagnosis amounts to; this is what speculative causal analysis fails to provide.
54. See Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice and Institutional Design,” 742ff.
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It is crucial to understand that the diagnostic task requires not just any old discussion
of causal mechanisms, but explanatory causal analysis in particular. We do not seek to
understand a process by which some prescription might bring about the desired outcome,
but to understand the process(es) by which realization of our desired outcome is inhibited.
Since successful clinical theorizing crucially involves explanatory causal analysis, it is a
weakness of the ideal guidance approach that it typically ignores its importance.
3.3.3 Designing to avoid failure
Once we have a working diagnosis, we set ourselves to the design task. This balances
design objectives that follow from both the moral and causal analyses. Normatively, the
design aim is to prescribe institutional solutions that will bring about social conditions
that comport with the moral values we can endorse on the basis of impartial reasons.
The design aim that follows from our causal analysis is to prescribe feasible institutional
solutions that can intervene effectively at important places in the causal process to improve
the outcome.
Again, although we may analytically separate the normative and empirical design aims,
they are tightly intertwined in practice. Return again to the architecture/engineering anal-
ogy. Architects and engineers mutually constrain the design process. As my construc-
tion example in section 3.1 illustrated, the physical limits of different structural materials
and their various possible configurations constrain architectural possibilities; architectural
standards and values constrain the set of desirable engineering solutions. Similarly, the
moral principles we choose to endorse are constrained by the means required to realize
those principles, while our assessment of interventions is constrained by the moral cost
of implementing those interventions. To illustrate these points, consider the following
(perhaps extreme) examples. If the realization of global income equality requires the es-
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tablishment of a world government and the latter would entail unacceptable costs (moral
or otherwise), the foregoing requires that we reconsider our endorsement of global in-
come equality as an attractive moral aim. Similarly, if the best means to consolidating
democratic governance requires drastically circumscribing the liberty of dissenters, the
foregoing requires that we look for other ways to consolidate democratic reforms.
A key part of the design phase is design evaluation. We are not interested solely in
overcoming identified failures; we also seek to forestall identifiable failures. As Petroski
puts it, the design process “may be considered a succession of hypotheses that such and
such an arrangement of parts will perform a desired function without fail.”55 Each in-
stitutional design proposal is similarly a hypothesis that the institution as designed will
successfully achieve its objective under the conditions in which it will be required to oper-
ate. Given the stakes, we can’t accept such hypotheses blindly. Nor is intuition a reliable
check. Thus, the last phase of the design process is to evaluate our design hypotheses
for potential weaknesses and potentially negative path dependencies. Will the proposal
generate morally perverse consequences? Will the institution be exploited by enterprising
opportunists? Will it attract sufficient compliance? Will it close off important possibili-
ties for improvement in the future? Should we find weaknesses, we return to the drawing
board to find ways to shore them up. If simple fixes are not available, we need to con-
sider overhauling the original proposal. The aim is to establish institutions that can foster
and coordinate interactions in a way that, when aggregated, lead to morally improved so-
cial conditions that keep open possibilities for future improvement, as well as mitigate or
contain the negative consequences of socially destructive interactions.
55. Petroski, To Engineer is Human, 44; original emphasis. “Without fail” need not mean “never to be
replaced.” The point of emphasis here is the ability to achieve an objective. It is perfectly acceptable to
deliberately design something that is temporary and aims at achieving an intermediate goal, so long as the
design doesn’t close off the possibility of future progress. Thanks to Elizabeth Anderson for bringing this
point to my attention.
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The importance of the evaluation phase and the willingness to revise in light of poten-
tial weaknesses suggests that clinical theorizing about institutions is a fluid, experimental
process. We do not seek to propose an institutional configuration for all time. Nor do we
aim to put together a “master plan” that encompasses an entire system of institutions. We
are, of course, interested in uncovering the interactions between distinct components of a
larger system and avoiding negative interactions as far as possible. But we should not hold
out hope for a fully worked out ideal. Our vision is too limited, our knowledge too local.
Each proposal is tentative and experimental, aiming at piecemeal, incremental progress.
None of the foregoing shows that the design process need not be guided by target states
of affairs. Indeed, when stating the aim of the design phase, I claimed that we had “morally
improved social conditions” in view. Doesn’t this suggest the need for ideal theory as a
guide to clinical theory? Don’t we need ideal theory to guide our thinking about what
constitutes “morally improved social conditions”? To make the objection stronger, note
that it need not rely on a view of ideal theory as delivering a singular “best” state of affairs.
The easy reply in this case is that ideal theory is not up to the job.56 All that is required to
get the objection off the ground is that the design phase must be prospective in the sense
that it requires a more or less well-specified target state of affairs and that ideal theory
is required to identify the principles of regulation that govern the targeted arrangements.
This is sufficient to vindicate at least a restricted version of the ideal guidance approach.
The fact that clinical theory seeks to bring about a moral improvement of social con-
ditions means that clinical institutional design must aim at something, namely, morally
improved social conditions. But on the failure analysis approach, the design phase is
largely retrospective in the sense that our sights are set by looking backward, at the places
we have been rather than at the places we would like to go to. We design institutions to
56. See Sen, The Idea of Justice, ch. 4.
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overcome failure, not to realize an ideal. To be sure, the evaluation phase requires that we
try to anticipate potential future failures and we might say that this make failure analytic
design prospective. But this is not prospective in the sense used by the ideal guidance ap-
proach. More accurately, it is counterfactually retrospective. That is, the evaluation phase
examines where we would have been had we implemented the original design proposal.
Our design aim then is to overcome these counterfactual failures.
Designing to overcome failures has no need for the principles of regulation identified
by ideal theory. All we need to know is (1) which possible solutions are feasible; (2) which
of the feasible solutions are morally acceptable; and (3) which of the feasible, morally ac-
ceptable solutions are likely to effectively intervene at the appropriate place in the causal
process generating the failure. None of this makes reference to the principles of regula-
tion identified by ideal theory. One might argue that we need ideal theory to identify the
morally acceptable solutions within the feasible set. But there’s no reason to employ the
overwrought framework of ideal theory to help us here. Attempting to identify ideally
just arrangements and the principles that regulate them is liable to distract from the task
of identifying solutions. In any case, ordinary moral reasoning is sufficient for identify-
ing which feasible options are morally acceptable. Return to the earlier discussion of the
comparative method for identifying failures (section 3.3.1). A similar method is effec-
tive here too. We take our current social conditions and compare them to the conditions
that would arise were we to implement some particular feasible institutional solution. We
then ask ourselves: Do we think the counterfactual conditions are acceptable? Are the
counterfactual conditions an improvement upon current conditions? On the basis of which
principles do we make these judgments? Can we justifiably endorse these principles upon
reflection? This comparative process constitutes nothing other than ordinary moral reason-
ing. Of course, by “ordinary,” I do not mean to suggest that our identification of morally
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acceptable options will be easy. My point is that the design process needs nothing like
ideal theory to identify principles of regulation to serve as targets for clinical theory. The
resources we need to prescribe morally progressive institutional solutions are available
without having to take on board the baggage of ideal theory.
3.4 A Fruitful Approach?
I have argued that we should abandon ideal theory in our attempts to prescribe institu-
tional reforms to address actual injustices and adopt a failure analysis approach to clinical
institutional design. The primary drawback of the ideal guidance approach is its myopia;
it focuses on understanding and applying an ideal of justice at the expense of a detailed
understanding of the problem. Failure analysis overcomes this myopia by refocusing our
attention on the problem. By integrating causal analysis with moral analysis, a failure an-
alytic approach is more sensitive to the complexities of the problems we wish to address
without sacrificing sensitivity to the important moral considerations that rightly constrain
our attempts to address our social failures.
The preceding development of the failure analysis approach has remained largely ab-
stract. It remains to be seen how clinical theorizing about particular institutional design
problems can be improved by adopting this approach. We would be right to be skeptical
of methodological innovations that have not been put to the test, that have not been shown
to yield fruit. Hence, the best way to vindicate the preceding discussion is to employ the
failure analysis framework in thinking about problems like extreme poverty and inequal-
ity, war and military intervention, and gender and racial discrimination. This is the task
for the remainder of this essay.
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CHAPTER 4
Interlude: From Theory to Application
I have argued for two basic claims thus far:
1. Political philosophers must attend to causal mechanisms.
2. Our institutional design prescriptions must start from diagnoses of social failures.
These claims mutually reinforce each other. A requirement to attend to causal mechanisms
puts pressure on philosophers to seek causal explanations of the states of affairs for which
they prescribe institutional reforms; a requirement to diagnose social failures puts pressure
on philosophers to attend to causal explanations of the failures. These two requirements
have been brought together under the failure analysis approach to clinical institutional
design.
Any appeal the failure analysis alternative might have remains limited so long as its
articulation remains abstract. The ideal guidance approach has gained widespread adher-
ence because it bears an appealing kind of fruit: it yields institutional design prescriptions
that reflect normative principles derived from systematic reflection on our deepest moral
commitments. I don’t deny that this is a significant achievement. Instead, I deny that
the prescriptions yielded by the ideal guidance approach can fulfill the promise of non-
ideal theorizing, namely, to present institutional remedies that can effectively bring about
morally improved states of affairs amidst unjust and otherwise nonideal conditions.
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Widespread adoption of the failure analysis methodology is vindicated only if it can
fulfill this promise. Of course, whether this is so depends on whether the prescriptions
this approach yields are successfully implemented, and implementation is largely out of
theorists’ hands. But successful implementation starts with proposals that are reasonably
expected to produce the desired results. In particular, the proposal must present institu-
tional solutions that will be feasible, efficient, stable, and effective for mitigating injustice.
I argue that the failure analysis methodology yields such proposals. This claim is justified
only by the successful application of failure analytic principles to concrete problems of
institutional design. I begin the task of application in the remaining chapters.
A final methodological word before I proceed. Because failure analysis requires that
we start with a detailed diagnosis of the problem at hand, we must select problems that are
relatively narrowly described. In other words, failure analysis is not equipped to address
amorphous problems such as global poverty. Instances of poverty are so varied that any
diagnosis that seeks to unify all cases under a single explanation is bound to leave us with
institutional prescriptions that are too abstract and general to assess.1 Instead of tackling
global poverty in toto, failure analysis recommends starting with analytically tractable
problems — high incidence of easily curable diseases or the corruption that pervades many
developing countries’ public administration.
The remaining chapters focus on development failures that arise in countries with great
natural resource wealth. There is a growing consensus among development political econ-
omists that countries that are fiscally dependent on revenue from resources like oil, nat-
ural gas, or copper are more likely to be governed by authoritarian regimes and suffer
economic stagnation. Many of the countries afflicted by this “resource curse” contain a
significant percentage of the global poor; these include Angola, Democratic Republic of
1. This is perhaps another problem with much of the global justice literature; it tries to take on problems
that are analytically unmanageable and proposes solutions that are too vague to assess.
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Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan, Venezuela, and Yemen. Cursed countries comprise
more than 300 million poor people, nearly a quarter of the 1.4 billion people who live
below the World Bank’s US$1.25/day poverty line — almost half of the global poor if we
exclude China and India.2 They are often riven by civil conflict, and their residents are
harried and left destitute by corrupt leaders who prioritize personal aggrandizement over
providing their citizens with basic public goods, such as law enforcement or public infras-
tructure. Some of the characters involved are infamous for their brutality, corruption, and
thievery; names like Sani Abacha, Omar al-Bashir, Mobutu Sese Seko, Teodoro Obiang,
and Than Shwe head the list.
The resource curse is a moral disaster from any number of normative perspectives.
Victims of the resource curse have little say in the governance of their lives; they suffer
from acute welfare deprivation; their basic needs often go unmet; their physical and men-
tal integrity are continually threatened; their control over possessions is insecure; they are
subject to arbitrary and predatory rule. Any ordering of states of affairs along any dimen-
sion of moral interest (e.g., welfare, autonomy, human rights, needs, and so on) will surely
list resource cursed conditions near the bottom. Given this, we can leave aside the failure
identification stage; the resource curse is a paradigmatic case of a social failure.
Having identified a failure, we proceed to the diagnostic phase. Part of our task here
is to characterize the ways in which the resource curse constitutes a moral problem. Since
our normative analysis must focus on the causal processes that actually generate the curse,
I start my assessment of the resource curse with a causal diagnosis of the problem. This
appears in the next chapter. Chapter 6 draws out the implications of this diagnosis for our
obligations to mitigate the privation experienced by resource curse victims.
2. This statistic is lower than it should be since the data for Libya, Myanmar, and Sudan — all populous
resource dependent countries with high poverty rates — are missing. Poverty data from UNDP, Human
Development Indicies, United Nations Development Programme, 2008.
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CHAPTER 5
Explaining the Resource Curse
States that are fiscally dependent on exportable point-source natural resources,1 such
as oil, natural gas, or copper, are more likely to be governed by authoritarian regimes
or have unstable or stagnant economies.2 Recent theoretical and empirical work on this
“resource curse” highlights the fundamental importance of domestic institutional quality in
explaining why this is the case.3 At bottom, the effect of resource revenue on development
is a conditional one: resource dependent countries with weak institutions are resource-
cursed, while resource dependent countries with strong domestic institutions can escape
1. On the theoretical importance of point-source vs. diffuse resources, see Philippe Le Billon, “The Politi-
cal Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts,” Political Geography 20 (2001): 561–584. Sny-
der and Bhavnani discuss the importance of a similar distinction, that between “nonlootable” and “lootable”
resources; see Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, “Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered
Framework for Explaining Political Order,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 563–597.
2. Seminal papers include: Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53 (2001):
325–361; Wantchekon, “Why do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?” (re-
sources and regime type); and Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth,” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 5398 (1995) (resources and economic growth). There
is also a literature that claims to show that resource abundance causes higher rates of civil war onset, but this
connection is more controversial than the other two; see Christa Brunnschweiler and Erwin Bulte, “Natural
Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence, and the Onset of Civil Wars,” Oxford
Economic Papers 61, no. 4 (2009): 651–674; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil
War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–595; James D. Fearon, “Primary Commodity Exports
and Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 483–507; Macartan Humphreys, “Natural
Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
49, no. 4 (2005): 508–537.
3. Among others, see Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon, “Resource Wealth and Political Regimes
in Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 7 (2004): 816–841; Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and
Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse,” The Economic Journal 116, no. 1 (2006): 1–20;
James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier, “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse,”
Journal of Development Economics 79, no. 2 (2006): 447–468; Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”
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the deleterious effects of resource wealth.
This institutional story gets something fundamentally right: the resource curse is ul-
timately a story about the extent to which domestic political institutions enable rulers to
pursue their own interests at the expense of citizens’ rights and well-being. But standard
institutional analyses fail to consider the full effects of resource revenue on the institutional
environment itself. This is a significant blindspot. If the persistence of weak institutions
is endogenous to the resource curse, then the conditional effect of resources on develop-
ment is more subtle than the standard institutional claim. The more subtle claim is this:
if a country does not have firmly entrenched strong institutions before it becomes fiscally
reliant on resource revenue, then weak institutions will persist and it is vulnerable to the
resource curse; if a country has firmly entrenched strong institutions before it becomes
fiscally reliant on resource revenue, then it can avoid the resource curse.4
In this chapter, I present a simple formal model to support the thesis that the per-
sistence of weak institutions in resource-cursed countries is endogenous to the resource
curse. Extant theoretical models take the institutional setting as given and then theorize
about the effect of resource revenue on governance and economic performance within the
given institutional environment. In contrast, the model I present is a more general model of
domestic competition over political outcomes. I aim to identify the underlying conditions
to which governance and economic performance are sensitive. The model reduces these
outcomes to two parameters: rulers’ dependence on citizens for support and the credibility
of supporters’ exit threats. Having shown that development outcomes are sensitive to these
parameters, I then theorize about how resource revenue affects them. The model shows
that if a ruler does not depend on support from a broad coalition of citizens prior to the
inflow of resource revenue, resource revenue undermines any impetus to increase his de-
4. I define weak and strong institutions in the next section.
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pendence on their support. However, if a ruler relies on citizens’ support prior to resource
discovery (and citizens’ have credible exit options), then the ruler uses resource revenue
to advance citizens’ interests.
5.1 Institutions and the Resource Curse
Let’s begin with some definitions. Let “ruler” denote the individual or group who re-
tains ultimate authority to implement or block the implementation of policy, as well as
the loyal bureaucrats to whom particular tasks are delegated.5 We can distinguish be-
tween two broad types of domestic institutional structures. Generally, strong institutions
empower (formally or informally) a broad coalition of citizens to effectively check the for-
mation and implementation of policy; weak institutions, in contrast, afford the ruler wide
latitude to implement policy without having to consult citizens’ interests. Roughly, strong
institutions limit a ruler’s discretion over policy decisions, while weak institutions fail to
limit a ruler’s discretion over policy decisions. Of particular importance here is the extent
of a ruler’s discretion over resource revenue. Weak institutions afford rulers wide latitude
to use resource revenue as they see fit, whereas strong institutions empower citizens to
oversee the use of resource revenue.
Stated generally, the core propositions of the standard institutional story are these:
The economic resource curse: Weak domestic institutions permit a ruler to allocate re-
source revenue in ways that inhibit sustainable economic productivity.
The political resource curse: Weak domestic institutions permit a ruler to allocate re-
source revenue in ways that undermine stable executive accountability to a broad
coalition of citizens.
Debate remains over how to specify the italicized phrases. Although political econo-
mists disagree about precisely which mechanisms cause the curse, there does seem to
5. Where convenience dictates, I refer to rulers using male pronouns.
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be widespread agreement that the curse is a result of various policy failures. This has led
to an emphasis on choosing the right policies to avoid the pernicious developmental effects
of resource wealth. Initially, development economists tended to focus on various macroe-
conomic policy failures — lack of sectoral diversification, in particular, lack of investment
in internationally competitive manufacturing; overconsumption of resource revenue and
failure to smooth spending, thereby increasing budget vulnerability to price volatility; and
underinvestment in human capital (e.g., education and health care).6 But it was soon noted
that macroeconomic policy failure is a political outcome. Thus, the resource curse litera-
ture has come to focus on the contribution of political factors to the curse. These include
unaccountable states with weak bureaucratic structures, which undermine their ability to
govern effectively; a political economy rife with corruption and patronage; and lack of
transparency in resource sales and revenue spending.7 In particular, several papers have
focused on the fact that resource wealth decreases the state ruler’s need to raise revenue
via taxation. This is developmentally deleterious for at least two reasons. Since it is not
their money being spent, citizens’ incentive and ability to hold rulers fiscally accountable
is diminished. The lack of accountability weakens the ties between the rulers and citizens,
widening the gap between their respective interests. Investing in development — which
is good for citizens — need not be in the interest of rulers. Moreover, the lack of fiscal
oversight permits rulers to invest in their personal aggrandizement with impunity — even
ignoring the fact that citizens’ ability to hold rulers accountable is severely compromised
by the latter’s capacity to suppress dissent.8
6. Richard Auty, ed., Resource Abundance and Economic Development (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001); Alan Gelb and Associates, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1988); Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European
Economic Review 45 (2001): 827–838.
7. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About
It? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jensen and Wantchekon, “Resource Wealth”; Ross, “Does
Oil Hinder Democracy?”
8. Cf. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
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This standard institutional explanation gets something fundamentally right: the re-
source curse is ultimately a story about the incentives generated by the domestic political
economy into which resource revenue flows; it is a story about the extent to which do-
mestic political institutions enable rulers to pursue their own interests while disregarding
ordinary citizens’ rights and well-being. However, standard institutional analyses fail to
consider the extent to which the persistence of the weak institutions is endogenous to
the resource curse. What if the incentive structure that generates overconsumption and
underinvestment, corruption and patronage, unaccountability and repression also inhibits
voluntary establishment of the institutional mechanisms required to avoid these ills?
Upon reflection, it is difficult to see how things could be otherwise. Positive institu-
tional reform arises from voluntarily implementing policies that increase rulers’ account-
ability to citizens and thereby secure citizens’ rights and improve general economic well-
being. If — as the institutional explanation claims — the resource curse arises from an in-
stitutional environment that encourages bad policies (i.e., policies that disregard citizens’
rights and general well-being), we have little reason to think that voluntary institutional
reform is likely under those same institutional conditions.
As noted above, the standard institutional explanation makes a conditional claim:
states with weak institutions suffer the curse, while those with strong institutions can avoid
the curse. But if the persistence of weak institutions is endogenous to the resource curse,
then this conditional claim is too simple. The endogenous institutions thesis implies a
more subtle conditional claim:
If a country does not have firmly entrenched strong institutions before it be-
comes fiscally reliant on resource revenue, then its weak institutions will per-
University of California Press, 1997); Hussein Mahdavy, “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Devel-
opment in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in Studies in Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M. A.
Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Mick Moore, “Political Underdevelopment: What Causes
‘Bad Governance’,” Public Management Review 3, no. 3 (2001): 385–418; Michael L. Ross, “Does Taxation
Lead to Representation?” British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 (2004): 229–249.
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sist and it is vulnerable to the resource curse; if a country has firmly en-
trenched strong institutions before it becomes fiscally reliant on resource rev-
enue, then it can avoid the resource curse.
This claim consolidates those kept separate by the distinct economic and political resource
curse claims, revealing them to be components of a single story. The economic resource
curse strikes when institutions facilitate the misallocation of resource revenue in the do-
mestic political economy; the political resource curse strikes when institutions permit the
ruler to allocate revenue in a way that undermines accountability to a broad coalition of
citizens. Weak institutions lie at the bottom of both of these phenomena. Institutions that
permit rulers to undermine accountability mechanisms facilitate misallocation of resource
revenues in the political economy. Hence, the resource curse is embodied by the persis-
tence of weak institutions induced by fiscal reliance on resource revenue.
I make the case for this claim in the remainder of this chapter. This endogeneity claim
has important implications for the efficacy of standard prescriptions to address the resource
curse. I consider these in the next chapter.
5.2 From Policy Choice to Institutional Design
Extant theoretical models take as given the institutional setting into which resource
revenue flows and then consider the effects resource revenue has within the given institu-
tional structure.
Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier model an institutional setting where clientelism is per-
mitted — that is, the ruler is permitted to offer public sector jobs in exchange for political
support — and then show that resource booms increase clientelism.9 Since the private sec-
tor is assumed to be more productive than the public sector, these increases in public sector
employment decrease overall economic productivity. Since resource booms improve ex-
9. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse.”
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traction efficiency and thereby have a positive effect elsewhere in the economy, Robinson
et al conclude that institutional obstacles to clientelism play a key role. Institutions that fa-
cilitate clientelism make it more likely that resource booms will lower total income, while
those that circumscribe clientelism will benefit from resource booms.
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik distinguish between grabber friendly institutions and pro-
ducer friendly institutions — between institutions that encourage rent-seeking activity and
those that encourage economically productive activity.10 To model the extent to which
institutions are grabber friendly, they include a term λ that measures producers’ average
share of the resource rents relative to grabbers’ average share; a higher λ means that in-
stitutions are producer friendly. Mehlum et al then derive several key results. Not surpris-
ingly, higher quality institutions — more producer friendly institutions — encourage more
productive activity than lower quality institutions. Further, as resource revenue increases,
institutional quality must also increase to encourage productive activity and discourage
rent-seeking behavior. Finally, resource windfalls raise total income when institutional
quality is high, but lower total income when institutional quality is low.
Wantchekon models an institutional setting where the state’s law enforcement capacity
is low, giving the ruler discretionary control over the budget.11 When the risk of armed re-
bellion is low, the ruler uses resource rents to secure political support rather than invest in
economic productivity; when the risk of armed rebellion is high, the ruler invests in repres-
sive technology to secure his rule. Wantchekon attributes an incumbency advantage to this
control over the budget and uses this incumbency advantage to explain democratic break-
down and autocratic consolidation in resource abundant countries. Wantchekon concludes
that institutions that enforce a transparent and rule-oriented distribution of resource rents
reduces the ruler’s discretionary control over the budget and thereby improve democratic
10. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse.”
11. Wantchekon, “Why do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?”
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stability.12
Each of these models treats (changes to) institutional quality as exogenous. They con-
sider how resource revenue induces clientelism, or rent-seeking behavior, or repression
within a particular institutional environment. But notice that these types of behavior not
only affect development outcomes, but also have a weakening effect on institutions. Clien-
telistic public sector employment undermines the coherence and competence of the state
bureaucracy, which in turn decreases the state’s capacity to collect taxes and increases the
ruler’s discretionary control over the budget. Rent-seeking undermines a rational, princi-
pled budgetary process, which facilitates waste and corruption. Repression consolidates a
ruler’s power and alters the effective channels by which political power can change hands.
All this raises a natural question: how does resource revenue affect the institutional envi-
ronment that facilitates, for example, clientelism, rent-seeking, or reppression? Failure to
consider this question represents a significant shortcoming of the resource curse literature.
Put simply, extant theory describes the ways in which resource revenue induces policy
choices that are deleterious for political and economic development, but it neglects any ef-
fect resource revenue might have on the underlying conditions that determine those policy
choices. To fill this gap, I present a general model of domestic competition over political
outcomes. In the model, groups of domestic constituents use whatever bargaining lever-
age they have to induce the ruler to choose policies that advance their interests. When
constituents lack bargaining leverage, the ruler is free to set policy as he sees fit; when
constituents possess bargaining leverage, they are able to constrain the ruler’s choices.
My aim is to identify the conditions that determine constituents’ bargaining strength.
Since relative bargaining strength shapes political choice, the model identifies the un-
derlying strategic conditions to which choices (and, hence, development outcomes) are
12. Cf. Francesco Caselli and Tom Cunningham, “Leader Behaviour and the Natural Resource Curse,”
Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 4 (2009): 628–650.
94
sensitive. The model reduces constituents’ bargaining strength to two parameters: (1) the
extent to which a ruler depends on constituents for (financial, political, military) support
to retain political power; and (2) the credibility of supporters’ exit threats (roughly, the
extent to which they can quit negotiations with the ruler without harming themselves).
Having shown that policy selection is sensitive to these parameters, I then theorize about
how resource revenue affects them.
One advantage of the model is that it presents a single framework for analyzing the
effect of resource revenue on both institutional design and the policy choices made within
any particular institutional setting. As I noted earlier, voluntary institutional reforms result
from political choices. Citizens receive assurance that their ruler will protect their rights
and promote their material well-being when institutional mechanisms are established to
limit the ruler’s discretion over policy. A ruler implements such limitations when he must.
To elicit cooperation from citizens, a ruler commits himself to advance citizens’ interests
by limiting his discretion over policy. Institutional design is here made a choice variable.
This permits us to study the effect of resource revenue on institutional design by examining
the effect of resource revenue on the conditions that determine political choices more
generally.
I present the model informally in the next section, highlighting the conditions that
shape political choices. (My reasoning is formalized in appendix A.) The following sec-
tion theorizes the effects resource revenue has on these conditions and, thus, on political
choices.
5.3 A Model of Political Competition
The lesson we learn from the institutional explanation of the resource curse is that the
curse is avoided when rulers choose to advance citizens’ general interests — when rulers
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choose to implement domestic mechanisms that limit their discretion over policy or when
rulers choose policies that advance citizens’ interests in secure rights and material well-
being. The question guiding our examination of the model is this: Under what conditions
do rulers advance citizens’ general interests?
I start with the truism that political choices arise from bargaining between different
groups within a polity, identified by their policy goals on a given issue. To gain insight into
the conditions under which rulers advance citizens’ interests, we must examine the general
strategic logic that regulates these bargaining interactions. The literature on institutional
development yields two basic insights. The first states that a state ruler’s dependence on a
reliable source of revenue to consolidate and sustain his monopoly on the use of effective
force in a territory leads him to exchange goods for private citizens’ provision of revenue.
Specifically, rulers provide things like domestic and international security, secure property
rights, favorable macroeconomic policies, and political representation in exchange for cit-
izens’ tax payments and help with securing loans.13 Consolidating one’s monopoly on
the use of force could be motivated by any number of considerations — the need to se-
cure personal political survival; the need to protect one’s assets; the need to secure trade
routes; the need to reliably enforce the law. The ruler’s motivation is immaterial; he has
incentive to seek citizens’ resources insofar as he is unable to pay the cost of consolidating
13. This general claim has a long and distinguished pedigree. See, for example, Robert H. Bates and
Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, “A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government,” Politics
& Society 14, no. 1 (1985): 53–70; Bates, Prosperity and Violence; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Rev-
enue (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988); Douglass C. North and Robert
Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973); Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49,
no. 4 (1989): 803–832; Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political
Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–576; Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized
Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States. Many of these
sources present case studies — early modern European cases in North and Thomas and Tilly; contemporary
African cases in Bates — to illustrate the operative strategic logic.
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his monopoly on the use of force from the revenue generated by his personal assets.14 As
Charles Tilly puts it in a study of the origins of the modern European state:
[T]he people who controlled European states and states in the making warred
in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus enjoy the advantages
of power within a secure or expanding territory. To make more effective war,
they attempted to locate more capital. . . . In the long run, the quest inevitably
involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply
and arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another
on the people and activities within their sphere of control. [. . . ] Variations
in the difficulty of collecting taxes, in the expense of the particular kind of
armed force adopted, in the amount of war making required to hold off com-
petitors, and so on resulted in the principal variations in the forms of European
states. It all began with the effort to monopolize the means of violence within
a delimited territory adjacent to a power holder’s base.15
Using “[v]ariations in the difficulty of collecting taxes” and so on, to explain the “princi-
pal variations in the forms” of states points to the bargaining dynamic underlying public
goods provision. Wherever citizens could make tax collection difficult (e.g., by hiding liq-
uid assets from tax collectors) or wherever internal rivals made consolidating a monopoly
on the use of force expensive (e.g., by presenting a credible threat to rebel), the ruler was
compelled to make concessions in exchange for cooperation — to provide protection, or to
enforce stable property rights, or subject himself to the oversight of citizens’ representa-
tives. Where this was not the case, the ruler could extract from citizens with impunity. We
can state the point more generally. Rulers are compelled to limit themselves and provide
public goods wherever two conditions are met: first, they depend on the cooperation of
some group of citizens to pursue their objectives, whatever those are; second, the citizens
on whose cooperation the ruler depends have credible exit options, that is, they can with-
hold their cooperation without making themselves worse off than they would be were they
to cooperate and provide the ruler with revenue.16
14. The ruler’s objective need not even be the consolidation of his monopoly on the use of force. He has
incentive to seek citizens’ resources insofar as he is unable to personally finance the pursuit of his objectives,
whatever they are.
15. Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 172.
16. The reasoning presented here is formalized by Clark, Golder, and Golder, “The Balance of Power.”
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The first insight obscures the fact that a ruler’s need to respond to the demands of a
group of citizens need not produce public goods. Political outcomes depend not only on
the bargaining strength of citizens relative to the ruler, but also on the composition of the
ruler’s support coalition. This leads to the second basic insight: all else equal, the ruler
is more likely to provide public goods as (1) the number of people on whom the ruler
depends for support increases, or (2) the credibility of the supporters’ options for backing
a leadership rival increases.17
The logic here is not complicated. Rulers want to retain power. Typically, they require
the support of some subset of the population (the “winning coalition”) to stay in power;
without the loyal cooperation of their supporters, rulers are vulnerable to challenges from
leadership rivals. Members of the winning coalition are drawn from a larger subset of
the population, the “selectorate.” The selectorate is composed of all members of a polity
that could potentially become members of the ruler’s winning coalition. In a democracy,
the selectorate comprises all those who are eligible to vote; in a military junta, powerful
military officers; in a monarchy, the nobles. Supporters pledge their allegiance to the
leadership candidate who can credibly offer them the best package of benefits. Thus, to
retain the loyalty of his supporters, a ruler provides them with a package of benefits that is
better than the package they could expect to receive from a leadership rival. When a ruler
depends on a small winning coalition, it is most efficient for him to provide his supporters
with private goods — monopoly grants, control over tracts of natural resources, public
sector jobs, or opportunities for corruption. Since the ruler must retain the support of a
17. See Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; for an accessible overview, see Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita et al., “Political Competition and Economic Growth,” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1
(2001): 58–72. On the importance of the last point, see William Roberts Clark et al., “Why Do Autocrats
Overachieve? Political Competition and Material Well-Being in Comparative Perspective” (University of
Michigan and Rutgers University, unpublished manuscript, 2010). The last point is qualified in an important
way below. For cases illustrating the operation of this logic in post-colonial Africa, see Robert H. Bates,
When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
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relatively small group of people, and since the benefits of private goods can be targeted
(i.e., they accrue only to the holder of the good), private goods provision is a relatively
cheap way to provide a high value package of goods to supporters. However, as the size of
the winning coalition grows, the ruler’s spending must be spread over more supporters and
the value of an individual’s private goods package diminishes. At some point, the winning
coalition becomes large enough that it is more efficient for the ruler to provide public
goods — security, law enforcement, individual liberties, infrastructure, or investment in
human capital (e.g., education or public health) — rather than private goods. Although
the benefits of public goods are nonexcludable (i.e., they accrue to everyone in the polity
if they accrue to anyone) and so cannot be targeted to supporters, there are economies
of scale in providing public goods, which enables a ruler to provide his supporters with
a higher value package of public goods than the package of private goods that could be
provided to each supporter for the same amount of total spending. Thus, a ruler becomes
more inclined to provide public goods as the size of his support coalition grows, all else
equal.
Similarly, in the absence of reliable sources of non-tax income (e.g., natural resources
or foreign aid), a ruler becomes more likely to provide public goods as the credibility of
his supporters’ threats to back a rival increase, even if the absolute size of the winning
coalition is small. More credible threats translate into greater bargaining leverage for
supporters, which enables them to demand a greater package of private goods in exchange
for their support. To meet the increasing demands of his supporters, a ruler must raise
revenue to finance private goods provision. Without reliable sources of non-tax income,
the ruler must turn his attention to increasing tax revenue. This means increasing the
number of taxpayers or increasing the income of his tax base. A ruler can do both by
fostering broad-based economic growth, which is most effectively and efficiently done by
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providing public goods rather than private goods. Consequently, absent reliable sources
of non-tax revenue, a ruler becomes more inclined to provide public goods — albeit as a
means to finance private goods provision — as the credibility of his supporters’ threats to
back a rival increases, all else equal.18
We can summarize the overall picture we get from these two basic insights as follows.
Wherever a ruler requires the (political, financial, military) support of a subset of the
population to retain power and those supporters gain bargaining leverage from credible
exit threats (e.g., asset mobility, private militias, credible leadership rivals), the supporters
will be able to extract favorable concessions from the leader. Whether the benefits of those
concessions accrue only to individual supporters or to citizens more widely depends on the
composition of the ruler’s support coalition — whether he only requires the support of a
small group of elites or of a broad coalition of citizens — and the extent to which the leader
must stimulate economic growth to finance his provision of goods.
This general picture emphasizes the importance of citizens’ bargaining strength rela-
tive to the ruler in shaping political choices. But it neglects the importance of both the
relative bargaining strength of distinct groups of citizens vis-a`-vis the ruler and the rela-
tive value of their loyalty to the ruler. A ruler’s choices depend not only on the bargaining
strength of the ruler’s supporters relative to the ruler, but also the bargaining strength of
supporters vis-a`-vis the ruler relative to the bargaining strength of other groups of citizens.
Similarly, a ruler’s choices depend not only on the value of supporters’ loyalty to the ruler,
but also the value of supporters’ loyalty to the ruler relative to the value of other groups’
loyalty to the ruler.19 Thus, to enhance our understanding of the conditions under which
rulers advance citizens’ interests, we must examine the logic of political choice when the
18. See Clark et al., “Why Do Autocrats Overachieve?”
19. Cf. “Not only the ruling class, but all classes whose resources and activities affected the prepara-
tion for war, left their imprint on European states” (Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 27; my
emphasis).
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ruler must negotiate with multiple groups, not simply with his supporters.
To incorporate this insight, suppose a ruler must now negotiate with two groups, an
elite class and a class of ordinary citizens.20 Suppose further that the ruler provides public
goods only in exchange for citizens’ cooperation; if he attempts to secure elites’ cooper-
ation, he provides private goods.21 He keeps everything for himself if he requires neither
elites’ nor citizens’ cooperation. Finally, suppose that public goods provision advances
citizens’ interests generally, whereas private goods provision advances only the interests
of their recipients and detracts from the interests of non-recipients.
An actor has valuable loyalty just in case the ruler prefers to concede to her control of
the prize over which they are bargaining rather than retain control of the prize for himself.
An actor has a credible exit option just in case she can quit the negotiation with the ruler
without making herself worse off than if she had continued and received the worst possible
bargaining outcome. Examples, alluded to above, include the ability to move one’s assets
to avoid appropriation by the ruler, whether by taxation or theft; the ability to provide per-
sonal security and resist the ruler’s demands with a private militia; the ability to emigrate;
or the ability to back a leadership rival in exchange for a greater package of goods.
The strategic logic that governs the ruler’s choice under these circumstances is the
same as above. So it remains true that he must make concessions to any group whose
support he requires to retain power and who have credible exit threats. Although they
remain necessary conditions, citizens’ possession of valuable loyalty and credible exit
threats are no longer sufficient to produce public goods, as they are above. To avoid bad
outcomes — outcomes where citizens’ interests are harmed — it must also be true that ei-
ther the elites have no credible exit options or their support is less valuable to the ruler for
20. The following reasoning is presented formally in appendix A.
21. This assumption is required for the model to produce any interesting variation; if the ruler provides
public (or private) goods regardless of his supporters’ identity, the logic underlying the ruler’s choice is
obscured.
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achieving his objectives than is the citizens’. If elites have credible exit options and their
support is more valuable to the ruler than the citizens’, then even if citizens have credible
exit options and valuable loyalty, the ruler will provide private rather than public goods.
Summing up: Rulers advance citizens’ interests when two conditions are met. The
first is a disjunctive requirement: either the ruler depends on the support of a broad coali-
tion of citizens and elites have no exit options; or the leader depends more heavily on the
support of a broad coalition of citizens to achieve his objectives than on the support of a
small elite group. Second, the citizens whose support is required have credible exit op-
tions. When these conditions are satisfied, state rulers are constrained to advance citizens’
general interests.22
Obviously, the model is schematic in an important sense: it grossly oversimplifies
the dynamics of political choice by reducing actors and demands to simple parameter
values. There are many ways we could complicate the model: we could make the prize
divisible; elites’ demands could induce the provision of public goods (as in early modern
England or postcolonial Botswana); rulers could provides citizens with private goods (as
in Saudi Arabia or Venezuela); we could add civil society groups to the bargaining table
or allow individuals to be members in multiple groups; the ruler could seek cooperation
from multiple groups in civil society. We haven’t even discussed all the ways we could
complicate the sequence of moves made by the actors. All these amendments would make
the model much more faithful to the complex situations we actually observe.
These amendments would also make the model considerably less tractable and thereby
undermine its point. The aim of the model is not to adequately capture the reality of
political choice or even to accurately predict actual outcomes. I use the model to trace
the strategic logic underlying political choice; the assumptions I make serve this purpose
22. The claim made in this paragraph corresponds to proposition A.8 in the formal appendix.
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alone. Actors and demands are reduced to parameters so that we can identify the parame-
ters to which development outcomes are sensitive, as well as the ways in which outcomes
are sensitive to the salient parameters. Once we precisely trace the logic, we can better
anticipate how changes in the parameters will affect the outcome. For example, using the
logic identified by the model, we can expect that if elites’ interests were best served by a
mix of private and public goods and they had the requisite bargaining leverage, then the
ruler would provide a mix of private and public goods, which would produce a mix of
development successes and failures. Or suppose the ruler depends (in different ways) on
both the elite and citizens and both groups have credible exit options. We could anticipate
that the ruler would divide the prize between the elites and citizens to placate them both.
My point here is that the model acquires a certain amount of flexibility in virtue of its
simplicity. We can apply the model’s insights to a wide and complex range of situations
because it is so simple.
5.4 Resource Revenue and Political Choice
How does resource wealth affect the logic of political choice? The most straightfor-
ward effect is to reduce the ruler’s need to “earn” his income by reducing his reliance on
tax revenue. In Mick Moore’s words, “[s]tate revenue can be considered ‘earned’ to the
extent that the state apparatus has to put in organizational and political effort in working
with citizens to get its money.”23 Simply, resource wealth reduces the ruler’s need to put in
effort to elicit cooperation from citizens to get his money. The importance of this point has
been repeatedly stressed in case studies of the Arab gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
23. Moore, “Political Underdevelopment,” 389.
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Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates),24 Iran,25 and Venzuela,26 as well as more general
studies of the link between taxation and democratization.27
When the ruler no longer depends on citizens as a source of revenue, he no longer
needs to negotiate with citizens to secure their financial cooperation. The ruler retains
discretion over the budget, which facilitates revenue misallocation throughout the econ-
omy.28 The ruler can use resource revenue to finance consolidation of his rule and so fend
off leadership challenges without requiring cooperation from citizens (at the polls, in arms,
etc.). In terms of the theory sketched above, a ruler flush with resource revenue no longer
depends on the citizens’ fiscal support to finance his attempts to retain power. Hence, he
need not establish institutional mechanisms that grant citizens oversight of the policy for-
mation process, such as representative bodies or a transparent budgetary process. More
perniciously, where a ruler does not depend on the electoral support of a broad coalition
of citizens to stay in office, he is freed from having to use resource revenue to secure
wide electoral support. This permits him to retain more of the revenue for himself with
impunity.
Relatedly, resource wealth frees the ruler from the need to foster economic growth to
meet demands for private goods. As noted above, when the ruler relies on tax revenue to
finance private goods provision, it is possible that the benefits of concessions to a small
group of elites accrue to citizens more widely.29 For example, as North and Weingast ar-
24. Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (1987):
1–18; Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in The Rentier State: Nation, State and the
Integration of the Arab World, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Croom Helm, 1987);
Kiren Aziz Chaudry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1997).
25. Mahdavy, “Patterns and Problems.”
26. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty.
27. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”; Ross, “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?” Herb registers
tentative disagreement; see Michael Herb, “No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and
Democracy,” Comparative Politics 37, no. 3 (2005): 297–316.
28. Cf. Wantchekon, “Why do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?”
29. See Clark et al., “Why Do Autocrats Overachieve?”
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gue, if elites interests are served by concessions that foster widespread economic growth,
such as secure property rights and the right to oversee taxation, then eventually citizens
more generally come to benefit from the ruler’s responsiveness to elites.30 But this possi-
bility is diminished by fiscal reliance on resource wealth, which tends to encourage rent-
seeking rather than productive activity on the part of elites.31 The benefits demanded by
elites in the context of resource dependence tend to be private rather than public in nature.
In fact, if the absolute value of the resource revenue is large enough, rulers might pre-
empt citizen discontent and foster loyalty by providing private goods to citizens-at-large,
such as direct cash transfers (the Arab gulf states) or transfers in kind (Venezuela). More-
over, the availability of resource revenue enables the ruler to meet these demands without
needing to raise tax revenue and, thus, without needing to provide productivity-enhancing
public goods. Without the need to foster economic growth, the ruler has little incentive to
implement a rational budget process or establish a coherent development strategy.
Finally, resource wealth affects the availability of exit options. Oil wells and copper
mines can’t be moved. Consequently, when the ruler neglects the interests of resource
holders, the latter can’t force policy concessions by threatening to take their enterprise
elsewhere.32 Thus, even if their support is essential for political survival, resource holders
are vulnerable to state predation due to a lack of credible exit options.
In general, the state’s fiscal reliance on resource wealth generates a curse because it
permits a ruler to rule autonomously, that is, to rule without having to consult citizens’
30. North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment.”
31. See Jean-Marie Baland and Patrick Francois, “Rent-Seeking and Resource Booms,” Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 61 (2000): 527–542; Aaron Tornell and Philip R. Lane, “The Voracity Effect,” American
Economic Review 89, no. 1 (1999): 22–46; Ragnar Torvik, “Natural Resources, Rent Seeking, and Welfare,”
Journal of Development Economics 67 (2002): 455–470. See Bates, When Things Fell Apart and Karl, The
Paradox of Plenty for illustrative examples.
32. It has been suggested to me that resource holders could threaten to destroy the resource stock. But this
is not a credible threat. Consider the fact that foreign oil companies in Venezuela continued to do business
despite losing 78% of their profits to the state by 1970! (ibid., 112.) Even if resource holders are left with
little after state appropriation, that’s still more than nothing.
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interests. The theory here comports with the central findings of the resource curse liter-
ature.33 When a ruler no longer needs citizens’ money, he has no incentive to increase
his tax base by fostering economic growth. This frees the ruler to use the revenue to pur-
sue his personal aggrandizement or politically motivated “white elephant” projects rather
than invest in human capital accumulation or sectoral diversification. Nor does he have
any incentive to develop a rational and meritocratic bureaucracy, since he has no need to
effectively collect taxes. This increases the ruler’s discretionary power in policy-making,
while freeing him to use public sector jobs as patronage to buy support. When a ruler no
longer counts on citizens’ political support, his performance is no longer subject to citizen
oversight. This frees the ruler to pursue his own objectives by any means necessary with
impunity.
So far, the story is a familiar one. But the model I have presented shows that the re-
source curse is more pernicious than previously thought. What makes the resource curse so
difficult to overcome is the fact that the autonomy afforded a ruler by resource wealth un-
dermines any incentive he might have to implement institutional reforms that limit his au-
tonomy. The resource curse is avoided when state rulers are constrained by a strong insti-
tutional structure, by institutional mechanisms that insure that rulers use resource revenue
to finance initiatives that advance citizens’ general interests, and enable citizens to remove
them in the case of failure to do so. Historically, the development of strong institutional
structures is the result of protracted bargaining between rulers and citizens — typically
carried out over decades, even centuries — the need for which arises from rulers’ need to
obtain citizens’ cooperation to fend of leadership challenges. By undermining a ruler’s
need to negotiate with citizens to consolidate his rule, resource wealth undermines a cen-
tral impetus for positive institutional change. This is why it makes sense to refer to the
33. See the discussion in section 5.2.
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resource curse as a trap. Once resource revenue is introduced into a weak institutional en-
vironment, it inhibits implementation of the institutional reforms needed to overcome the
negative developmental effects of resource wealth. In other words, the weak institutions
that engender the resource curse are endogenous to the causal process precipitating the
curse.
The central lesson is this: the resource curse occurs not because the incentives gen-
erated by the domestic political economy encourage negligent, corrupt, and sometimes
violent predators to acquire and wield power to the detriment of citizens, but because the
domestic political economy generates incentives for anyone who ultimately controls re-
source revenue to rule in a negligent, corrupt, and sometimes violent fashion. More to the
point, the resource curse strikes whenever resource revenue flows into a domestic political
economy with a weak institutional structure. Under such conditions, it matters little who
holds power or how they acquired it. Once in office, the lack of institutional constraints
permits the ruler to rule autonomously, which subsequently permits him to rule without
regard for citizens’ general interest in secure rights and material well-being.
5.5 Empirical Implications
According to the theory I have presented, the following claim is true:
If a country does not have firmly entrenched strong institutions before it be-
comes fiscally reliant on resource revenue, then its weak institutions will per-
sist and it is vulnerable to the resource curse; if a country has firmly en-
trenched strong institutions before it becomes fiscally reliant on resource rev-
enue, then it can avoid the resource curse.
If this claim is true, what should we observe empirically? Contrary to a recent paper by
Haber and Menaldo, the theory does not imply a systematic relationship between fiscal
reliance on resource revenue and the quality of governance; an increase in fiscal reliance
on resources need not precipitate a decline in institutional quality and a decrease in fiscal
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reliance need not precipitate improvements in institutional quality.34 The theory I have
presented is consistent with multifarious observable relationships. Following an increase
in the state’s fiscal reliance on resource revenue, institutional quality could: (1) remain the
same; (2) decline; (3) improve temporarily or sporadically but consistently return to lower
levels; (4) improve but remain below some threshold level of strength (in the case of weak
institutions); (5) perhaps even improve above some threshold level of strength (in the case
where strong institutions preceded the increased fiscal reliance). Hence, against Dunning’s
claim to the contrary, an institutional theory of the resource curse can account for demo-
cratic persistence following increases in resource revenue.35 If the theory is consistent with
so many observations, is there any way to tell whether the theory is wrong?
The theory does imply clear counterexamples; it tells us what we should definitely not
observe. If the theory is correct, then if weak institutions precede a state’s fiscal reliance
on resource revenue, we should not observe stable and consistent improvement in insti-
tutional quality in the face of sustained fiscal reliance on resources. Do we observe such
counterexamples?
As a start, consider Haber and Menaldo’s classification of fiscally reliant states — those
whose governments received an average of 5% of their revenues from resources from 1972
to 1999. Suppose we take the Polity regime measure — an index constructed from com-
ponents measuring the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and com-
petitiveness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the executive’s policy making
power — as a good proxy for institutional strength.36 In Haber and Menaldo’s analysis, a
34. See Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal
of the Resource Curse,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 1 (2011): 1–26.
35. See Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 54.
36. On the Polity measure, see Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2006” (University of Maryland, unpublished manuscript, 2008). We
will have reason to reject this as a measure of institutional strength later.
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country is democratic if it scores 7 or above on the Combined Polity 2 measure.37 Accord-
ing to their classification, there are seven countries that “democratized during or after a
resource boom”: Botswana, Ecuador, Mexico, Mongolia, Peru, Russia, and Venezuela.38
Of these, Botswana is misclassified using their own coding rules; it received a Polity 2
score of 7 or above from 1969 through 2007, but only became fiscally reliant on diamond
revenue during the early 1970s. Of the remaining cases, two of them have been classified
as democratic for a comparatively short time — Mexico (since 2000) and Russia (since
2001) — and a third, Peru, has not been stably democratic (1980–1991, 2000–present). As
noted earlier, the theory is consistent with temporary or sporadic institutional improve-
ments; it implies that fiscal reliance on resource revenue inhibits sustained institutional
improvement. Hence, although we should not exclude these cases as potential counterex-
amples, we should reserve judgment on them until they have been stably democratic for a
longer period.
We are now left with three strong candidate counterexamples to the theory: Ecuador,
Mongolia, and Venezuela. Of these, Venezuela presents the most striking potential coun-
terexample to my theory. Regarding fiscal reliance, Venezuela has sustained much higher
levels of reliance on resource revenues for much longer than either Ecuador or Mongo-
lia. By 1932, oil provided more than 30% of government revenues and its mean fiscal
reliance on oil was 53% through 2007. Ecuador, by comparison, started receiving re-
source revenues in 1972, averaging nearly 29% through 2005. Alternatively, Venezuela’s
total resource income averaged $1693 per capita from 1930 to 2007, dipping slightly be-
low $1000 per capita only twice since 1946. Mongolia, by comparison, averaged $242
per capita from 1957 (its first year receiving resource revenue) to 2006, topping $500 per
37. The original Polity 2 measure ranges from −10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). Haber and
Menaldo normalize it to range from 0 to 100. Hence, in their data, a country is democratic if it scores 85 or
above. See Haber and Menaldo, “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?” 4, 5.
38. See ibid., 6.
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capita only twice (2005, 2006).39
Regarding institutional quality, Venezuela had been held up as a model for other Latin
American countries, hailed for the stability of its democratic institutions from the time it
emerged from military rule in 1958 until the political crisis experienced in the late-1990s.
By comparison, Mongolia has only been classified as a democracy for a comparatively
short time (since 1992), while Ecuador’s democratic run lasted roughly 21 years, showing
signs of instability beginning in 2000.
In sum, Venezuela has sustained higher levels of fiscal reliance on resource revenue,
for a longer time, while sustaining stable democratic institutions for longer than either
Ecuador or Mongolia. In addition, Venezuela established democratic institutions after
a longer period of relatively high resource dependence (roughly 20 years) than either
Ecuador (7 years) or Mongolia (12–15 years). Given all this, the theory implies that if
any country should have succumbed to the resource curse, it should have been Venezuela.
Venezuela should not have been able to sustain democratic institutions for so long given
the depth and duration of its resource dependence prior to and after the emergence of
democratic institutions.
Examining the Venezuelan case is thus a good preliminary test for my theory. Specifi-
cally, we must probe the Venezuelan case in more detail for evidence that the mechanisms
posited by my theory were not at work; in particular, we must examine whether Venezue-
lan institutions were strong in the sense defined above — namely, that they empowered a
broad coalition of citizens to effectively check the ruler’s discretion over policy forma-
tion. If this turns out to be true, we have good reason to at least modify the theory I have
presented above.
39. Statistics derived from Haber and Menaldo’s dataset, received from authors. Fiscal reliance data is not
available for Mongolia.
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5.6 Venezuela: A Test Case
Is Venezuela a genuine counterexample? Was it able to establish strong institutions
despite its heavy resource dependence prior to and after democratization? Reflection on
Venezuela’s institutional history suggests not. Scholars seem to agree that Venezuela’s
history has been marked by extreme presidentialism. Even during its democratic pe-
riod, Venezuela’s institutions have granted the chief executive wide, and in some cases
unchecked, discretion over the formation and implementation of policy. I summarize the
key points here.
After achieving independence from Spain in 1811, Venezuela was ruled by decen-
tralized and competing caudillos, strongmen who commanded personal militias. State
power was finally centralized under military rule in 1899. Military rule lasted until 1958,
with a brief period from 1945–1948 — known as the trienio — when Venezuela was gov-
erned by a popularly elected party, Accio´n Democra´tica (AD). When the dictator Marcos
Pe´rez Jime´nez was overthrown by a military coup in 1958, the ruling junta invited the
major political parties — AD, the Comite´ de Organizacio´n Polı´tica Electoral Independi-
ente (COPEI), and the Unio´n Republicana Democra´tica (URD) — to form the government.
Given a second chance, the political parties established a broad consensus for the direction
of the new democracy. The Pact of Punto Fijo, the Minimum Program of Government,
and the Worker-Employer Accord were signed prior to elections in 1958 by the inter-
ested parties — in addition to the three political parties were FEDECAMARAS and the
CTV, the national business lobby and labor union, respectively. Accordingly, Venezuela’s
democracy has come to be known as a pacted democracy; the parameters for future deci-
sions — those concerning development strategy in particular — were set out by a bargain
among political and economic elites.40
40. For further details on these pacts, see Brian F. Crisp, Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and
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These pacts were borne of the demise of the trienio period. According to Brian Crisp,
the AD was overthrown in 1948 because it failed to cultivate consensus among competing
civil society groups, especially business and labor.41 Bringing the key interests together
to agree on a development strategy was important for consolidating the fledgling democ-
racy. But these pacts also secured elite privilege. In Terry Lynn Karl’s words, the pacts
“ensure[d] [the parties’] survival by selectively meeting demands while limiting the scope
of representation in order to reassure traditional dominant classes that their vital interests
will be respected.”42 It is true that subsequent governments undertook massive social ini-
tiatives, creating jobs and providing social services to the poor. But state institutions were
designed to benefit the elite disproportionately.43
The key to this institutionalization of privilege was centralizing political power in the
executive branch.44 Although the Constitution of 1961 did not formally entrench the pres-
ident’s dominance, this became the case in practice. Two key powers were afforded the
president. First, the president had the authority to suspend constitutional guarantees and
rule by decree. Economic liberties were suspended throughout the period from 1961 to
1999 (when a new constitution was drafted), permitting the president to set economic
and financial policy by decree throughout the period. (The legislature had the author-
ity to reinstate suspended guarantees, but never reinstated economic liberties.) Second,
the president had the authority to create consultative commissions and the state agencies
that compose the decentralized public administration (DPA). This included unrestrained
authority to appoint the members of these commissions and agency governing boards.
Typically, the president created a commission to research policy solutions to a particu-
Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 25ff
and Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 94–101.
41. Crisp, Democratic Institutional Design, 23.
42. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 93.
43. This point is repeatedly stressed by both Crisp and Karl.
44. The following draws primarily from Crisp, Democratic Institutional Design, chs. 3–5.
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lar problem and then proposed draft legislation on the basis of their recommendations.
Commissions were dominated by federal government officials, and representatives of pri-
vate capital (FEDECAMARAS) and organized labor (the CTV). Although commissions
institutionalized consultative relations between the state and civil society, only a narrow
segment of civil society was represented. In Crisp’s words:
Consultative commissions are used to open the political system to some par-
ticipants while keeping it closed to others. Bureaucratic institutions are not
simply neutral means of making decisions but instead are tools used by the
powerful to control and channel conflict.45
The state agencies that compose the DPA were the president’s key instruments for im-
plementing policy. Each agency was created with funds from the executive (financed by
oil revenues) and members of the governing board were appointed by the president. Like
the commissions, these were also composed primarily of federal officials and representa-
tives of capital and labor. Most state activity was carried out by these agencies; by 1980,
state agencies accounted for 70% of government spending.46 Yet agencies’ budgets were
not subject to congressional oversight.
Although the legislative branch had formal powers to check the executive, the electoral
system undermined its efficacy as a constraint on executive decision making. Until 1993,
Venezuela was a single-district, closed list proportional representation electoral system.
Voters voted for a party list. Parties were allotted seats in the legislature according to the
percentage of the popular vote they received. Legislators were chosen sequentially from a
list made by the party until the party’s allotted seats were filled. The list was closed (vot-
ers couldn’t alter order of candidates) and blocked (voters couldn’t add candidates to the
list). Importantly, this meant that party officials were more important for the legislators’
political survival than the voters. This permitted the parties to exercise strict discipline
45. Crisp, Democratic Institutional Design, 119.
46. Ibid., 68.
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over legislators. This crucially limited voters’ exit options by relegating legislators to a
peripheral role in policy making and granting them little effective oversight over the presi-
dent. Exit options were further limited by the pacts signed in 1958, which determined that
the state’s development strategy was to be the same regardless of the party in power. If
voters were disappointed with the party in power, they could change their affiliation, but
they could not change the country’s development strategy.
In short, from 1958 to 1999, Venezuela’s institutions were such that the president was
usually the only elected official involved in the formation and implementation of policy.
The president exercised discretion over appointments to consultative commissions and
state agency governing boards, and most state spending was beyond citizen oversight.
The concentration of political power in the executive has only become more extreme
since Hugo Cha´vez took office in 1998. Shortly after taking office, Cha´vez convened a
Constituent Assembly to revise the 1961 constitution, a procedure that went beyond the
provisions for constitutional review outlined in the 1961 constitution. Moreover, Cha´vez
was able to implement his preferred procedure for electing Assembly members, which re-
sulted in an Assembly dominated by Cha´vez supporters.47 The new constitution drafted by
the Assembly was ratified in a nationwide referendum on December 15, 1999. One week
later, the Assembly went beyond the newly ratified constitution and adopted the Decree for
a Transitional Regime. It subsequently dissolved all branches of government, including the
national Congress, state legislatures, and state governors, appointing new officials in place
of those elected during the 1998 popular elections. Crucially, the Assembly dissolved the
historically independent Supreme Court of Justice and Electoral Council, creating new
bodies and appointing new members in their place.48 In effect, Cha´vez gained complete
47. Allan R. Brewer-Carı´as, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The Cha´vez Authoritarian Experiment
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11–12.
48. Ibid., 13–23.
114
control of the country’s key institutions. This control was bolstered in 2007 when Cha´vez
used his decree authority to implement constitutional reforms that had been rejected in a
popular referendum earlier that year.49 Since 1999, Cha´vez has used his control of these
institutions to harass and exclude opponents. With the creation of the PSUV (Partido So-
cialista Unido de Venezuela/United Socialist Party of Venzezuela) and its assimilation into
the state’s bureaucratic apparatus, traditional party pluralism has effectively been replaced
with single-party government.
It is true that Cha´vez has been elected to office on three occasions (1998, 2000, 2006)
and has survived a recall referendum (2004). Despite this, Freedom House has declared
that “Venezuela is not an electoral democracy. While the act of voting is relatively free
and the count is fair, the political opposition is forced to operate under extremely diffi-
cult conditions, and the separation of power is nearly nonexistent.”50 In Javier Corrales’
words, Cha´vez has “eliminated the contradiction between autocracy and political compet-
itiveness.”51
This brief review suggests that Venezuela’s institutions have been persistently weak;
thus, it is not a counterexample to the theory I have presented.
Did fiscal reliance on oil have anything to do with the persistent weakness of Venezuela’s
institutions? Answering that question gives us an opportunity to probe the mechanisms
posited by my theory.
Oil was first discovered at Lake Maracaibo in 1901. Between 1920 and 1925, oil’s
share of total exports went from 1.9% to 41.6% and hit 91.2% by 1935.52 From 1980
49. Brewer-Carı´as, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela, 381.
50. Freedom House, Freedom in the World — Venezuela Country Report, 2010, URL: http : / / www.
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010.
51. Javier Corrales, “Hugo Boss,” Foreign Policy, no. 152 (2006): 33. See also Javier Corrales and Michael
Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Cha´vez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).
52. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 80.
115
to 2009, oil’s share of total exports remained high, averaging 89%.53 As noted above,
oil’s share of government revenues has averaged 53% since 1930. From 1964 to 1984,
Venezuela sustained its heaviest reliance on oil, with oil providing an average of 66% of
government revenues, reaching a peak of 83% in 1974.
Oil’s centrality to the Venezuelan economy was secured by the 1943 Hydrocarbons
Act. This bill established the “fifty-fifty” principle: the state must obtain at least 50%
of production profits.54 The state simultaneously moved away from taxing citizens. (At-
tempts to increase taxes on anything other than oil extraction were persistently rejected
until the early 1990s, when the economy was already in severe decline.55) This law “es-
tablished a permanent temptation to cut into the profits of foreign companies as a means
of sustaining oil-subsidized activities while avoiding the taxation of domestic groups.”56
The pacts signed in 1958 further consolidated oil’s central role in the economy, with the
interested parties agreeing to an oil-based development strategy. Committed to “sowing
the petroleum,” subsequent administrations persistently milked foreign oil companies for
revenue; by 1970, the state retained 78% of profits.57 The oil industry was finally nation-
alized in 1976. Administration after administration used oil revenue to prop up an over-
valued currency and keep taxes low. Oil also financed massive social spending programs,
permitting the parties to avert popular discontent and foster patronage, a strategy Karl
calls “preemptive inclusion.”58 But most importantly, oil revenues facilitated the creation
of hundreds of state agencies, each with their own patrimony. Because agency budgets
were not subject to congressional oversight, and because governing board appointments
53. Data from WTO statistics database, URL: http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E,
accessed May 2011.
54. Dunning, Crude Democracy, 160–161; Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 87.
55. Dunning, Crude Democracy, 164.
56. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 88.
57. Ibid., 112.
58. Ibid., 93, 104.
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were discretionary, presidents retained unchecked discretion over the use of agency funds.
Thus, oil-financed state agencies “gave public authorities a set of tools with which to
shape economic development, subsidize private capital, pay off political allies, and co-opt
enemies.”59 Huge oil revenues enabled the president to placate potential opposition while
autonomously pursuing a development strategy that disproportionately benefited an elite
few. This trend continued unabated during the implementation of IMF austerity measures
in the early 1990s and has only become exacerbated during Cha´vez’s tenure.60
Addiction to oil revenues also precipitated a severe fiscal crisis in the late 1980s and
early 1990s; this ultimately led to the destabilization of pacted democracy, culminating in
Cha´vez’s rise to power.61 Beginning in 1973, high oil prices fueled a massive increase
in government spending, nearly tripling from 1973 to 1974 and then doubling again from
1979 to 1981.62 Huge capital-intensive projects received most attention; the government
rapidly expanded the state-run steel, aluminum, and petrochemical industries. The newly
acquired oil industry also required significant investment, as oil companies had ceased
investment and exploration sometime in the late 1960s in anticipation of nationalization.
Awash in petrodollars, state enterprises paid little attention to efficiency measures; waste
was extensive.63
When oil prices collapsed in the early 1980s, the failure to cultivate broad tax ex-
traction capacity left it without a domestic revenue base. So the government tapped the
international credit markets. With deep oil reserves as collateral, loans came fast and easy.
59. Crisp, Democratic Institutional Design, 36.
60. See Brewer-Carı´as, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela; Corrales and Penfold, Dragon in the Trop-
ics; Michael Shifter, “In Search of Hugo Cha´vez,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006): 45–59; Kurt Weyland,
“Will Chavez Lose His Luster?” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6 (2001): 73–87.
61. “Cha´vez’s appeal cannot be explained without acknowledging the deep dissatisfaction with the existing
political and economic order felt by much of the population in Venezuela” (Shifter, “In Search of Hugo
Cha´vez,” 46).
62. See the table at Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 165.
63. Ibid., 111, 125, 140.
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They had the added advantage of enabling the parties to avoid politically unpopular tax
reforms. A prolonged period of loose spending in boom times had triggered a voracious
demand for more spending; expenditures increased even as revenues decreased.64 Oil had
cultivated unsustainable expectations; Venezuelan institutions were too weak to rein in the
rent-seeking, waste, and corruption. Facing a severe debt crisis, Venezuela was forced by
the IMF to implement tough austerity measures in the face of widespread domestic opposi-
tion. Following coup attempts in February (led by Hugo Cha´vez) and November 1992, the
incumbent, Carlos Andre´s Pe´rez, was removed from office in August 1993 under charges
of embezzling $17 million of government funds.
There are two key points to extract from this case study. First, Venezuelan rulers have
historically exercised vast and often unchecked discretion over the formation and imple-
mentation of policy, even throughout its democratic period. Thus, Venezuela’s institutional
trajectory is consistent with the theory I have presented here; it is not a counterexample.
Second, oil dependence helped to consolidate presidential dominance through the demo-
cratic period and beyond. The practice of preemptive inclusion is evidence that the parties
required citizens’ cooperation to some extent; Venezuela’s history of mass protests, gen-
eral strikes, and sporadic civil violence ensured this. But declining reliance on general
tax revenue enabled the president to avoid congressional control of the budget. With the
creation of fiscally autonomous state agencies, the president gained discretionary control
over a significant percentage of government revenues. Inevitably, the president became
the target of influence trafficking. With so little oversight over spending, misallocation of
petrodollars, waste, and corruption were all but guaranteed.
Adequately testing my theory requires systematically examining additional candidate
counterexamples in greater depth. I must put this off for another time.65 But the above
64. See the table at Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 165.
65. Preliminary research suggests we can exclude Russia as a counterexample too. M. Steven Fish de-
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study reveals an important lesson for future identification of potential counterexamples.
The resource curse is not about a lack of democratic institutions per se, but a lack of insti-
tutions that constrain rulers’ discretion over the formation and implementation of policy.
Democratic institution are often strong institutions, as I define them. But, as the Venezue-
lan case demonstrates, they need not be; formally democratic institutions can be consistent
with a largely unconstrained executive in practice. This cuts the other way too; strong in-
stitutions need not be democratic. Hence, potential counterexamples are not necessarily
those countries that democratize during or following increased reliance on resource rev-
enue. Instead, we must look for countries that appear to have begun with weak institutions
prior to becoming resource dependent and subsequently established strong institutions. I
leave this for future research.
scribes Russia as a “superpresidentialist” state and argues that resource revenue has sustained weak institu-
tions, facilitating revenue misallocation and corruption. See M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia:
The Failure of Open Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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CHAPTER 6
The Resource Curse and the Demands of Justice
The resource curse occurs when resource revenue enters a country with weak domestic
institutions — institutions that leave state rulers free to form and implement policy without
regard for citizens’ general interest in secure rights and material well-being. Roughly,
rulers are free to neglect citizens’ interests when they do not rely on citizens’ support to
retain political power or citizens cannot credibly threaten the ruler to withhold cooperation.
If a country has weak institutions prior to becoming resource dependent, resource revenue
undermines rulers’ reliance on citizens’ support, perpetuating weak institutions.
The claim that the persistence of weak, curse-inducing institutions is endogenous to
the resource curse has important implications for an effective prescriptive program to ad-
dress the curse. The prescriptions that emerge from standard institutional analyses of the
resource curse tend to focus on domestic institutional reform. The thought supporting stan-
dard prescriptions is a natural one: if the curse arises from domestic institutional failures,
then we could encourage policies that avert the resource curse if we improved domestic
institutions in the relevant ways. For example, resource-cursed states that exhibit low ruler
accountability should establish mechanisms that permit citizens to oversee resource rev-
enue management; states that are vulnerable to price volatility as a result of short-sighted
budgeting practices should stabilize expenditures to avoid the negative development ef-
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fects of boom-bust cycles; states that overconsume should instead invest in increasing
productive capacity in non-resource sectors and in human capital accumulation.1 This line
of reasoning is further encouraged by examples of resource abundant countries who have
managed to avoid the curse — Canada and Norway are prime examples. What these coun-
tries have in common are strong institutions that encourage government accountability
and, consequently, policies that advance citizens’ general interest in secure rights and eco-
nomic well-being.
This prescriptive program is sustained by assuming away the possibility that continued
reliance on resource revenue causes weak institutions to persist. Consider this offering
from a recent collection of essays: “[we] assume throughout that both countries and com-
panies can and should do something to more effectively and fairly develop oil resources.
We assume in particular that governments are willing to take sometimes bold and difficult
steps to succeed where most states have failed.”2 This is clearly a consequential assump-
tion: “[i]f states are unable or unwilling to take such steps, then the best solution may
well be to leave the oil and gas in the ground.”3 In other words, attempts to overcome
the resource curse while governments that remain fiscally reliant on resource revenue are
not willing to take “bold and difficult steps” to limit their discretion over the revenue are
unlikely to be successful.
The impetus for assuming that governments are willing to implement positive insti-
tutional reforms is understandable: it turns the resource curse into a tractable problem,
amenable to technocratic solutions. But this yields prescriptions that ignore the possibility
that weak institutions persist so long as resource revenue continues to enter the domestic
political economy. If the endogenous institutions thesis is true, then it is futile to first
1. See, among others, Joseph Bell et al., Natural Resource Charter, 2010. URL: http : / / www .
naturalresourcecharter.org; Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse.
2. Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse, 14–15, emphasis added.
3. Ibid., 15.
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identify, say, underinvestment in human capital accumulation or lack of accountability to
citizens as key causes of the resource curse and then prescribe that the state invest more in
human capital or establish mechanisms to insure citizen oversight of resource transactions.
Such prescriptions ignore the full extent of the problem.
If the standard explanation is correct, then overcoming the resource curse is simply a
matter of improving the domestic institutions of resource-cursed countries. But if weak
institutions persist so long as the state remains fiscally reliant on resources, voluntary in-
stitutional reform is inhibited by the continued flow of resource revenue into the domestic
political economy. In fact, my argument in the last chapter suggests that the prospects
for general institutional reforms that can directly strengthen the institutions of resource-
cursed countries are slim. This is plainly bad news, since strong domestic institutions are
the key to overcoming the resource curse. In this final chapter, I try to show that it’s not all
bad news. Overcoming the resource curse will certainly be much more complicated than
previously thought, but there are worthwhile options to explore.
The explanation presented in chapter 5 identifies two necessary conditions for an effec-
tive prescription: (1) it must increase state rulers’ reliance on civil society groups whose
demands induce the provision of public goods, and (2) it must provide citizens with credi-
ble exit options. This first condition seems intuitively obvious. Most extant prescriptions,
if not explicitly aiming to increase ruler reliance, would in effect do so. But extant pre-
scriptions neglect the second condition. The importance of this condition cannot be over-
stated. Without also granting citizens’ exit options, institutions that merely satisfy the first
condition are insufficient for improving citizens’ bargaining leverage vis-a`-vis their rulers.
Rulers who rely on citizens can still neglect their interests if those citizens have no better
options. Focusing reform efforts on the second condition has a second advantage. Since
increasing rulers’ reliance on citizens is incredibly difficult so long as resource revenue
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continues to enter the country, providing certain types of exit options — opportunities to
emigrate, for example — would permit resource curse victims to escape the resource curse
even where it cannot be overcome.
To highlight the importance of providing citizens with exit options, I consider recent
proposals to address the resource curse presented by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar. Al-
though these proposals would increase ruler reliance if implemented, they encounter nu-
merous problems; not least, they would produce morally undesirable consequences if im-
plemented, and each encounters feasibility challenges. But most importantly here, they
fail to provide citizens with exit options and, so, are insufficient to effectively overcome
the resource curse.
6.1 Resources and the Demands of Justice
Pogge and Wenar have built upon the standard institutional explanation of the resource
curse in their respective moral assessments of the resource curse.4 The general lesson
both draw from their reviews of the relevant literature is that resource abundant countries
are cursed because resource revenue is held by the wrong hands: “The resource curse is
not a curse that falls on poor countries because they have abundant resources. [. . . ] The
blessing of resources turns into a curse when tyrants and insurgents are allowed to sell
off a country’s resources while crushing popular resistance, and to use the proceeds in
ways that make the people worse off.”5 But both think that the standard explanations ne-
glect an important consideration, namely, the extent to which rules regulating international
4. See Wenar, “Property Rights.” Pogge’s most cogent discussion of the issue is found in Pogge, World
Poverty and Human Rights, 113–114, 163–165; but cf. Thomas W. Pogge, “‘Assisting’ the Global Poor,”
in Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004); Thomas W. Pogge, “Real World Justice,” The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 29–53;
Thomas W. Pogge, “Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor,”
Leiden Journal of International Law 18, no. 4 (2005): 717–745.
5. Wenar, “Property Rights,” 8, 9; cf. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 114. In drawing this
conclusion, Pogge and Wenar follow the spirit, if not the letter, of the writings of prominent development
economists, such as Paul Collier; see Collier, The Bottom Billion, ch. 3.
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resource trade causally contribute to the persistence of the failed institutions that permit
resource revenue to fall into the wrong hands. The main culprit is what Pogge calls the
“international resource privilege,” which grants the power to effect legally valid resource
transfers to any person or group holding a monopoly on the use of effective force in the
territory containing the resources in question. When it comes to international resource
transfers, the resource privilege insures that “might makes right.”6 The story is a relatively
simple if sparse one. The resource privilege creates incentives for predators to acquire
and wield power violently. This explains the proliferation of civil war, as rebel groups are
able to sustain themselves by forcibly controlling resource-rich territory and selling off
the resources. Once in power, resources provide predatory rulers with a valuable revenue
stream, which is used to buy arms and political support to keep themselves in power, even
against widespread opposition. Even reform-minded rulers, if they want to stay in office,
are compelled to divert resource revenue to the private fortunes of the political elite or to
keeping potential rebels at bay. As Wenar notes, such clientelism facilitates widespread
corruption and hinders effective development investment, which helps explain economic
stagnation.
For both Pogge and Wenar, the fact that resource wealth is a curse constitutes an in-
justice because the wrong hands come to hold resource revenue as a result of international
rules upheld by the rich and powerful to promote their own economic advantage.7 But
they differ in the details here. For Pogge, the international resource privilege helps pro-
6. Wenar, “Property Rights,” 13.
7. Although it should be noted that Pogge and Wenar differ on the extent to which the resource privilege
is imposed upon underdeveloped countries by developed ones. Pogge claims that the rich actively impose
the resource privilege upon the poor (Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 115), whereas Wenar is more
circumspect, claiming only that it “persists by custom because powerful global actors have strong interests
in maintaining the status quo” (Wenar, “Property Rights,” 15). Wenar’s doubts about any fact of imposition
are discussed in more detail in Leif Wenar, “Feasible Reform of International Trade in Resources,” in Jaggar,
Pogge and His Critics, sec. 3.
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duce the resource curse and, consequently, the vast misery associated with it.8 Thus, our
enforcement of the resource privilege is unjust because it violates a duty not to impose
foreseeable and unnecessary harm.9 For Wenar, the resource privilege is analogous to a
rule that grants thieves legitimate title to stolen goods — it effectively treats predators as
the legitimate owners of natural resources and permits them to conclude resource transac-
tions without citizens’ consent, thereby violating citizens’ property rights in their country’s
natural resources.10 Hence, our enforcement of the resource privilege is unjust because it
violates a duty to respect citizens’ property rights.
To be precise about the nature of Pogge’s and Wenar’s criticisms, note that there are
two distinct sites at which we can morally assess the resource curse — transactions and in-
stitutions. To illustrate the distinction, consider the difference between assessing instances
of theft and assessing a rule that, for arbitrary reasons, prevents members of a racial minor-
ity from holding private property. In the former, we assess the extent to which transactions
violate principles of justice; in the latter, we assess the extent to which institutions violate
principles of justice. Similarly, with respect to the resource curse, we might judge that
individual transactions that put resource revenue in the hands of authoritarians are unjust
because they foreseeably visit grave harm upon ordinary citizens at the hands of predatory
dictators (with Pogge), or violate citizens’ property rights (with Wenar). Those who en-
gage in such transactions — the agents of countries and firms that purchase resources or
territorial concessions from authoritarians — do so unjustly because their actions violate
clear principles of justice — that we ought not impose foreseeable and unnecessary harm
8. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 113–114.
9. Cf. Pogge, “‘Assisting’ the Global Poor”; Thomas W. Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Violation of Neg-
ative Duties,” Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): 55–83.
10. Wenar, “Property Rights,” sec. 3. Wenar cites numerous legal documents — both international and
domestic — to support citizens’ claim to rightful ownership of the resources in their territory: Article 1
of the two International Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights); Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Iraqi and Angolan domestic law;
as well as various UN resolutions and declarations.
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on others and that we ought to respect property rights.
With respect to institutions, we might judge that the resource privilege is unjust be-
cause it generates an incentive scheme that foreseeably induces negligent, corrupt, and
sometimes violent characters to acquire and exercise power to the detriment of ordinary
citizens (with Pogge), or confers de facto legitimacy upon resource transactions brokered
by predatory dictators, which violates citizens’ property rights (with Wenar). Thus, not
only do individual resource transactions with authoritarians violate clear principles of jus-
tice, but the rule that grants legitimate title to authoritarians, and our enforcement of it, is
also unjust because it violates our duty to not impose foreseeable and unnecessary harm
or to respect property rights.
Although Pogge and Wenar undoubtedly lament the unjust transactions that generate
the resource curse, their criticisms focus intently on institutions. This is clearly so for
Pogge, whose criticism is part of a long-standing program aimed at showing that global
poverty results from unjust international institutions; the resource privilege is a recurring
example of how the “global institutional order” harms the global poor.11 Although Wenar
discusses transactions more than Pogge does, his institutional focus is clear. Wenar’s reply
to the following objection is telling. The objection concedes that “what we pay to fuel
our cars might end up being spent on [dictators’] torture chambers or personal jets,” but
then argues that “this is the way it is in. . . a globalized market economy. . . . Some of the
money we pay at the pump may go to support tyrants, but that seems just a part of modern
life.”12 Wenar’s response is that this is based on a “misdirection of attention from the insti-
tutional to the natural,” and that the resource curse “results from a defect in the rules that
allocate control over [natural] resources.”13 To be sure, individual authoritarians and those
11. See the references in footnotes 4 and 9 in this chapter.
12. Wenar, “Property Rights,” 8.
13. Ibid., 8, emphasis added.
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who transact with them violate citizens’ property rights. But this is hardly the end of the
story. It need not be this way, after all; international rules need not grant legitimate title
to predatory dictators. Accordingly, “[t]he resource curse results from a failure of institu-
tions: specifically, a failure to enforce property rights.”14 Hence, the resource privilege is
unjust as a rule because it fails to prevent unjust transactions.
6.2 Are There Alternatives to the Resource Privilege?
Let’s concede both the normative claim — that the resource privilege is unjust — and
the causal claim from which it is supposed to follow — that the resource privilege causally
contributes to the resource curse. There remains an important question, namely, whether
these claims entail a duty to establish an alternate rule in place of the resource privilege,
as Pogge and Wenar suppose.15 This will be so only to the extent that there are admissible
alternative institutions or rules that are capable of preventing the resource curse.16 This is
a simple point about “ought implies can”: if the rationale for institutional reform is to avert
the resource curse, and there are no admissible alternate rules that can effectively avert the
curse, then it is not the case that we ought to reform the resource privilege.17
Say R∗ is an admissible alternate rule if it meets three conditions:
1. R∗ does not violate any moral principle;
2. R∗ is not too complicated for the parties who will be subject to R∗ to understand and
apply; and
14. Wenar, “Property Rights,” 9, emphasis added.
15. I use “establish an alternate rule in place of” and “reform” interchangeably throughout, despite their
lack of synonymy. (The latter usually connotes piecemeal change, while the former usually connotes whole-
sale change.)
16. Although it is a slight abuse of terminology, convenience dictates that I group the injustices identified
by Pogge and Wenar under the term “resource curse” for the remainder of the paper. The abuse is only
slight because the resource curse is clearly causally related to the injustices with which Pogge and Wenar
are concerned.
17. Note that this is consistent with the deontological flavour of Wenar’s focus on property rights vio-
lations. Wenar’s rationale for reforming the resource privilege is an instrumental one, viz., to effectively
enforce property rights. Insofar as there is no admissible alternate rule that effectively enforces property
rights, we have no duty to reform the resource privilege.
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3. Implementation of R∗ is feasible; at a minimum, we can reasonably expect the rele-
vant parties to enact R∗ and establish mechanisms to credibly enforce R∗.
There will certainly be disagreement about how to further specify these conditions, but we
need not settle such disputes here.18 What is important is the more general point that we
do not have a duty to reform a rule R if there is no alternative R∗ that meets these three
conditions and is capable of preventing the injustice in question. More specifically, to
justify the claim that we should reform the resource privilege, there must be some alternate
rule for regulating international resource transactions that meets the three admissibility
conditions and, if implemented, would effectively avert or mitigate the resource curse.
To get a handle on what sort of rule could effectively avert or mitigate the resource
curse, recall the central lesson of chapter 5: weak institutions persist — and thereby facili-
tate the misallocation of resource revenue — so long as resource revenue continues to flow
into a domestic political economy with an antecedently weak institutional structure. This
is true regardless of who holds power or how they acquired it.19 This suggests that any
rule that fails to prevent the flow of resource revenue into countries with weak institutional
structures will fail to alter the outcome. Whether we have a duty to reform the resource
privilege depends on whether there are any admissible alternatives to the resource privi-
lege that prevent resource revenue from entering domestic political economies with weak
institutional structures. Are there any such alternatives? If there are, are they admissible?
Pogge and Wenar have each proposed alternatives that aim to keep resource revenue
from entering resource-cursed political economies. Considering their proposals proves to
be instructive for thinking more generally about the space of possible alternatives. I briefly
18. I discuss the notion of feasibility at greater length in appendix B.
19. My brief study of Venezuela in the last chapter is a striking case in point. Pogge repeatedly presents
Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo as an example of a democratically elected chief executive who failed to use
resource revenue to implement good policies due to the inability of the domestic institutions to constrain
rent seeking behaviour on the part of elites. Oddly, given his sensitivity to the effect of institutions, he seems
to not recognize the instruction this example provides for thinking through the relationship of the resource
privilege to the resource curse.
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outline the proposals before raising some difficulties.
6.2.1 Pogge’s proposed alternative
Pogge proposes an “amend-and-adjudicate” strategy (as I will call it). His proposal has
two main components. First, fledgling democracies whose economies depend heavily on
resource exports should amend their constitutions to include a clause that declares resource
transfers executed by future authoritarians illegitimate.
[A] constitutional amendment in which our country declares that only its
constitutionally democratic governments may effect legally valid transfers of
ownership rights in public property and forbids any of its governments to rec-
ognize ownership rights in property acquired from a preceding government
that lacked such constitutional legitimacy.20
By putting investors on notice that the resource transfers negotiated with authoritarians will
be challenged should democracy be restored, the amendment aims to deter investment in
resource extraction under authoritarians. Without more or less stable investment demand,
resources become less valuable to would-be authoritarians, thereby reducing the size of the
prize awaiting those who successfully acquire political power by unconstitutional means.
The anticipated effect is to reduce the number of attempts to acquire power unconstitu-
tionally and thereby consolidate democratic reforms. To ensure that the deterrent effect of
the amendment is not undermined by authoritarians who simply suspend the amendment,
Pogge proposes the establishment of a “Democracy Panel.” This is “an international panel,
composed of reputable, independent jurists living abroad who understand [the country’s]
constitution and political system well enough to judge whether some particular group’s
acquisition and exercise of political power is or is not constitutionally legitimate.”21 This
“adjudication” part of Pogge’s proposal is meant to restore investors’ confidence in their
20. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 163. I should note that the amendment is meant to be
prospective rather than retrospective. The amendment prohibits any of the country’s future constitutionally
legitimate governments from recognizing as legitimate the resource transfers executed by future unconstitu-
tional governments that precede the former.
21. Ibid., 156.
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title to legitimately transferred resources. Unless obtained from a government that is deter-
mined illegitimate by the panel, investors have no reason to worry about the legitimacy of
their title to the resources. This is supposed to restore the incentives to invest in extraction
under democratic regimes while diminishing those same incentives under nondemocratic
regimes.
6.2.2 Wenar’s proposed alternative
Wenar focuses on establishing mechanisms that respect the property rights of the cit-
izens of resource abundant countries. At a minimum, respecting citizens’ property rights
requires a government to acquire “some sort of valid consent” from its constituents when
transferring resources.22 In light of this, the crux of Wenar’s proposal is to prohibit re-
source transfers that take place without citizens’ valid consent. To give valid consent,
citizens must have at least minimal civil and political rights. As an authoritative standard
for determining whether citizens have the requisite rights, Wenar employs the widely-used
Freedom in the World report, a rating of countries according to their respect for civil and
political rights published by Freedom House.23 To create “the strongest legal framework,”
he makes the least controversial assumptions possible: a Freedom House rating of 7 — the
lowest possible rating — on either civil liberties or political rights is “decisive indication
that no regime can legitimately sell resources from that country.”24
With this legal framework in place, Wenar turns to the matter of enforcement. Nation-
ally, he proposes to grant standing to the citizens of a resource-cursed country to bring civil
suits against resource corporations in the latter’s domestic courts.25 Alternatively, resource
22. Wenar, “Property Rights,” 20.
23. For details on the Freedom House ratings, see http://www.freedomhouse.org.
24. Wenar, “Property Rights,” 25.
25. Wenar cites three cases as precedent: Doe v. Unocal, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir.); WIWA v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co. & Shell Transport and Trading Co., WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); and Kensington v.
PNP Parnibas, 05 Ci. 5101 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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corporations could be tried domestically for the crime of receiving stolen goods.26 Suc-
cessful civil or criminal cases against resource corporations would help enforce citizens’
resource rights by deterring the former from dealing with predatory regimes.
To enforce the proposed property rights regime internationally, Wenar prescribes what
he calls a “trust-and-tariff” trade policy. The “tariff” part of the proposal requires com-
pliant states to identify defector states — states who host resource corporations that deal
with illegitimate governments or states who have direct such dealings of their own — and
levy tariffs on imported goods coming from defectors. Insofar as the tariff harms the
competitiveness of defector state firms in compliant state markets, the tariff serves as a
punishment for acquiring resources from predatory regimes and aims to deter future such
acquisitions. Further, we can think of the tariff as a “compliance premium” on defector
state imports, which enables compliant state consumers to “wash their hands” of the ille-
gitimate resource transfers. This is where the “trust” part of the proposal comes in. Once
an illegitimate regime comes to power, compliant states should establish a “Clean Hands
Trust” for the citizens of the resource-cursed state. This trust fund would be filled by the
proceeds from the tariffs levied by compliant states against defector state imports until the
fund’s principal equals the value of the resources illegitimately transferred from the preda-
tory government to defector states. The money in the fund is then held for the citizens of
the resource cursed country until the minimum conditions for legitimate resource trans-
fers are met. Once these conditions are met, the money (the fund’s principal plus interest)
is transferred to the citizens of the resource-cursed country (or, perhaps more accurately,
their legitimate representatives).
Wenar uses a well-chosen example to illustrate the operation of the trust-and-tariff
mechanism. Sudan has a Freedom House rating of 7. Suppose China acquires $n of oil
26. Wenar cites the National Stolen Property Act (18 USC 2314) and the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a
Federal statute on the receipt of stolen goods (18 USC 662) as support for this litigation strategy.
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from Sudan. To enforce the Sudanese people’s resource rights, the US should establish
a Clean Hands Trust for Sudan and fill it until its principal equals $n. The money put
into the fund should be raised from tariffs levied against Chinese imports. The money is
held in trust for the Sudanese people until the minimum conditions for legitimate resource
transfers are met, at which point, the contents of the fund are transferred to the Sudanese
people.
6.3 Assessing the Alternatives
Are these proposed alternatives to the resource privilege admissible? I doubt it, for
two sets of reasons. The first concerns practical issues; the second involves normative
concerns. I discuss each of these in turn.
The fact that each of these rules would, if effective, drastically limit the availability
of legitimately traded resources generates significant distributional consequences, which
vitiates their feasibility.27 In the case of Pogge’s proposal, a genuinely effective Democ-
racy Panel would affect the availability of resources, the terms of transfer, and the identity
of legitimate trading partners. Given that most resources are located in countries that are
likely to be ruled “illegitimate” by the panel, powerful actors (actors with significant bar-
gaining power) have incentives either to weaken the terms of the agreement ex ante and
thereby compromise the effectiveness of the panel or to capture the panel ex post and use it
to serve their own interests. Consequently, credible decentralized enforcement — essential
to keeping resource revenue from entering resource-cursed political economies — would
constitute a heroic feat of collective action, a prospect we would be unwise to rely upon. In
27. On the difficulty for cooperation presented by distributional conflicts, see Robert Axelrod and Robert
O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no.
1 (1985): 226–254; James Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Ver-
sus Information,” International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 387–423; James D. Fearon, “Bargaining,
Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 52, no. 2 (1998): 269–305.
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the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms, corporations would ignore the panel’s
judgements, as well as the amendment itself, and resource transfers would carry on as
usual, leaving the resource curse intact. In any case, the prospects for effective coopera-
tion on the matter appear bleak.28
Wenar’s proposal initially looks more promising than Pogge’s, but it too has serious
limitations stemming from its distributional effects. One problem is the potential for in-
hibiting international cooperation on other important global issues. While Wenar is correct
to note that defector states do not have a legitimate complaint when “antitheft tariffs” are
levied against their goods, it’s also true that such tariffs must be recognized as legitimate by
the World Trade Organization if they are to be upheld in the trade dispute resolution pro-
cess. Suppose the WTO deems antitheft tariffs legitimate. If, for example, the US levies
an antitheft tariff against Chinese goods because China buys Sudanese oil, the WTO rules
in favor of the US in any dispute resolution process and any retaliatory trade measures
by the Chinese are open to legitimate dispute by the US. Of course, China is still free to
retaliate by obstructing cooperation on other important issues, such as security and cli-
mate change, not to mention future trade negotiations. Given the importance of China to
achieving global cooperation on these issues, this is a high price to pay.
Although this is a serious problem, the main challenge here is not what happens when
such a rule is in place. From a feasibility standpoint, the main problem is establishing a
rule to recognize antitheft tariffs as legitimate in the first place. Again, such a rule has
important distributional implications for the parties to WTO negotiations. As evidenced
by the intractability of the Doha Round talks — which have been characterized by a deep
28. Wenar has noted two further limitations. First, that Pogge’s proposal requires that a resource abundant
country be democratic to enact the amendment, since a nondemocratic government is unlikely to enact such
an amendment. Second, the proposal generates anti-democratic incentives. Anticipating a challenge to its
title should democracy be restored, resource corporations and their host governments have incentives to help
prop up the authoritarian regime from whom the resources were purchased. See Wenar, “Feasible Reform,”
15.
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divide between developed countries led by the European Union and the US on one side
and developing countries led by Brazil, China, India, and South Africa on the other — the
interested parties have highly divergent interests. This is enough to make cooperation dif-
ficult. Add to this the importance of certain resources as manufacturing inputs and the
importance of a dynamic, export-oriented manufacturing sector for economic develop-
ment, and it’s unlikely that all parties to WTO negotiations would agree to implement a
rule that legitimizes the use of antitheft tariffs.
We can generalize these particular practical concerns to any rule that (like Pogge’s
and Wenar’s) limits the entry of resource revenue into weak domestic political economies.
First, since so much resource wealth is located in countries with weak institutional struc-
tures, any such rule will drastically limit the availability of valuable resources, undermin-
ing the credibility of any decentralized enforcement mechanism. Further, monitoring and
enforcement costs associated with such a rule might well be too high to justify implement-
ing the rule. Second, the distributional conflicts that would arise from any such rule have
great potential to inhibit international cooperation, not only on economic matters, but on
other important matters as well, such as security, migration, and the environment. Even if
such a rule could effectively avert the resource curse, it may well generate new problems
whose costs outweigh the benefits of implementing the rule. Third, difficulties associated
with judging the extent to which strong domestic institutions are adequately entrenched
to avoid the curse and the length of time required to entrench strong institutions makes
any such rule burdensome to implement. When is a domestic institutional structure strong
enough to avert the resource curse? When is an institutional structure entrenched enough
to withstand pressure to revert? These questions have no definitive answers. If we sin-
cerely want to help avert the resource curse, our difficulty answering these may make us
hesitant to resume trading with a resource abundant country that has been put on watch.
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In cases where our hesitance leads us to withhold resource revenue from countries who
are prepared to benefit from resource revenue, the rule unfairly burdens citizens of the
resource abundant country by robbing them of important opportunities to improve their
lives. (Not to mention potential charges of unjustified paternalism on the part of countries
who prevent resource revenue from entering the country.)
What about the normative concerns? An obvious one arises once we acknowledge that
Pogge’s and Wenar’s proposed rules, if enforced, would drastically cut our access to legit-
imately traded resources. Global economic dependence on resources such as oil, gas, and
copper guarantees that a rule that prevents us from trading with resource-cursed countries
would have adverse effects on the global economy. This would undoubtedly harm citi-
zens of developed countries through massive job loss and and drastic price increases, but
it would also cause severe deprivation in the developing world. Many developing coun-
tries rely on resource-intensive industrial development to increase employment and reduce
domestic poverty. Further, drastic price increase would preclude countries struggling to
industrialize from successfully doing so; an industrial development strategy would be put
out of reach for many countries. Ironically, Pogge’s and Wenar’s proposals to alleviate the
resource curse might increase the depth and extent of severe poverty. This consequence is
morally unacceptable.
(Instead of a general prohibition on acquiring resources from cursed countries, we
might implement ad hoc measures to encourage regime change in particular cases. The
long trade embargo against apartheid South Africa is a case in point. Even still, such
measures must be considered on a case-by-case basis, with sufficient attention given to
salient contextual factors that are likely to influence the effectiveness of the action. In light
of my argument in chapter 5, this means at a minimum investigating the likely effects of
the proposed action on citizens’ bargaining position vis-a`-vis their ruler. Any use of such
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measures must also give full consideration to the moral complexity of such actions.29)
Additionally, the resource privilege actually upholds certain important values in inter-
national affairs and perhaps should, on balance, be retained. Consider an analogy with
Article 2 in the United Nations Charter, which prohibits most types of intervention in the
domestic affairs of sovereign states. This norm of nonintervention has certainly permitted
some brutal dictators to get away with genocide and other heinous crimes. But, on balance,
there are good reasons for such a prohibition: armed intervention often has drastically neg-
ative consequences that outweigh the benefits of any particular intervention;30 we want to
constrain powerful states’ impulse to engage in neo-imperialist “nation-building”;31 and
such prohibitions protect important values such as the right to self-determination and the
need to limit the resort to war.32 Similarly, although the resource privilege permits the
resource curse, on balance, there might be good reasons to uphold the rule. Suppose the
rule included a clause that a vendor government be deemed legitimate by its citizens. This
potentially opens the door to serious market disruptions and exacerbates the rent-seeking
behavior underlying the curse by encouraging enterprising opposition parties to continu-
ally (but without ground) challenge the governing party’s legitimacy in an attempt to secure
greater control of resource rents. This is highly likely in many resource abundant coun-
tries, wherein politics are often dominated by ethnic or regional rivalries. In addition, the
29. For example, Gordon discusses the complexity of economic sanctions; see Joy Gordon, “A Peaceful,
Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions,” Ethics & International Affairs 13, no. 1 (1999):
123–142.
30. Cf. Richard W. Miller, “Respectable Oppressors, Hypocritical Liberators: Morality, Intervention, and
Reality,” in Ethics and Foreign Intervention, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003); Iris Marion Young, “Violence Against Power: Critical Thoughts on Military
Intervention,” in Chatterjee and Scheid, Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention.
31. Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, “Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention and The Future of International Law,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Polit-
ical Dilemmas, ed. Jeffrey L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003); Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
32. C.A.J. Coady, “War For Humanity: A Critique,” in Chatterjee and Scheid, Ethics and Humanitarian
Intervention.
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current rule makes normative sense against the background commitment to noninterven-
tion articulated in the Charter. Thus, we have good reason to uphold the resource privilege
(or something like it) to the extent that we have good reason to uphold a commitment to
nonintervention.
It is, of course, impossible to declare all potentially effective alternates to the resource
privilege inadmissible, simply because there are many that have yet to be proposed. Hence,
the foregoing considerations are not conclusive. But they do strongly suggest that any
rule that prevents resource revenue from entering domestic political economies with weak
institutions is unlikely to be admissible, for both practical and normative reasons. As I
argued earlier, we do not have a duty to reform rules for which there are no effective
admissible alternatives. Thus, to the extent that no effective admissible alternates emerge,
we do not have a duty to reform the international resource privilege.
Of course, this does not imply that we have no duties whatsoever to victims of the re-
source curse.33 Let’s concede that the resource privilege permits unjust transactions; espe-
cially with respect to Wenar’s argument concerning property rights, I find this a compelling
claim. Then, at the very least, agents of the countries and firms that transact directly with
dictatorial “resource thiefs” owe compensation to the citizens of those countries, even if
the transactions are unavoidable (e.g., because there simply aren’t enough legitimate ven-
dors to meet necessary resource demands). Moreover, the resource privilege regularizes
a pattern of unjust resource transactions. This plausibly grounds a claim on behalf of
those who are harmed by the privilege to receive compensation from those who contribute
indirectly to the regularization of unjust resource transactions, including, among others,
those who enjoy products made with unjustly acquired resources or whose jobs involve
using unjustly acquired resources.34 Thus, even if the resource privilege fails to generate
33. I’m grateful to Elizabeth Anderson for comments that led to the following discussion.
34. Relatedly, Barry argues that those who merely suspect their actions have contributed to another’s de-
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a duty to reform the resource privilege, there are other grounds for, at a minimum, duties
of compensation.35
Nothing I have said so far is sufficient to establish that the residents of developed
countries have duties of justice to the victims of the resource curse, much less define
the scope or stringency of any such duties. Nevertheless, the above considerations are
suggestive. If the foregoing is right, an important question arises, namely, how to discharge
any duties we have to the victims of the curse. We find guidance on this question by
examining the ways in which proposals like Pogge’s and Wenar’s would be ineffective in
addition to being inadmissible.
6.4 The Need for Exit Options
Even if we can overcome the concerns presented in the previous section, proposals
such as Pogge’s and Wenar’s would be ineffective for overcoming the resource curse. The
theory presented in chapter 5 identifies two necessary conditions for a prescription to ef-
fectively address the resource curse: (1) it must increase state rulers’ reliance on civil
society groups whose demands induce the provision of public goods, and (2) it must pro-
vide citizens with credible exit options. At best, Pogge’s and Wenar’s proposals fulfill the
first condition: they would increase rulers’ fiscal reliance on a broad coalition of citizens
by depriving them of resource revenue. But they — along with most other extant prescrip-
tions36 — do nothing to address citizens’ exit options. The importance of this condition
privation should be willing to err in favor of the deprived; see Christian Barry, “Applying the Contribution
Principle,” Metaphilosophy 36, nos. 1/2 (2005): 210–227. Further discussion of this so-called “contribution
principle” is found in Christian Barry, “Understanding and Evaluating the Contribution Principle,” in Real
World Justice, ed. Andreas Follesdal and Thomas W. Pogge (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
35. A further potential ground for duties of compensation, which I decline to discuss in any detail here,
rests on the charge that weak institutional structures and their developmental consequences are a legacy of
colonial rule. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins
of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001):
1369–1401.
36. See, e.g., Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse.
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cannot be overstated. Rulers who rely on citizens can still neglect their interests if those
citizens have nowhere else to go or no alternate leadership candidates to turn to. For any
prescription to effectively improve citizens’ bargaining leverage vis-a`-vis their rulers, it
must also provide citizens with exit options.
Focusing reform efforts on exit options has a second advantage. Since increasing
rulers’ reliance on citizens is incredibly difficult so long as resource revenue continues
to enter the domestic political economy, providing certain types of exit options might per-
mit resource curse victims to escape the curse even where it cannot be overcome. In
lieu of prescriptions to overcome the resource curse, we can compensate curse victims by
providing them exit options. In fact, given evidence that foreign aid perpetuates rulers’
unaccountability to citizens, exit options may be the best form of compensation.37
What is an exit option, and how can we improve resource curse victims’ access to
them? An exit option represents an opportunity to avoid the (deleterious) consequences
entailed by remaining in one’s current environment. The important feature of an exit option
in this context is its expected net benefit (expected benefit less expected costs) relative to
one’s current situation. In the bargaining literature, an exit option is characterized by the
payoff one expects to receive if one abandons the negotiation and no agreement is reached.
In the present context, an exit option is characterized by the net benefit one expects to
receive if one quits her current situation to avoid the consequences of remaining in that
situation. An exit option is credible if the net benefit of quitting a situation is greater than
37. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith present evidence that foreign aid is predominantly given to unaccount-
able governments, as this facilitates the donor’s extraction of policy concessions; see Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith, “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions”; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, “A Political Economy
of Aid.” Additionally, the theory presented in chapter 5 suggests that unearned income is problematic re-
gardless of the source; it need not derive from resource extraction. Foreign aid is just another form of
unearned income. Morrison presents further evidence that resource revenue and foreign aid have similarly
anti-democratic effects, although via a different mechanism than the one specified here; see Kevin M. Morri-
son, “Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization: A Best-Case Scenario,” Public Choice 131 (2007): 365–
386; Kevin M. Morrison, “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability,”
International Organization 63 (2009): 107–138.
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the net benefit of remaining in that situation. In the particular case of the resource curse,
a credible exit option consists in an opportunity to quit a resource-cursed situation that
provides greater net benefit than what one expects to receive by remaining in the resource-
cursed situation.
What sorts of things could potentially constitute exit options for curse victims? We
find some guidance on this by looking to the exit options frequently emphasized in the
institutional development literature cited in section 5.3. In the context of early modern
Europe (esp. 17th century England), theorists have focused on citizens’ ability to hide
their income from taxation, as well as the real threat of armed revolution they posed.38
Bueno de Mesquita et al’s selectorate theory emphasizes the credibility of supporters’
threats to shift their support to leadership challengers.39 This suggests we might be able to
provide curse victims with credible exit threats by increasing the liquidity of their assets
or their ability to move already liquid assets, increasing their ability to credibly threaten
armed resistance, or increasing their capacity to credibly threaten to shift their support to
leadership challengers.
Unfortunately, each of these faces difficulties that must be overcome if they are to be
pursued in the resource curse context. With respect to asset mobility, most victims of the
resource curse have few assets to move and the prospects for obtaining liquid assets are
slim, since economic stagnation is a component of the curse. Further, as noted above, oil
wells and copper mines can’t be moved, meaning that resource holders can’t exit without
leaving their assets behind. But the main problem here is that a person may be able to
move their assets out of the ruler’s reach without being able to move their body out of
reach. Thus, so long as rulers’ do not rely on citizens, asset mobility does not necessarily
38. See, e.g., Bates and Lien, “A Note on Taxation”; North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commit-
ment”; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
39. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; see also Clark et al., “Why Do Autocrats
Overachieve?”
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help victims escape the threat to their person presented by a negligent or oppressive ruler.
Since resource-cursed states are typically military dictatorships, single-party states, or
rigged-election democracies, ordinary citizens have few opportunities to threaten a ruler’s
political survival by shifting allegiance to a political rival. The ruler’s ability to retain
power is rarely affected by electoral outcomes, so curse victims can rarely exit by voting
for a rival.40 Moreover, leadership struggles are typically confined to a small elite and
are largely insulated from ordinary citizens by the traditional hierarchies often found in
resource-cursed societies.41 This means that those who are able to credibly shift political
allegiances often threaten to do so to extract greater private goods.
Finally, although resource-cursed countries often experience armed civil conflict,42 or-
dinary citizens are not usually in a place to take up armed resistance against nefarious
rulers. The latter typically have a massive military advantage, which makes armed re-
sistance too costly for citizens living at subsistence levels. Moreover, as illustrated by
civil wars in Angola (1975–1991, 1992–2002), Sierra Leone (1991–2002), and Sudan
(1983–present) — in which resource control was often a central issue — ordinary citizens
are often casualties rather than participants in civil conflict, typically caught between elite
groups vying for political power.
So asset mobility, armed resistance, and shifting one’s allegiance are examples of exit
options, but making these credible for curse victims poses serious difficulties. Another
obvious candidate is migration. If a victim is permitted to migrate from her resource-
cursed conditions to a country with stable democratic governance and stable economic
opportunities, she can thereby improve her life prospects. Of course, emigration is costly
to the migrant. The associated legal and administrative costs can be quite high. More
40. But, as the case of Venezuela shows, being able to do so might not make a difference.
41. Bates, When Things Fell Apart provides illustrations.
42. Although, as noted in chapter 5 at footnote 2, whether resource abundance causes an increase in civil
war onset is controversial.
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importantly, leaving one’s country often involves leaving behind family and friends, not
to mention the sense of dislocation associated with relocating to a new society with (po-
tentially vastly) different social and cultural norms and expectations. There are also the
costs of being an “outsider,” of being alienated and treated with suspicion by immigration
officials, potential employers, and neighbors. Whether emigration presents a credible exit
option depends on whether the net benefits of migration are greater than the net costs.
This means that the credibility of emigration as an exit option declines as the costs in-
crease. There is potential here, as some of the costs associated with migration are under
the control of developed countries. But future research on the availability of emigration
options for curse victims should be cognizant of these costs. It should also be cognizant
of the extent to which mitigating these costs is feasible. Immigration imposes costs on the
residents of destination countries as well, and residents of developed countries typically
resist bearing these costs. This is especially true when the immigrants are desperately poor
and largely unskilled, as victims of the resource curse typically are. This fact supplies us
with a powerful rhetorical point: for all our talk about helping the global poor — for all
our calls for foreign aid and humanitarian intervention — our resistance to admitting the
poor into our own countries reveals that we are unwilling to do the things that could really
help.43 Although damning, this point does not yield a promising proposal to address the
curse.
The central point here is a schematic one: future proposals to address the resource
curse should focus on granting citizens credible exit options. This is so for two reasons.
First, it is a necessary condition for effectively overcoming the curse; second, exit options
effectively compensate curse victims for the deprivation caused by unjust resource trans-
actions. The prospects for providing curse victims with exit options may not look good
43. Thanks to Bill Clark for raising this point.
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at a first glance. Yet, because extant theorists have largely neglected the importance of
exit options, the possibilities are underexplored. Hence, future prescriptive work on the
resource curse should focus on improving citizens’ exit options.
6.5 Where To Now? A Tentative Proposal
Fortunately, the preceding challenges do not yet warrant despair. The theory presented
in chapter 5 implies that it is not resource revenue per se that causes development failures,
but any factor that diminishes rulers’ reliance on citizens. Hence, potential solutions to
the resource curse need not focus directly on resource revenue. We might look at other
levers that potentially affect rulers’ reliance on citizens and try to pull on those in an
effort to counteract the deleterious effects of resource revenue. The analysis in section 5.4
suggests a place to look: any form of income for which rulers need not put in political
and organizational effort to receive, “unearned” revenue as Moore calls it. These certainly
include foreign aid disbursements;44 the Venezuelan case study suggests sovereign lending
might be another. Do countries with vast resource revenues receive significant amounts of
foreign aid or take on significant amounts of public debt? Could these factors give us
enough leverage to mitigate the resource curse?
For a limited number of cases, they are. Among countries classified as resource de-
pendent by Haber and Menaldo, three were among the top ten recipients of official de-
velopment aid (ODA) from 2004 to 2006: Nigeria (US$6.1 billion per year), Democratic
Republic of Congo ($1.9 billion per year), and Sudan ($1.6 billion per year).45 Addition-
ally, Egypt and Indonesia are among the top ten ODA recipients since 1970, receiving
44. See footnote 37 in this chapter.
45. OECD, Development Aid at a Glance, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2008, 23 (Table 1.2.7). Official development aid is defined as official flows to countries aimed at promoting
economic development and welfare; see ibid., 9.
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Table 6.1: General government gross debt, percent of GDP, 1990–2010
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Bahrain
8.3 16.5 29.3 28.7 32.8
(4.5) (5.8) (8) (13.5) (21.7)
Guinea
99.6 92.6 118.7 150.2 91.4
(2.7) (3.7) (3.1) (2.9) (4.3)
Qatar
10.9 42.4 55 18 25.6
(7.4) (8.1) (17.8) (43) (126.5)
SOURCE: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2010
GDP in US$ billions reported in parentheses.
averages of US$3 billion and $1.9 billion per year respectively.46 While many resource
dependent countries have decreasing public debt, a few have shown upward trends during
the last twenty years, including Bahrain, Guinea, and Qatar (see table 6.1). And, of course,
Venezuela experienced a debt crisis despite the availability of resource revenue. All this is
to say that we do find resource dependent countries receiving aid and loans despite their
vast resource revenues.
A strategy targeting foreign aid and sovereign loan disbursements has definite limits.
In the first place, we are talking about a relatively small number of countries. Secondly,
the money received in aid and loans is often much lower than that received from resource
extraction, so these might not be influential levers to pull.
Yet, a strategy targeting aid and debt can have some promise. Several of the listed
countries are among the most populous, with Indonesia, Nigeria, Egypt, and the DRC
among the twenty most populous countries in the world. The list also comprises some of
the worst countries in the world, with Sudan, the DRC, Guinea, and Nigeria among the top
fifteen states in Foreign Policy’s “Failed States Index.”47 So targeting aid and loans has the
46. OECD, Development Aid at a Glance, 25 (Table 1.2.10).
47. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010 failed states index interactive
map and rankings.
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potential to lift vast numbers of people out of extreme deprivation. Finally, although small
compared to resource revenues, the amounts disbursed in aid and loans is not insignificant.
Aid and loans may provide enough of a handle to gain some leverage on the problem.
I end with a tentative outline for a strategy to mitigate the resource curse that targets
foreign aid and loan disbursements to resource dependent countries. Given the conditions
for an effective proposal, my strategy has two prongs. One aims to increase rulers’ fiscal
reliance on citizens by restricting their access to aid and loans; the other aims to increase
citizens’ exit options by opening up opportunities for citizens to withhold their income
from domestic taxation.
To increase rulers’ fiscal reliance on citizens, I propose that we look for ways to make
development aid and government loans conditional on reaching a threshold level of fiscal
reliance on non-resource tax revenue. We should require states to draw some threshold
percentage of their revenue from taxes on income and profits earned domestically by indi-
viduals and businesses outside the resource sector. This rule should be general; it should
apply to all states. But the threshold should be set in a way that discriminates between
non-resource dependent states and resource dependent countries. The aim of the rule is
to induce resource dependent states to increase their fiscal reliance on citizens, not punish
those who have already achieved this. The threshold should also be set in a way that ac-
counts for the aid or loans to be disbursed; states should achieve the threshold even when
we include the money to be disbursed.
I anticipate that, if enforced, the rule would induce two changes in resource dependent
states. First, they would need to develop broad tax extraction capacity in addition to the
more narrow capacity to milk revenue from resource companies specifically. The former
capacity requires tax authorities that penetrate deeply into the population. This, in turn,
requires development of a coherent, disciplined, and meritocratic bureaucracy; given the
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difficulty and cost of collecting taxes from multifarious sources, rulers will prefer a civil
service that collects taxes honestly and efficiently to maximize the state’s take. By closing
holes that permit the waste and corruption that so often plagues resource dependent states,
creation of such a bureaucracy could reduce revenue misallocation and thereby improve
development outcomes.
Second, resource dependent states would need to cultivate a broad domestic tax base
that is capable of providing revenue. Simply, tax revenue requires that citizens earn an
income and businesses turn a profit. Enabling citizens and businesses to earn money that
can be taxed requires developing an economic environment that induces and facilitates
productive activity. To increase its tax revenue, the state will need to provide certain public
goods: rule of law, physical security, secure property rights, public infrastructure, and
education and health care. These investments would advance citizens’ interests markedly.
Inducing productive activity further requires setting the tax rate at a place where citi-
zens prefer work to leisure. Thus, cultivating a broad tax base involves an implicit bargain
between the state and civil society. This brings us to the issue of citizens’ exit threats.
Citizens’ ability to exit the workforce places constraints on a ruler’s ability to collect tax
revenue. The ruler cannot simply set a high tax rate to quickly achieve the specified tax
reliance threshold; at a sufficiently high rate, people would simply stop working, eroding
the ruler’s tax base. Instead, the ruler must set tax rates low enough to induce productive
activity. The tax yield might be relatively low initially, further inducing the ruler to make
growth enhancing investments. To collect enough tax revenue at rates that are low enough
to encourage economic activity, the ruler will need to make investments that enable more
people to make more money. Again, such investments would advance citizens’ interests
markedly.
We must provide citizens with additional exit options; the threat to stop working is not
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credible so long as a person’s net income under predatory tax rates provides more than
the life of bare subsistence to which she is likely to be relegated if she stops working.
Suppose citizens could earn income outside the ruler’s jurisdiction, leaving it out of the
ruler’s reach (at least, out of his reach for the purpose of satisfying the proposed rule).
This would diminish the ruler’s eligible tax revenue, which would jeopardize his ability
to attract the aid and loans he needs. To maintain his tax base, the ruler would need to
cultivate an environment where citizens prefer to earn taxable income domestically rather
than abroad. This would give citizens additional leverage in bargaining with the ruler over
taxation.
Can we provide poor individuals with opportunities to earn income abroad? Here’s a
possibility. Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending networks, such as ProsperTM and Lending Club,
are a recent innovation that enable individuals to lend and borrow money directly without
the mediation of banks. To participate, an individual opens an account with the network.
To borrow money, one must fill out a survey used to screen borrowers and determine a
credit rating as defined by network rules. This rating is used to set the terms of the loan
and permits lenders to assess the risks and rewards associated with lending to any particu-
lar borrower. Lenders survey the outstanding loan requests and decide which borrowers to
invest in. Lenders are free to contribute as much as they choose above a minimum (typi-
cally $25) to any particular loan. This permits individuals to invest small sums of money
and earn a relatively tidy return, even after the fee charged by the network to facilitate the
transactions.48
If a ruler is making investments that enable people to earn an income, then P2P lend-
ing could present attractive investment opportunities even for people with low income.
48. Returns range from roughly 5.5% to more than 25%, depending on the terms of the loan and the
borrower’s rating. Networks typically charge an annual servicing fee that works out to around 1% of the
lender’s total return. For further details, see http://www.prosper.com or http://www.lendingclub.com.
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But two changes would be required for P2P lending to provide resource curse victims
with credible exit options. First, we would need to establish international P2P lending
networks; currently, P2P lending networks are limited to domestic contexts. Plausibly,
this could be done; Kiva, a quasi-P2P microfinance organization, connects lenders and
borrowers across borders. (Although there is an important difference between the Kiva
and P2P models: established microfinance institutions actually disburse the loans in the
Kiva case, whereas loans are disbursed directly by lenders in the P2P model. Perhaps this
makes a difference for implementation.49) Second, P2P lenders are often legally required
to meet minimum income or net worth thresholds that are out of reach for low income
individuals. For example, Idaho, New Hampshire, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington re-
quire P2P lenders to have an annual gross income of at least $70,000 plus a net worth of at
least $70,000 (excluding house, home furnishing, and vehicle) or to have a net worth of at
least $250,000 (with the same exclusions).50 Such requirements would obviously exclude
the target individuals in the present. At a glance, reducing the minimum requirements to
make P2P accessible to as many poor individuals as possible seems doable. Of course, de-
termining the extent to which this is possible would require full consideration of the legal
rationale for retaining relatively high minimum requirements. I must reserve this task for
another occasion.
In sum, I propose the following general strategy as a means to mitigating the resource
curse in a limited number of countries. First, we implement a requirement that official aid
and sovereign loan disbursements be conditional on meeting a minimum threshold of fis-
cal reliance on domestic tax revenue. To be eligible to satisfy the requirement, the revenue
should derive from taxes on income earned domestically by individual citizens and profits
earned by businesses outside the resource sector. In implementing this rule, we induce
49. See http://www.kiva.org for further details of their model.
50. See http://www.prosper.com/legal/compliance.aspx.
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rulers to make investments that advance citizens’ interests in an effort to increase his eligi-
ble tax base. Second, we establish international peer-to-peer lending networks that could
facilitate opportunities for citizens to invest their limited resources abroad. This could en-
able citizens to reduce the amount of their income that is eligible for taxation that meets
the rule, thereby providing them with leverage in bargaining with the ruler over taxation.
To keep citizens’ investments in the country, the ruler may have to concede oversight of
taxation and public spending to citizens, which would further advance citizens’ interests.
I should reiterate the tentative nature of my proposal; its sole purpose is to outline a
framework for a potential solution to the resource curse in a limited number of cases. Its
strongest claim is to have satisfied the conditions for an effective prescription in broad
strokes. Serious questions remain concerning implementation and feasibility. For exam-
ple, we must settle the question of who is to implement and enforce the rule. Foreign
aid and sovereign lending are decentralized phenomena; states receive loans and aid from
multifarious sources. Implementing the rule is likely to require a complex (and costly)
regulatory apparatus. We would need to identify an agent that is both capable and willing
to oversee implementation. Perhaps international organizations such as the World Bank or
IMF are candidates, but whether this is so requires further research. On the feasibility side,
there remains the question of whether the proposal is incentive compatible. Randall Stone
presents evidence that IMF conditionality lacks credibility because powerful donor coun-
tries often interfere with rigorous enforcement when the recipient country has influence
with powerful patron states.51 A similar problem could apply here.
My proposal is not without its limits. But I submit that it points in a direction that is
worth exploring further. Perhaps most importantly, given the argument in section 6.4, it
illustrates how we might integrate a focus on exit options into our prescriptions to avert
development failures.
51. Randall W. Stone, “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa,” American Political Science
Review 98, no. 4 (2004): 577–591.
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6.6 A Last Word
In the introduction, I announced my commitment to cosmopolitan moral principles.
This leads me to affirm that we — the residents of developed countries — have duties of
justice to address the resource curse and enable resource curse victims to live minimally
decent lives. But I want to make clear that one need not share my cosmopolitan com-
mitments to agree that we have some sort of duty to resource curse victims. Thomas
Nagel — who is decidedly not a cosmopolitan — distinguishes duties of justice from du-
ties of humanitarian assistance. On his view, duties of justice arise only among members
of the right sort of association. Duties of assistance follow from “some minimal con-
cern we owe to fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition and
early death from easily preventable diseases”; they are supposed to be less demanding than
duties of justice since they do not depend on one’s relationship to the deprived.52 Curse
victims’ privation is severe enough to guarantee that, at the very least, we have a minimal
humanitarian duty to help them avoid their poverty and oppression.
We need not settle whether we have duties of justice or duties of humanitarian assis-
tance to resource curse victims to affirm that we are, at minimum, obliged to provide them
with credible exit options. If we have duties of justice, institutions that ensure just treat-
ment of individuals must provide them with credible exit options vis-a`-vis their political
leaders; if we only have duties of assistance, credible exit options will be among the most
effective ways to help curse victims avoid poverty and oppression.
My institutional proposal also meets the stringent demands of cosmopolitan justice
while remaining consistent with minimal humanitarian obligations. If it is true, as I con-
cede in section 6.3, that the resource curse constitutes an injustice, then we are straight-
forwardly required to avert the injustice. This requires that we either avoid the actions
52. Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” 118.
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that cause the injustice or establish institutions that prevent those actions from generat-
ing unjust outcomes. I present some reasons to think that we cannot simply stop buying
natural resources from dictators. Failing this, the strategy I outline satisfies the necessary
conditions for effectively mitigating the unjust consequences of transacting with dictators.
Thus, it satisfies the demands of cosmopolitan justice.
In lieu of granting resource curse victims entry into developed countries, the strategy I
outline also meets the minimum requirements for effectively assisting curse victims avoid
their plight, as specified in section 6.3. We could, as humanitarians frequently prescribe,
merely continue to give humanitarian aid directly to curse victims. This might alleviate the
symptoms of their problem. But it would not address the underlying condition, namely,
citizens’ weak bargaining leverage vis-a`-vis their ruler. Genuine aid targets the underlying
condition. Since my proposal does this, it (or something like it) would be required by a
minimal humanitarianism.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion: Toward a Pragmatic Statism
The preceding chapters lay the groundwork for a distinctively pragmatic approach to
questions of global justice. In contrast to the conventional approach, the failure analysis
approach integrates architecture and engineering, the normative and the empirical. Rather
than defining our obligations to the global poor by reference to an ideal of justice, it seeks
practical remedies to development failures. We need not look hard to identify develop-
ment failures; malnutrition, disease, oppression, and violence abound. We need not know
what obligations we would have in an ideal world to know that morality requires we do
something to mitigate these development failures. The statistics, images, and stories are
too jarring to permit moral complacence. We are hence faced with an urgent question:
What must we do to avert or mitigate development failures?
The conventional wisdom is that development failures persist because we — developed
states and their constituents — do not intervene enough to provide developing states with
much-needed assistance. Simply, poverty persists because we do not provide enough de-
velopment and humanitarian assistance;1 violence and genocide persist because we do not
intervene militarily to prevent it.2 Cosmopolitans take this theme one step further. Not
1. See, e.g., Sachs, End of Poverty.
2. See, e.g., Collier, The Bottom Billion; International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
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only should we intervene more often to prevent development failures; we should institu-
tionalize the prescribed interventions by establishing a layer of suprastate institutions with
mandatory global jurisdiction and the authority to restrict activity within state borders.3
My argument implies that it is too quick to step from an obligation to mitigate devel-
opment failures to an obligation to intervene to provide assistance. At a minimum, any
case for intervention must examine the effect the prescribed intervention is likely to have
on citizens’ bargaining position vis-a`-vis their leaders. When some intervention can be
shown to improve citizens’ bargaining leverage, then there is a strong case in favor of
the intervention. But there is empirical evidence that shows that official foreign aid and
armed intervention in particular are not often employed to empower citizens but rather to
strengthen the position of rulers.4 In such cases, developed countries’ intervention under-
cuts the bargaining dynamic that underlies successful development, thereby freeing rulers
to neglect citizens’ interests. This suggests that, in these cases, development failures arise
because we intervene too much rather than too little. Perhaps our obligation to mitigate
development failures requires that we refrain from our current interference in sovereign
states.
Regarding cosmopolitan institutional proposals, my argument in chapter 5 suggests an
even stronger claim, namely, that cosmopolitan institutions are self-defeating in an impor-
tant sense. Recall from the introduction that we can reduce arguments for cosmopolitan
institutional schemes to a common schema:
1. The cosmopolitan commitment generates an obligation to realize the cosmopolitan
objective.
2. Cosmopolitan institutional arrangements are required to realize the cosmopolitan
objective.
3. See my discussion in the introduction on this point.
4. See Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of
Economic Growth 5 (2000): 33–63; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Intervention and
Democracy,” International Organization 60 (2006): 627–649; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, “A Political
Economy of Aid”; Morrison, “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and Regime Stability.”
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3. The cosmopolitan commitment generates an obligation to establish cosmopolitan
institutional arrangements.
An important question is whether cosmopolitan institutions would, if implemented, re-
alize cosmopolitan objectives. Since cosmopolitan objectives — secure rights, sufficient
material well-being, and so on — are realized when successful development occurs, this
question is transposed to the following in light of chapter 5: would cosmopolitan insti-
tutional arrangements improve citizens’ bargaining leverage vis-a`-vis their leaders? The
answer, I think, is no. I conjecture that cosmopolitan institutions would induce state lead-
ers to seek support from third parties (other states, or regional and global agencies) at
the expense of their dependence on citizens for support, thereby undermining citizens’
bargaining leverage.
Consider two issues that are much discussed in the global justice literature: global dis-
tributive justice and limits on state sovereignty (which includes humanitarian intervention
and the practice of state recognition).
Proposals for global redistributive institutions — e.g., Brock’s global taxation schemes,
Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend, or the numerous calls to increase foreign aid5 — share
a common feature. Each of them proposes to transfer “unearned” resources to developing
countries; rulers need not expend effort vis-a`-vis their citizens to receive it.6 Rulers who
need not earn their income have little incentive to interact with citizens, nevermind nego-
tiate with citizens over policy. In short, global redistributive institutions diminish rulers’
fiscal reliance on citizens. In light of the theory presented in chapter 5, this implies that
global redistributive institutions undermine a necessary condition for inducing rulers to
advance citizens’ interests, hence, for realizing cosmopolitan objectives.
5. Brock, Global Justice, ch. 5; Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, ch. 8; see Shue, Basic Rights
for an example of an argument to increase official aid transfers.
6. Recall my discussion of earned vs. unearned income in sections 5.4 and 6.5.
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Or consider cosmopolitan arguments in favor of military intervention to prevent gross
and systematic human rights violations,7 or prescriptions to reform international institu-
tions to reduce the need for intervention.8 The key shared feature here is that a ruler’s
retention of power ultimately depends on the decisions and actions of outsiders rather than
citizens. If third parties can credibly threaten to forcibly remove a ruler, he will be inclined
to seek outside support rather than internal support. The more a ruler depends on outside
political support, the less he depends on citizens.9 Since policy is shaped in negotiations
with political supporters, conditioning a ruler’s authority on outside support induces rulers
to bargain over policy with noncitzens rather than citizens. Ultimately, when authority is
conferred from outside, rulers are accountable to noncitizens.
It is true that cosmopolitan institutional proposals typically condition redistributive
transfers or respect for sovereignty on the realization of cosmopolitan objectives. Typi-
cally, these proposals require developing countries to make progress on improving peo-
ple’s lives to receive their distributive share or avoid military intervention. Fine. But
this ignores an important fact about the world in which the proposed institutions are sup-
posed to operate. Those who make redistributive or intervention decisions (third party
states, international organizations) have their own agendas and use their control over re-
sources as bargaining chips in pursuit of those agendas. Sure enough, cosmopolitans have
in mind that these outside authorities would use this influence to provoke rulers to fulfill
7. For example, Brock, Global Justice, ch. 7; Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, ch. 7; Fernando R. Teso´n,
Humanitarian Intervention, 3rd ed. (Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2005).
8. For example, Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination; Thomas W. Pogge, “Pre-empting
Humanitarian Interventions,” in Freedom, Power, and Morality: Essays for Felix Oppenheim, ed. Ian Carter
and Mario Ricciardi (London: Palgrave, 2001); Thomas W. Pogge, “Moralizing Humanitarian Intervention:
Why Jurying Fails and How Law Can Work,” in Humanitarian Intervention, Humanitarian Intervention, ed.
Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, NOMOS XLVII (New York and London: New York University Press,
2006).
9. Consider how third party states or outside organizations intervene to prop up allied dictators despite
their domestic unpopularity; e.g., Saddam Hussein (before the late-80s), Marcos, Mobutu, Pahlavi, Suharto.
When dictators fall, it is often because third parties intervene to forcibly remove them — e.g., Hussein — or
step aside to let domestic politics take over when intervention would be too costly — e.g., Mubarak, Pahlavi.
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cosmopolitan objectives. But this requires that these outside authorities reliably promote
the interests of another country’s citizens, sometimes to the detriment of their own private
interests. This becomes especially worrisome once we recognize that those who fill the
offices of these outside agencies (be they other states or global agencies) are constrained
by the interests of their own political supporters. I find it implausible to expect that these
latter interests would be reliably aligned with the interests of citizens in another country.
Suppose we can rely on global agencies to consistently use their authority to prod de-
veloping country rulers to fulfill cosmopolitan objectives. Even still, this remains fragile
assurance that the latter will be induced to advance citizens’ interests. Mill highlights two
problems with relying on others to promote an individual’s interests: insufficient motiva-
tion and lack of relevant knowledge.
[The individual] is the person most interested in his own well-being; the in-
terests which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment,
can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest
which society has in him individually. . . is fractional, and altogether indirect;
while with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that
can be possessed by any one else.10
The point is that the citizens themselves will be most motivated to press their interests with
their ruler, and they will know best which interests or needs are most urgent. Hence, even
if we can to rely on global agencies to promote individuals’ interests (though I’m dubious),
we obtain a stronger guarantee for realizing cosmopolitan objectives if we pursue courses
of action that enlarge the number of citizens on whose support rulers depend and intensify
the degree to which rulers rely on that support.
The preceding examples provide some reasons to think that, in cases where rulers come
to rely more on outside agencies for support than on their own citizens, cosmopolitan insti-
tutional arrangements are liable to undermine the fulfillment of cosmopolitan objectives.
10. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill, ed. Dale E. Miller (New York:
Random House, 2002), 79.
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In these cases, institutional cosmopolitanism is self-defeating.
Stated generally, the central lesson is this:
In a world where politics is predominantly strategic, cosmopolitan institu-
tional arrangements are liable to undermine state leaders’ need to rely on
their citizens for political support, thereby compromising citizens’ bargaining
leverage vis-a`-vis their leaders.
When citizens’ bargaining leverage vis-a`-vis their leaders is compromised, cosmopolitan
objectives are liable to go unfulfilled.
My arguments throughout the dissertation crucially assume that the relevant politi-
cal agents act strategically. By this, I don’t mean that political agents are ultra-rational,
self-interested agents without any concern for others. All I mean is that political agents
undertake actions in service of their agendas, which are largely shaped by the agendas of
their core supporters. Should we endorse this assumption when asking questions about
global institutional design?
It depends on the normative question we seek to answer. If we seek to identify a
normative standard by which we can assess current institutions and outcomes, we need
not. One way to arrive at an evaluative standard is to specify the institutional arrangements
that would be realized in a fully just world. It seems appropriate to assume that political
agents in a fully just world are motivated largely by moral considerations.11
But the institutional prescriptions I have considered throughout this essay are clearly
interested in advancing cosmopolitan objectives in our decidedly unjust world. That polit-
ical agents act strategically seems to be a deep and enduring feature of our world. No, not
all political agents act strategically; and those who do don’t do so all the time. But a suf-
ficient number of political agents are motivated by strategic considerations often enough
to ensure that outcomes are reliably shaped by strategic, rather than normative, considera-
tions.
11. See the discussion at the end of section B.2.
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This fact is surely lamentable from a moral perspective; but it is likely a fact that we
can’t escape, at least not any time soon. The upshot is that our reasoning about institutional
design should account for the fact that the particular agents who will occupy positions of
authority in any institutional scheme will typically be moved by strategic considerations.
Thankfully, this does not imply that we should give up devising institutional reforms meant
to advance cosmopolitan objectives. Instead, we must seek institutional remedies that
shape political agents’ incentives in a way that aligns their interests with the fulfillment of
cosmopolitan objectives.12
This is a difficult task, to be sure. But my arguments in chapters 5 and 6 suggest a
direction in which to look. In general, those who seek to mitigate development failures
should attend to the likely effects of an institutional prescription on individuals’ bargaining
relationship with their political leaders. More specifically, they should devise strategies
that (1) increase (rather than reduce) rulers’ dependence on a broad coalition of citizens
for support, and (2) provide citizens with credible exit options. Simply put, successful
remedies for development failures are likely to realize their moral objectives when they
improve citizens’ capacity to press their demands with their rulers.
Contrary to typical cosmopolitan offerings, I conjecture that these conditions are more
likely to be satisfied in a system of sovereign states than in a system of vertically dispersed
authority with global organizations residing at the top. This is decidedly not a recom-
mendation to maintain the status quo; in the current system, rulers’ reliance on citizens is
too often undermined, as powerful states use threat of force or withdrawal of cooperation
to keep rulers in the developing world in line. Instead of a system in which the bound-
12. For elaboration of this point, see Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, “The Normative Purpose
of Economic ‘Science’: Rediscovery of an Eighteenth-Century Method,” International Review of Law and
Economics 1 (1981): 155–166; Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, “The Feasibility Issue,” in Oxford Hand-
book of Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
158
aries of political communities are created and maintained by a few global powers, what
is needed is a system in which sovereign political entities are confined within boundaries
that are contested by members of political communities, and emerge from a process of
negotiation between prospective rulers and those they intend to rule.13 This requires in-
stitutions that effectively prevent global powers from interfering in the domestic political
processes of political communities so that the outcome will arise from a process of internal
contestation among members of the community. Such a process of internal contestation re-
quires prospective rulers to secure the support of domestic citizen groups, which, in turn,
gives those domestic groups influence over the policy making process. In short, realiz-
ing cosmopolitan objectives requires institutions that will enforce rather than dilute strong
sovereignty norms.
I do not assert that states or nations have moral value per se.14 I tentatively endorse a
system of states for engineering reasons; a system of sovereign states is most likely to sat-
isfy the conditions under which development failures would be averted and cosmopolitan
objectives would be realized in our world. Since cosmopolitans are centrally concerned
with establishing the conditions needed to fulfill the requirements of their moral commit-
ments, my arguments suggest that they would be wise to adopt a pragmatic statism.
13. Cf. Bates, Prosperity and Violence; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
14. Cf. David Miller, On Nationality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, “The
Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9, no. 3 (1980): 209–
229.
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APPENDIX A
Technical Appendix
I now present the reasoning from section 5.3 formally. To do this, I extend the “Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty” game presented by Clark, Golder, and Golder.1 The strategic logic
presented here is the same as in that model. My contribution is the formalization of this
strategic logic when the ruler faces more than one group of citizens with differential bar-
gaining strength and competing policy objectives.
The players. There are three players who bargain over an indivisible prize.
• A ruler (R), who sets policy, first, to insure his retention of political power and,
second, to maximize discretionary income.
• An elite class (E), whose members engage in rent-seeking activity; they demand
institutions and policies that maximize their share of the prize.
• A citizen class (C), whose members demand public goods, i.e., institutions and
policies that secure their rights and promote their general well-being.
The timeline.
1. The ruler chooses to: neglect the interests of both the elites and citizens (PREY);
advance elites’ interests (SUPPORT E); or advance citizens’ interests (SUPPORT C).
2. The elites and citizens each choose one of the following actions simultaneously2: to
lobby the ruler for a favorable change (VOICE); to comply with the ruler’s choice
and absorb the consequences (LOYALTY); to take action to avoid the consequences
of the ruler’s choice (EXIT). If neither the elites nor the citizens choose VOICE, the
game ends and the players receive their payoffs.
1. Clark, Golder, and Golder, “The Balance of Power.”
2. Although the timing of elites’ and citizens’ response to the ruler’s initial choice doesn’t matter. In all
cases, at least one player has a (weakly) dominant response.
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3. If either the elites or the citizens choose VOICE, the ruler must either CONCEDE (i.e.,
advance the interests of a lobbying player) or IGNORE (i.e., persist in implementing
the initial choice). Since elites and citizens prefer opposing policies, the ruler can
concede to only one of the two players if both elites and citizens choose VOICE.
If the ruler concedes to either player, the game ends and the players receive their
payoffs.
4. If the ruler ignores any exercise of voice, then the player(s) who exercised voice
choose(s) either EXIT or LOYALTY. If the ruler reverses a choice that is initially
favorable for i, then i chooses either EXIT or LOYALTY. The game ends and the
players receive their payoffs.
The payoffs.
• If the ruler preys or both the elites and citizens exit, he receives a benefit of 1;
otherwise, he receives 0. If the elites remain loyal, the ruler receives an additional
payoff LE ; if the citizens remain loyal, the ruler receives an additional payoff LC.
The ruler pays a cost KR if either the elites or the citizens use voice.
• If the ruler supports the elites and the latter remain loyal, then the elites receive 1;
otherwise, they receive 0. If the elites exercise voice, they pay a cost KE and receive
1 if the ruler concedes and 0 if the ruler ignores. If the elites exit, they receive XE .
• If the ruler supports citizens and the latter remain loyal, then the citizens receive
1; otherwise, they receive 0. If the citizens exercise voice, they pay a cost KC and
receive 1 if the ruler concedes and 0 if the ruler ignores. If the citizens exit, they
receive XC.
Assumptions.
1. The players have full information.
2. Ki,Li,> 0 for i ∈ {E,C}.
3. 1 > Xi for i ∈ {E,C}.
4. i will exit only if Xi > 0 for i ∈ {E,C}
5. The ruler will respond only if Li > 1 for i ∈ {E,C}
6. If Li,L j > 1, the ruler responds to i if Li > L j for i, j ∈ {E,C}; Li 6= L j
7. i will not use voice if Xi > 1−Ki for i ∈ {E,C}
I solve the model for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Since the point of the model is
to determine the conditions under which rulers attend to citizens’ interests, the main claims
of interest concern the ruler’s initial policy choice. These are stated below as propositions
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A.7 and A.8. Before proving these propositions, I prove a series of lemmas concerning
equilibrium play in the various subgames.
Lemma A.1. For i, j ∈ {E,C}, j 6= i, if the ruler ignores i or concedes to j following i’s
use of voice, then
a. i remains loyal if Xi ≤ 0;
b. i exits otherwise.
Proof. Suppose the ruler ignores i or concedes to j. Ui(loyalty) = 0. Suppose Xi ≤ 0.
Then Ui(exit) = Xi ≤Ui(loyalty). So i remains loyal.
Now suppose Xi > 0. Then Ui(exit)≥Ui(loyalty) and i exits. 
Lemma A.2. For i ∈ {E,C}, if the ruler concedes to i following i’s use of voice, i remains
loyal.
Proof. Suppose the ruler concedes to i. Then Ui(loyalty) = 1 >Ui(exit) = Xi (by assump-
tion). So i is always loyal if the ruler concedes. 
Lemma A.3. For i ∈ {E,C}, if i uses voice, then
a. the ruler ignores i if Xi ≤ 0;
b. the ruler ignores i if Xi > 0 and Li ≤ 1, except when i 6= j ∈ {E,C} remains loyal
following an initial policy of supporting j and X j ≤ 0 or L j < Li ≤ 1; then the ruler
concedes to i.
c. the ruler concedes to i if Xi > 0 and Li > 1, except when either (1) both i and j use voice,
or (2) j is loyal following an initial policy of supporting j, and X j > 0 and L j > Li;
then the ruler ignores i.
Proof. I prove each subitem separately.
a. Suppose Xi ≤ 0. Then i remains loyal if ignored (by lemma A.1). Thus, UR(concede) =
Li ≤UR(ignore) = 1+Li. So the ruler ignores i.
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b. Suppose Xi > 0 and Li ≤ 1. Then minUR(ignore) = 1 (by lemma A.1), which is greater
than UR(concede) = Li. So the ruler ignores i.
The preceding holds except in either of the following cases when Xi > 0 and Li ≤ 1.
Suppose j remains loyal following SUPPORT j.
Case 1. Suppose X j ≤ 0. Then j is loyal when the ruler concedes to i (by lemma
A.1). So UR(concede to i) = Li +L j−KR > UR(ignore i) = L j−KR (by lemmas A.1
and A.2). Thus, the ruler concedes to i.
Case 2. Suppose L j < Li. Whether j exits or not, minUR(concede to i) = Li−KR when
the ruler concedes to i (by lemma A.2), whereas UR(ignore i) = L j −KR (by lemma
A.1). Since L j < Li, UR(concede to i)>UR(ignore i). Thus, the ruler concedes to i.
c. Suppose Xi > 0 and Li > 1. Then UR(ignore i) = 1−KR <UR(concede to i) = Li−KR
(by lemmas A.1 and A.2). So the ruler concedes to i.
The preceding holds except in either of the following cases. Suppose (in addition) that
X j > 0 and L j > Li.
Case 1. Suppose both i and j use voice. Then UR(concede to j)=L j−KR >UR(concede to i)=
Li−KR >UR(ignore) = 1−KR (by lemmas A.1 and A.2). Thus, the ruler ignores i.
Case 2. Suppose j is loyal following SUPPORT j. Then UR(ignore i) = L j −KR >
UR(concede to i) = Li−KR (by lemmas A.1 and A.2). Thus, the ruler ignores i.
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma A.4. For i ∈ {E,C}, if the ruler initially supports i, then i remains loyal.
Proof. Let s j denote j’s strategy for i 6= j ∈ {E,C}. Ui(exit | support i,s j) = Xi. Suppose
the ruler supports i in his initial policy choice. If j uses voice following SUPPORT i, then
the ruler can ignore j or concede to j (by lemma A.3b).
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Case 1. Suppose the ruler ignores j; then Ui(loyalty | support i,s j)= 1>Ui(exit | support i,s j).
So i is loyal whenever the ruler supports i and ignores j.
Case 2. Suppose the ruler concedes to j. If Xi≤ 0, i remains loyal following CONCEDE
TO j and exits otherwise (by lemma A.1). If Xi ≤ 0, then
Ui(loyalty | support i) =

0 if j uses voice
1 if j exits or remains loyal
.
Since Ui(exit | support i,s j) ≤ 0, Ui(loyalty | support i,s j) ≥ Ui(exit | support i,s j); so
loyalty weakly dominates exit. Thus, if the ruler concedes to j following j’s use of voice
and Xi ≤ 0, i responds to SUPPORT i with loyalty whatever j does. If Xi > 0, then
Ui(loyalty | support i) =

Xi if j uses voice
1 if j exits or remains loyal
.
Again, Ui(loyalty | support i,s j) ≥ Ui(exit | support i,s j); so loyalty weakly dominates
exit. Thus, if the ruler concedes to j following j’s use of voice and Xi > 0, i responds
to SUPPORT i with loyalty whatever j does. Since i is loyal whether Xi ≤ 0 or Xi > 0, i
responds to SUPPORT i with loyalty whenever the ruler concedes to j following j’s use of
voice.
Since i is loyal whether the ruler concedes to j or ignores j following j’s use of voice,
i is loyal whenever the ruler supports i. 
Lemma A.5. For i ∈ {E,C}, if the ruler initially supports j, then
a. i remains loyal if Xi ≤ 0;
b. i uses voice if 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki and either X j ≤ 0 or Li > L j for i 6= j ∈ {E,C};
c. i exits otherwise.
Proof. Suppose the ruler supports j in his initial policy choice. By lemma A.4, j remains
loyal.
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a. Then Ui(loyalty) = 0. Suppose Xi ≤ 0. Then Ui(exit) = Xi ≤Ui(loyalty). So i remains
loyal.
b. Now suppose Xi > 1−Ki. Since maxUi(voice | support j)= 1−Ki, Ui(voice | support j)<
Ui(exit | support j) and i exits if the ruler supports j.
c. Finally, suppose 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki.
Case 1. Suppose X j ≤ 0. Then j remains loyal if the ruler concedes to i when i uses
voice (by lemma A.1). Thus, Ui(voice | support j) = 1−Ki ≥Ui(exit | support j). So
i uses voice in response to SUPPORT j if 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki and X j ≤ 0.
Case 2. Suppose Li > L j. Whether j exits or not, the ruler concedes to i (by lemma
A.3b, case 2). So Ui(voice | support j) = 1−Ki ≥Ui(exit | support j). So i uses voice
in response to SUPPORT j if 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki and Li > L j.
Case 3. Suppose X j > 0 and L j > Li. Then the ruler ignores i’s voice (by lemma A.3c,
case 2). Since Xi > 0 (by assumption), i exits if ignored and Ui(voice | support j) =Xi−
Ki≥Ui(exit | support j) =Xi. Thus, i exits in response to SUPPORT j if 0< Xi≤ 1−Ki,
X j > 0, and L j > Li.
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma A.6. For i ∈ {E,C}, if the ruler initially preys, then
a. i remains loyal if Xi ≤ 0;
b. i uses voice if 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki and either Li > max{1,L j} or Li > 1 and X j > 1−K j
for i 6= j ∈ {E,C};
c. i exits otherwise.
Proof. Suppose the ruler preys in his initial policy choice. Then Ui(loyalty) = 0.
a. Suppose Xi ≤ 0. Then Ui(exit) = Xi ≤Ui(loyalty). So i remains loyal if Xi ≤ 0.
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b. Now suppose Xi > 1−Ki. Since maxUi(voice | prey) = 1−Ki, Ui(voice | prey) <
Ui(exit | prey) and i exits if Xi > 1−Ki.
c. Now suppose 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki. Let s j denote j’s strategy.
Case 1. Suppose Li > max{1,L j}. By lemma A.3c, the ruler concedes to i if i uses
voice. Thus, Ui(voice | prey,s j) = 1−Ki ≥Ui(exit | prey,s j)>Ui(loyalty | prey). So
i uses voice if 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki and Li > max{1,L j}.
Case 2. Suppose Li > 1 and X j > 1−K j. Consequently, j exits if the ruler preys
(by lemma A.6b) and the ruler concedes to i if i uses voice (by lemma A.3c). Thus,
Ui(voice | prey,s j = exit) = 1−Ki ≥Ui(exit | prey,s j = exit)>Ui(loyalty | prey,s j =
exit). So i uses voice if 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki, Li > 1, and X j > 1−K j.
Case 3. Suppose L j > Li > 1 and 0 < X j ≤ 1−K j. Consequently, j uses voice (by
lemma A.6c, case 1) and the ruler concedes to j (by lemma A.3c). Thus, Ui(voice | prey,s j =
voice) = Xi−Ki ≤Ui(exit | prey,s j = voice) and Ui(loyalty | prey,s j = voice) = 0 <
Ui(exit | prey,s j = voice). So i exits if 0<Xi≤ 1−Ki, L j > Li > 1, and 0<X j ≤ 1−K j.
Case 4. Suppose Li≤ 1. Then the ruler ignores i (by lemma A.3b). Thus, Ui(voice | prey,s j)=
Xi−Ki≤Ui(exit | prey,s j = voice) and Ui(loyalty | prey,s j = voice)= 0<Ui(exit | prey,s j =
voice). So i exits if 0 < Xi ≤ 1−Ki and Li ≤ 1.
Proposition A.7. For i ∈ {E,C}, the ruler preys if and only if Xi ≤ 0 or Li ≤ 1.
Proof. If: Case 1. Suppose Xi ≤ 0 for all i ∈ {E,C}. Then i remains loyal whatever the
ruler does (by lemmas A.4, A.5a, A.6a). Thus, UR(prey) = 1+LE +LC >UR(support i) =
Li+L j. So the ruler preys.
Case 2. Suppose Xi ≤ 0 < X j and L j ≤ 1 for i 6= j ∈ {E,C}. Then i remains loyal
whatever the ruler does (by lemmas A.4, A.5a, and A.6a). Further, j exits in response to
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PREY (by lemma A.6b and c, case 4) or SUPPORT i (by lemma A.5b and c, case 3) but re-
mains loyal when SUPPORT j (by lemma A.4). Thus, UR(prey)= 1+Li≥UR(support j)=
Li+L j >UR(support i) = Li. So the ruler preys.
Case 3. Suppose Xi > 0 and Li ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {E,C}. Then i exits in response to PREY
(by lemma A.6b and c, case 4) or SUPPORT j (by lemma A.5b and c, case 3) but remains
loyal when SUPPORT i (by lemma A.4). Thus, UR(prey) = 1≥UR(support i) = Li. So the
ruler preys.
Since the ruler preys in all cases, the ruler preys if Xi ≤ 0 or Li ≤ 1.
Only If: Suppose the ruler preys. Prove the contrapositive to show a contradiction.
Suppose it’s not the case that Xi ≤ 0 or Li ≤ 1 for i ∈ {E,C}. By De Morgan’s law,
Xi > 0 and Li > 1. It follows from lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.6 that maxUR(prey) =
max{Li−CG,1}. It follows from lemma A.4 that minUR(support i) = Li. Since Li > 1
by assumption, minUR(support i) > maxUR(prey). So the ruler supports i. Thus, we get
a contradiction by assuming Xi > 0 and Li > 1. Hence, if the ruler preys, either Xi ≤ 0 or
Li ≤ 1. 
Proposition A.8. For i ∈ {E,C}, the ruler supports i if and only if Xi > 0 and Li > 1 and
either X j ≤ 0 or L j ≤ Li for i 6= j ∈ {E,C}.
Proof. If: Suppose Xi > 0 and Li > max{1,L j}. Then i exits in response to PREY (by
lemma A.6b and c, case 4) or SUPPORT j (by lemma A.5b and c, case 3) but remains loyal
when SUPPORT i (by lemma A.4).
Case 1. Suppose X j ≤ 0. Then j remains loyal whatever the ruler does (by lemmas A.4,
A.5a, and A.6a). Thus, UR(support i)= Li+L j >UR(prey)= 1+L j >UR(support j)= L j.
So the ruler supports i if Xi > 0 and Li > 1 and X j ≤ 0.
Case 2. Suppose X j > 0 and Li > max{1,L j}. Then j exits in response to PREY (by
lemma A.6b and c, case 4) or SUPPORT i (by lemma A.5b and c, case 3) but remains loyal
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when SUPPORT j (by lemma A.4). Thus, UR(support i) = Li > max{UR(support j) =
L j,UR(prey) = 1}. So the ruler supports i.
Since the ruler supports i in all cases, the ruler supports i if Xi > 0, Li > 1 and either
X j ≤ 0 or L j ≤ Li.
Only If: Suppose the ruler supports some i ∈ {E,C}. Prove the contrapositive to show
a contradiction. Suppose it’s not the case that Xi > 0 and Li > 1 and either X j ≤ 0 or
L j ≤ Li for i 6= j ∈ {E,C}. By De Morgan’s law, either it’s not the case that Xi > 0 and
Li > 1 or it’s not the case that X j ≤ 0 or L j ≤ Li for i 6= j ∈ {E,C}.
Case 1. Suppose it’s not the case that Xi > 0 and Li > 1 for some i ∈ {E,C}. By De
Morgan’s law, Xi ≤ 0 or Li ≤ 1. We can ignore j’s action, so the ruler receives L j ∈ {0,x}
for x ∈ℜ. If Xi ≤ 0, it follows from lemma A.6 that minUR(prey) = 1+Li+L j and from
lemma A.4 that maxUR(support i) = Li + L j for all i ∈ {E,C}. Since minUR(prey) >
maxUR(support i), the ruler preys if Xi ≤ 0. If Li ≤ 1, it follows from lemma A.6 that
minUR(prey) = 1+L j and from lemma A.4 that maxUR(support i) = Li +L j for all i ∈
{E,C}. Since minUR(prey) > maxUR(support i), the ruler preys if Li ≤ 1. Hence, the
ruler preys if Xi ≤ 0 or Li ≤ 1.
Case 2. Suppose it’s not the case that X j ≤ 0 or L j ≤ Li for i 6= j ∈ {E,C}. By De
Morgan’s law, X j > 0 and L j > Li. If L j > 1, it follows from the “If” part of this proof that
the ruler supports j. Now hold i’s action action constant, so the ruler receives Li ∈ {0,x}
for x ∈ℜ. If L j ≤ 1, then it follows from lemma A.6 that minUR(prey) = 1+Li and from
lemmas A.3–A.5 maxUR(support j)=maxUR(support i)=L j+Li. Since minUR(prey)>
maxUR(support i), the ruler preys if L j ≤ 1. Thus, the ruler does not support i if X j > 0
and L j > Li.
In either case, the ruler does not support i. Thus, we get a contradiction by proving
the contrapositive. Hence, if the ruler supports i, Xi > 0 and Li > 1 and either X j ≤ 0 or
169
L j ≤ Li for i 6= j ∈ {E,C}. 
In words, proposition A.7 says the following.
1. The ruler preys upon and neglects both groups’ interests just in case both elites and
citizens either lack credible exit options, or possess loyalty that is worth less than
whatever benefits accrue to the ruler from retaining discretion over the good.
In words, proposition A.8 says the following.
2. The ruler advances citizens’ general interests just in case citizens have credible exit
options and either (a) loyalty that is both more valuable than the elites’ loyalty and
more valuable than whatever benefits accrue to the ruler from retaining discretion
over the good, regardless of the elite’s exit options; or (b) loyalty that is more valu-
able than whatever benefits accrue to the ruler from retaining discretion over the
good and the elite have no exit options. In the latter case, the elite’s loyalty could be
more valuable than the citizens.
3. The ruler advances elites’ interests just in case the latter have credible exit options
and either (a) loyalty that is more valuable than the citizens’ loyalty and more valu-
able than whatever benefits accrue to the ruler from retaining discretion over the
good, regardless of citizens’ exit options; or (b) loyalty that is more valuable than
whatever benefits accrue to the ruler from retaining discretion over the good and the
citizens have no exit options. In the latter case, the citizens’ loyalty could be more
valuable than the elites’.
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APPENDIX B
An Analysis of Feasibility
My aim in this appendix is to articulate a conceptual framework that helps discipline
our evaluation of feasibility claims.1 I claim that feasibility should be analyzed in terms
of constrained possibility: a political proposal φ is feasible just in case φ is possible in
view of certain relevant facts. My analysis draws on work in the semantics of modals. On
the standard view, possibility claims express existential quantification over a contextually
restricted set of possible worlds.2 Hence, more precisely, φ is feasible just in case there
exists a world at which φ is realized among the set of possible worlds that are similar to the
actual world in certain respects. This set is composed by ordering and placing constraints
on worlds along those comparative dimensions that are deemed relevant for thinking about
feasibility. My objective here is to sketch a formal apparatus that models how we compose
this set and, hence, how we should evaluate feasibility claims.
That the concept of feasibility should be given a modal analysis is likely not surprising.
But the formal apparatus is helpful for locating the areas where substantive theorizing is
1. For other discussions of feasibility, see Brennan and Pettit, “The Feasibility Issue”; Tyler Cowen,
“The Importance of Defining the Feasible Set,” Economics and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (2007): 1–14; Mark
Jensen, “The Limits of Practical Possibility,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2009): 168–184;
Juha Ra¨ikka¨, “The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1998):
27–40; Sanjay G. Reddy, “The Role of Apparent Constraints in Normative Reasoning: A Methodological
Statement and Application to Global Justice,” The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 119–125.
2. Angelika Kratzer, “The Notional Category of Modality,” in Words, Worlds, and Contexts: New Ap-
proaches in Word Semantics, ed. Hans Jurgen Eikmeyer and Hannes Rieser (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), 38–
74; Angelika Kratzer, “Modality,” in Semantics: An International Handbook of Contemporary Research,
ed. Arnim von Stechow and Dieter Wunderlich (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991), 639–650.
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required when evaluating feasibility claims. My analysis suggests that the real theoretical
work consists in identifying the considerations we should take as the salient dimensions for
comparing possible worlds. To this end, I present a reasonably comprehensive list of such
dimensions as an initial offering; inter alia, this list includes technological, motivational,
and institutional factors. Since this analysis enables us to be flexible with regard to where
we locate the constraints along these dimensions, I also offer some broad guidelines for
thinking about how restrictive we should be when evaluating the feasibility of particular
kinds of political proposals. The result is a conceptual framework to guide our assessment
of feasibility claims in political philosophy.
B.1 A general schema
Desiderata for an analysis. Here, I simply stipulate the desiderata that any analysis
must meet. (I justify these desiderata at some length in a longer version of this paper.)
Any analysis of feasibility must meet at least the following four conditions.
1. Continuity. Feasibility is most plausibly treated as a matter of degree. Any analysis
should treat feasibility as a continuous rather than a dichotomous notion.
2. Multidimensionality. Numerous types of considerations affect a political proposal’s
feasibility. To wit, economic, cultural, environmental, and institutional considera-
tions are distinct types of constraints, each of which impinges on a proposal’s real-
ization. Any analysis of feasibility should account for this multidimensionality. (I
offer an initial list of the relevant dimensions below section B.2.)
3. Flexibility. The concept of feasibility is differentially employed depending on the
normative question at hand. Any analysis of feasibility should be flexible enough to
accommodate these different applications.
4. Determinacy. For any context, feasibility should have a determinate meaning. When
a theorist employs the concept of feasibility to rule out a particular political pre-
scription, we should have a reasonably precise grasp of, for example, what sorts
of prescriptions would count as feasible beyond the particular proposal under con-
sideration. Put differently, a theorist should be able to specify her understanding
of feasibility with enough determinacy to enable her audience to apply her notion
of feasibility to proposals not under consideration. Thus, any analysis of feasibil-
ity should permit one to specify the concept as applied to a particular context as
determinately as is possible (acknowledging the unavoidable imprecision of our as-
sessment of feasibility constraints).
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The intuitive picture. As a first pass, say that a proposal φ is feasible just in case
φ ’s realization is practically possible. Let’s treat φ as a proposition that describes the state
of affairs required by the proposal. On the standard view of the semantics of modals,
possibility claims express existential quantification over a contextually restricted set of
possible worlds. In this case, the restriction is circumstantial: φ is feasible just in case φ ’s
realization is possible in view of certain facts.3 More precisely:
Initial pass: φ is feasible just in case there exists a world at which φ is realized among
the set of worlds that are similar enough to the actual world at t,
where t denotes the time at which the transition to φ is to start.
Two complications arise here. First, there does not seem to be any obvious way to
capture the continuity of feasibility using this framework. Existential quantification is a
dichotomous matter; either a world exists at which φ is realized or not. We need a way
to delimit the set of worlds over which we quantify so as to make apparent that feasibility
is a matter of degree. Second, I have spoken throughout of feasibility being a matter of
“processes” and “pathways”; but this first pass fails to capture this. Whether there exists a
world at which φ is realized is distinct from whether there is a pathway by which we can
transition from a world to one at which φ is realized. So we need to amend this first pass
to accommodate talk of processes and pathways.
Some terminology before continuing. A world w′ is circumstantially accessible from
another world w if w′ is compatible with certain specified facts at w; that is, w′ is circum-
stantially accessible from w if the relevant facts at w do not rule out w′. For my purposes,
say w′ is circumstantially accessible from the actual world if (1) w′ satisfies logical, nomo-
logical, and biological constraints and (2) w′ shares a common history with the actual
world up to t, the time at which the transition to φ is supposed to start. Elaborating on
(1), w′ is circumstantially accessible from the actual world if it does not entail any logi-
3. Kratzer, “Modality.”
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cal contradictions, if it does not entail any violations of the actual world’s physical laws,
and if it does not entail that the structures, functions, or developmental processes of living
organisms are fundamentally different from those of the organisms in the actual world.
To satisfy the multidimensionality condition, let’s treat modal space as a N-dimen-
sional metric space, with each of the N dimensions corresponding to a class of consider-
ations we think represents a relevant constraint on our ability to transition to any political
proposal. We can think of each of the N dimensions as an axis of the metric space. Sup-
pose we arrange each world that is circumstantially accessible from the actual world along
each of these axes according to the extent to which it deviates from the actual world along
that dimension at t. In this way, we can treat a dimension as representing a similarity
relation between worlds at t. A world at which human agents have radically different mo-
tivations from agents at the actual world is relatively far away from the actual world along
the motivation dimension; a world that is pretty similar to the actual world with respect
to technology is placed relatively close to the actual world along the technology dimen-
sion. Thus, each world has a location in the space that is defined by that world’s distance
from the actual world at t along each of its dimensions. (Note that we are judging the
similarity of worlds at t; that is, we are judging the extent to which initial conditions at
a world are similar to initial conditions at the actual world. This permits worlds to differ
greatly at times after t. Importantly, this leaves open the possibility that proposals that
require radical deviations from the actual world at some time hence are feasible, so long
as there is a causal path from the specified initial conditions to the conditions required by
the proposal.)
To define feasibility in any context, we decide how far from the actual world we are
willing to diverge — at t — along each dimension before we cease to count a world as
feasible. Put differently, we determine which barriers at t we will treat as obstructing any
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path to a proposal φ ’s realization. These bounds define the set of feasible worlds, the set
of worlds over which we quantify. To determine whether φ is feasible, we look at the set
of feasible worlds and determine whether φ is realized at any world in the feasible set. If
so, then we can say that φ is a feasible proposal; if not, not.
More precisely. Suppose we arrange all the worlds that are circumstantially accessible
from the actual world in a N-dimensional metric space with the actual world, denoted by
α , at the origin. For each dimension i, we stipulate a function fi : W → R, which gives
a world’s (directed) distance from α along dimension i at t. Each world w can now be
characterized as a vector w = ( f1(w), . . . , fN(w)), which represents the conditions that
obtain at w at t. (Note that the space need not be dense; where some conjunction of, say,
technological, motivational, and institutional requirements is inconsistent, there will be a
gap at the location characterized by that vector. Also notice that there might be more than
one world at any location, namely, those worlds that are characterized by the same vector
but differ in other (irrelevant, for our purposes) respects.)
Transposing our first pass above, we want to say that φ is feasible just in case there
exists a world at which φ is realized among the set of feasible worlds. Let Θ be the set of
feasible worlds; that is, the members of Θ are those worlds that are not only circumstan-
tially accessible from α , but also satisfy some limits on how far conditions at a world can
deviate from conditions at α at t. Our present task is to delimit Θ. We can do this in sev-
eral ways. One straightforward way is to specify a vector of constraints (γ1, . . . ,γN),γi ∈R,
which stipulate (as precisely as possible) how close to α (or how similar to α) some world
w must be along each dimension to count as feasible. (I stress that these distance judg-
ments are made by comparing worlds at t.) So let each Θi be the set of worlds that satisfy
the constraint for that dimension: Θi = {w : fi(w) ≤ γi}. Then Θ contains the intersec-
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tion of the Θis: Θ =
⋂N
i=1 Θi. (This defines a N-dimensional cube, or hypercube, which
contains all the worlds taken to satisfy the constraints.)
A more general way to delimitΘ— which permits a more nuanced definition ofΘ— is
to define a metric for the modal space. A clear candidate here is the Euclidean norm:
‖w‖=
√
f1(w)2+ . . .+ fN(w)2.
Then Θ is the set of worlds that are within some specified distance of the actual world:
Θ = {w : ‖w‖ ≤ Γ}, where Γ ∈ R is the maximum distance a world w can be from α to
count as feasible. (Γ could be a function of the γis if one desired.) If we want to make
it more or less difficult for worlds with higher values along some dimension i to count as
feasible, we define a weighted distance function, d : W ×W → R:
d(w1,w2) =
√
β1[ f1(w1)− f1(w2)]2+ . . .+βN [ fN(w1)− fN(w2)]2,
where βi ≥ 0. (For example, one might want to weight dimensions according to their
respective costliness of transitioning to new conditions.) If βi = 1, then the distance along
dimension i enters unweighted. Now Θ = {w : d(w,α) ≤ Γ}. If we want to add hard
constraints along some dimension i, then let Θ = {w : d(w,α) ≤ Γ∧ fi(w) ≤ γi}. The
point here is simply to show that we have options in delimiting Θ; we are not forced to
define Θ in any particular way.4
Having delimited Θ, we are now in a position to define feasibility more carefully: φ
is feasible just in case there exists a world at which φ is realized in Θ. But since we want
to make clear the point about transitional processes, we should be a little more precise.
4. Note also that using a metric space and distance function is not necessary. More generally, we could
say that fi generates a partial preorder on worlds with respect to dimension i. We could then define a function
F to yield a total order as a function of the fis. Finally, we could define a function G to select worlds from
the total order to determine the members of Θ. I use a metric space and a distance function because they
yield a helpful graphical representation; hence, they are useful for expository purposes. (Thanks to Alex
Silk for pointing this out to me.)
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Recall that t denotes the time at which the transition to φ is supposed to start; we want to
know whether φ is realized at some time after t. Hence,
Final pass: φ is feasible if and only if there exists a world in Θ at which φ is realized at
t ′ > t.5
Formally,
φ is feasible iff ∃w ∈Θ and ∃t ′ > t : [[φ ]]w,t ′ = 1.
We can capture the continuity of feasibility as follows. Let P be the set of worlds at
which φ is realized (formally: P = {w : [[φ ]]w = 1}) and let Q be the set of worlds at which
ψ is realized, where ψ is an alternative proposal (formally: Q = {w : [[ψ]]w = 1}).
• A proposalψ is at least as feasible as (D) φ iff ∀w∈ P ∃w′ ∈Q : d(w′,α)≤ d(w,α).
• ψ is more feasible than φ iff ψDφ ∧¬(φ Dψ).
• Finally, ψ and φ are equally feasible iff ψDφ ∧φ Dψ .
Notice that this analysis satisfies each of the desiderata mentioned above. The analysis
is obviously multidimensional. The analysis provides flexibility because the feasible set’s
bounds are free to vary depending on the question at hand. When doing ideal theory, we
can loosen the constraints on each dimension (or ignore some dimensions altogether), al-
lowing a more inclusive definition of feasibility. When doing nonideal theory or, closer to
the ground, making specific policy recommendations for specific problems, we can tighten
the constraints on each dimension individually, altering these constraints as is fit given the
salience of any particular dimension. This yields a more restrictive definition of feasibility,
depending on the case at hand. Notice that this also addresses the complication introduced
by process-talk. When we set the constraints that delimit the feasible set, we determine
which barriers we will take as blocking a proposal’s realization within the salient time
frame. Put differently, the worlds that satisfy the specified constraints are those worlds to
5. The problem of how to determine whether φ is realized at a counterfactual world arises here. I briefly
address this issue at the end of this appendix.
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which there are open transitional paths. (Importantly, this does not imply that the transition
is easy.)
The analysis provides determinacy by requiring theorists to be specific (or, more ac-
curately, as specific as possible) about where they set the constraints on each dimension.
This prevents theorists from ruling out (or ruling in) proposals for vaguely-defined rea-
sons; by requiring specificity, theorists must expose their assumptions about what counts
as feasible in a given context, thereby subjecting those assumptions to scrutiny.
Finally, that the analysis satisfies continuity is straightforward — each of the N dimen-
sions that carve up the space is a continuum and circumstantially accessible worlds can
be located anywhere along each continuum (provided that some location does not entail
an impossible world). Moreover, worlds are free to vary along these dimensions inde-
pendently, as are the constraints we set on any dimension. In this way, feasibility is fully
continuous. It is true that any particular definition of the feasible set treats feasibility as
dichotomous; the definition draws a bright line around those worlds that are set apart for
consideration. But this is only for the purposes of deliberation; the line is set to rule out
the worlds we deem too distant for practical consideration. In principle, the line is free
to vary in a continuous fashion across deliberative contexts. Moreover, across the whole
space, we can intelligibly judge some worlds more or less feasible than others to the extent
that the former are closer to the actual world than the latter.
B.2 Putting the schema to work
The foregoing provides only the skeleton of an analysis of feasibility. A further ad-
vantage of this framework is that it indicates where substantive theorizing must take place
when defining feasibility. This work must occur at two places. First, we must figure out
which dimensions — which classes of considerations — represent relevant constraints on
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our capacity to transition to any given political prescription. Second, we must articulate
some broad guidelines for determining how inclusive the feasible set should be depending
on the normative question of interest. I take up the first question in the next section and
leave the second to the following section.
Which dimensions? Recall that each dimension corresponds to an axis of the modal
space, and that each dimension can be treated as a similarity relation among worlds — we
organize worlds along a dimension according to their degree of similarity to the actual
world at t with respect to some set of considerations that affect our capacity to realize a
political proposal. But which sets of considerations should we use to define the dimensions
of the modal space? Common sense tells us that a proposal φ is practically impossible for
us and therefore infeasible if φ requires the realization of a logically contradictory state of
affairs, or the violation of the physical laws of our universe, or that living organisms have
structures, functions, or developmental processes that are fundamentally different from
living organisms in the actual world. Our evaluation of feasibility claims can safely ignore
all worlds that violate these logical, nomological, and biological constraints. Hence, we
do not need any dimensions that correspond to these hard constraints to organize the space
of possible worlds; we simply stipulate that only those worlds that meet these constraints
are circumstantially accessible from the actual world and populate the modal space with
only those worlds. Nor do we need a history dimension, since we are only interested in
determining whether φ can be reached from the specified initial conditions, which presup-
poses the actual history. Thus, we ignore all worlds whose histories up to time t diverge
from the history of the actual world. Aside from logic, physics, biology, and history, what
other types of considerations influence φ ’s feasibility?
Here, I only canvass what I take to be a reasonably comprehensive list of feasibility
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considerations. This is not meant to be the definitive list, so I do not make much of a case
for the inclusion of any particular dimension. Whether we should attend to any particular
dimension depends on whether that dimension enriches our evaluation of particular feasi-
bility claims. If we attend to some set of considerations and it consistently turns out not
to make much difference to our assessment, that is some evidence that we do not need a
distinct dimension corresponding to that set of considerations.
The following list characterizes the dimensions — or similarity relations among pos-
sible worlds — that I take to be representative of reasonably distinct constraints on our
capacity to realize φ .
1. Environmental constraints. Environmental constraints comprise things like a loca-
tion’s climate, natural resource profile, and topography. These factors affect the
realization of, for example, particular development strategies. Agriculturally-based
development becomes less feasible as the local environment becomes less hospitable
to agriculture; certain industries become more viable as certain natural resources
become increasingly available locally and as the location has increased access to
natural transportation routes (e.g., navigable waterways).
2. Technological capabilities. Technological capabilities encompass the tools, tech-
niques, and organizational schemes by which we implement φ . Consider the fol-
lowing examples of technological constraints on our ability to realize some φ . The
extent to which we can implement a proposal to redistribute global wealth depends
on the means available to collect and distribute tax revenue, as well as the means
available to monitor and enforce compliance. The feasibility of widespread cooper-
ation depends on the available communication technology, while the feasibility of
broad-based economic development depends on the available productive technology.
3. Cognitive capabilities. Human agents are subject to multifarious cognitive biases
and other cognitive limitations. This means that our ability to implement political
proposals is often limited by attending to irrelevant or misleading considerations
or making choices that are otherwise less than optimally rational. Moreover, we
lack the computational capacity and often the social scientific knowledge required
to anticipate the consequences of our reform choices with any accuracy. These lim-
itations surely influence the feasibility of any φ , as well as our ability to specify the
conditions that must arise to make φ feasible.
4. Intrinsic motivational capacities. Intrinsic motivational capacities comprise the in-
trinsic features of individual human agents that influence their ability to be moti-
vated to undertake those actions that are required by φ . These include preferences,
the capacity to put oneself in another’s position, and capacities to overcome vari-
ous affective biases (e.g., kin preference), prejudices, and fears. To illustrate the
point, it is a common refrain among nationalists that people cannot be motivated
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to pursue cosmopolitan political objectives, thereby undermining the feasibility of
cosmopolitan proposals.6 The general point is that some φ is feasible only insofar
as the relevant agents can be motivated to undertake the actions required by φ given
certain intrinsic constraints on motivational capacity.
5. Extrinsic motivational factors. The set of extrinsic motivational factors consists of
features of an agent’s environment that interface with her intrinsic motivational ca-
pacities and affect her motivation to undertake the actions required by φ . These
comprise social norms, which dictate appropriate conduct, as well as the incentive
structure to which agents respond — i.e., the structure of rewards and punishments
meant to provoke or elicit certain types of conduct. The incentive structure subse-
quently affects the extent to which φ is incentive compatible, the extent to which the
structure of rewards and punishments required to induce the actions required by φ
accords with the relevant agents’ intrinsic motivational limitations.7
6. Resource availability (budget constraints). Clearly, φ is feasible only to the extent
to which the resources required to realize φ — including money and labor — are
available. This is why the economic concept of a budget constraint is helpful here.
In economic analysis, individuals’ consumption options are limited to those that
are affordable given a particular income level. A similar notion applies here: our
policy or institutional options are limited to those that can be implemented given the
available resources.
7. Institutional factors. Extant institutional capacities and constraints affect the extent
to which the policies required by some φ can be enacted. To cite two examples:
the number and distribution of veto points in an institutional structure — that is, the
number of offices that can prevent deviation from the status quo — affect the extent
to which reform legislation can be passed;8 the extent to which citizens can hold a
political official accountable for the latter’s policy choices affects the provision of
public goods, such as security, individual liberties, infrastructure, and investment in
economic development.9 Hence, any evaluation of φ ’s feasibility should attend to
the institutional conditions required to realize φ .
8. Social factors. Social factors comprise those features of a society or of social re-
lationships that affect individuals’ ability (not motivation) to undertake the actions
required by φ . These include the extent to which individuals are united in their pur-
suit of a common goal, the extent to which individuals’ personal goals are harmo-
nized, and the depth and extent of civil conflict. Since these factors are influenced by
6. Miller, On Nationality. For an empirical evaluation of the claim, see Gillian Brock and Quentin D.
Atkinson, “What can Examining the Psychology of Nationalism Tell Us About Our Prospects for Aiming at
the Cosmopolitan Vision?” Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 11, no. 2 (2008): 165–179.
7. For a discussion of feasibility that treats it almost entirely in terms of incentive compatibility, see Bren-
nan and Pettit, “The Feasibility Issue.” Frey argues that focusing entirely on designing incentive schemes to
prevent opportunistic behavior “crowds out” civic virtue; thus, cultivating appropriate social norms is im-
portant for motivating cooperative behavior. See Bruno Frey, “A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic
Virtues,” The Economic Journal 107, no. 443 (1997): 1043–1053; Bruno Frey, “Institutions and Morale: The
Crowding-Out Effect,” in Economics, Values, and Organization, ed. Avner Ben-Ner and Louis G. Putterman
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 437–460.
8. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2002).
9. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.
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pervasive cultural and religious practices, I take social factors to subsume cultural
factors. The importance of social factors for feasibility is reflected, for example,
in Rawls’s move to make the “fact of reasonable pluralism” — that is, the fact that
citizens within a liberal society hold “incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive
doctrines” about what constitutes a worthwhile life — a central constraint on the
choice of political principles.10
I take the foregoing list as nothing more than a start, although a reasonably comprehensive
start, on the task of specifying the dimensions we use to frame our evaluation of feasi-
bility claims. I said earlier that I take this task to be where the “real work” needs to be
done. By this, I mean that any evaluation of feasibility claims fundamentally rests on the
considerations we take to be salient for evaluating the feasibility of particular political pro-
posals. Much of the confusion perpetuated by the political philosophy literature on this
score is tied to a failure to say precisely which sets of considerations are taken to affect
the feasibility of particular proposals. The aim of the foregoing analysis is to provoke the-
orists to be precise about the considerations they take to be salient and, further, to specify
as precisely as possible the constraints they are placing along each of the salient dimen-
sions when declaring a proposal (in)feasible. But the flexibility afforded by my analysis
of feasibility permits theorists to precisify the notion of feasibility in accordance with the
particular normative question they engage. In the next section, I offer some guidance on
how to tailor the notion of feasibility to suit one’s theoretical purposes.
Feasibility in political philosophy. The motivation for requiring that feasibility be
given an analysis that permits flexible use is this: theorists use a more or less inclusive
notion of feasibility depending on their normative question of interest. I have already
given several examples of this: we use a more inclusive notion to evaluate the feasibility
of organizing state institutions in accordance with Rawls’s two principles of justice than
to evaluate the feasibility of Pogge’s proposed amendment for averting coups; we evaluate
10. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xvi and passim.
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the feasibility of a particular proposal to democratize international institutions such as
the World Trade Organization differently depending on whether our aim is to identify
near-term policy solutions, institutional arrangements that are practicable under conditions
of pervasive injustice more generally, or institutional arrangements to which we should
aspire as a long-term goal. Which dimensions we take to be salient and where to set the
constraints along these dimensions will differ across domains of inquiry. Can we identify
some general rules-of-thumb to be applied in distinct domains?
Before proposing some general rules, I first distinguish between four broadly-defined
types of domain. The first is what I have called ground-level policy analysis. The ob-
jective here is to identify practicable near-term policy reforms to address particular social
problems (e.g., an embargo on Sudan to address ongoing armed civil conflict and geno-
cide there). It is important for ground-level policy analysis that the proposed reforms be
practicable under conditions as we find them in the actual world.
The second and third types I call clinical theory and nonideal aspirational theory.
Note that these are species of what is conventionally called nonideal theory. The conven-
tional nonideal theory label is ambiguous between three distinct conceptions of the task
of nonideal theory: (1) theorizing that identifies intermediate institutional reforms to help
us transition from actual institutions to fully just institutions; (2) theorizing that identifies
institutions that we should aspire to implement under nonideal conditions (i.e., under con-
ditions of persistent injustice); and (3) theorizing that prescribes near-term or midrange
institutional solutions to general classes of actual injustice (e.g., institutional solutions to
address the problem of genocide more generally, not some particular genocide). We might
call these (1) transitional theory,11 (2) nonideal aspirational theory, and (3) clinical theory
11. We should take care to distinguish this use of “transitional” from its use in the burgeoning transitional
justice literature. The latter addresses the moral, legal, and political issues that arise in the wake of war and
civil conflict; e.g., the appropriate role of war crimes tribunals in facilitating the transition to a cooperative
society.
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respectively. Failing to disambiguate nonideal theory has led political theorists to con-
flate the various objectives; for example, theorists commonly identify clinical theory with
transitional theory.12 But we should be careful to differentiate types of theorizing that are
animated by distinct objectives; this is especially true for the present discussion, since each
of these might appeal to more or less inclusive notions of feasibility.
(I do not treat transitional theory separately here, for two reasons. First, transitional
theory is not a worthwhile enterprise. As I argue in chapter 3, the institutional arrange-
ments we identify as fully just offer, at best, misleading guidance for the task of identifying
morally desirable institutions under nonideal conditions. Second, it is not clear to me that
the task of transitional theory requires a notion of feasibility that is more or less restrictive
than either nonideal aspirational theory or clinical theory.)
The last type of theoretical domain is what I have been calling ideal theory. The
objective here is to examine what social and political arrangements might be like “under
reasonably favorable but still possible historical conditions, conditions allowed by the laws
and tendencies of the social world.”13 Put differently, ideal theory aims to work out fully
just institutions given reasonably optimistic assumptions about what is possible for human
agents who are like us in essential respects and who live in a world that resembles ours
in certain fundamental respects. What institutions could arise in a world of modest but
not acute resource scarcity, where technological and social limitations do not significantly
bind our ability to bring about just states of affairs, and where individual agents can be
motivated to pursue just social arrangements for their own sake? That is a question for
ideal theory.
Distinguishing between domain types as above lends itself fairly straightforwardly to
12. See my discussion above in sec. 3.2.
13. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001), 4.
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the business of articulating general guidelines for evaluating feasibility claims in each of
these domains. Ground-level policy analysis resides at the restrictive end of the spec-
trum. Since we are here interested in entertaining proposals that are implementable in the
near-term under actual conditions, we should restrict our attention to those worlds that very
closely resemble the actual world along each of the dimensions enumerated above. (Recall
that all similarity judgments are made with respect to t, the time at which the implemen-
tation of the proposal is to begin.) We appropriately reject as infeasible those proposals
that are not realized in any worlds that are very close to our own.14 We can afford to be
slightly more inclusive when doing clinical theory. This is because our interest in doing
clinical theory extends to midrange solutions; thus, we should consider worlds at which
conditions obtain that are likely to arise given actual conditions. We should continue to
employ each of the dimensions discussed above, but we can afford to set the constraints to
include worlds that are a little further away from the actual world.
At the other extreme, we can (and perhaps should) employ a fairly inclusive notion
of feasibility when doing ideal theory. Here, we can consider worlds that depart quite
substantially from our own, yet are still recognizable to us as salient possibilities. This
permits us to set the constraints on each of the dimensions to include worlds that are
quite distant from the actual world, and perhaps even ignore some dimensions altogether.
(For example, for certain questions, we might ignore technological or social limitations
altogether.)
Nonideal aspirational theory falls somewhere between clinical theory and ideal theory.
This is because the former shares features with each of the latter. On the one hand, we want
to entertain political proposals that are to operate under conditions of persistent injustice;
thus, we must assume the presence of some agents who are unwilling or unable to meet
their obligations due to some notable limitations. On the other hand, we seek proposals
14. Cf. Ra¨ikka¨’s notion of political feasibility in “The Feasibility Condition,” 28f.
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that are worthy to be called aspirational; we want to explore the limits of what is possible
under conditions of persistent injustice. Thus, we must assume conditions that are less
restrictive than those that we find in the actual world — for example, that a greater number
of agents are subject to fewer motivational limitations or that institutions possess greater
capacity to overcome collective action problems. The flexibility afforded by the analysis I
have offered permits us to get the right mix of constraints and capacities. We can be more
restrictive along some dimensions while being less restrictive along others, depending on
the issue at hand; alternatively, we can uniformly set the constraints at a middle range
between the two extremes.
The general point in this section is that the notion of feasibility we should employ
in any given domain of inquiry should be as restrictive or inclusive as we need for the
purpose at hand. We should set our constraints to include only worlds that are quite close
to ours when we appraise proposals that are meant to be implemented under conditions that
closely resemble those that obtain in the actual world, and move the constraints outward
as our question of interest leads us to consider proposals that are meant to operate under
conditions that diverge from our own.
B.3 Concluding remark
The practical utility of this framework rests on our ability to determine whether some
proposal is realized in a counterfactual world, and I promised above to briefly address
the question of how we might do this. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to
defend a response at any length, I conjecture that formal (mathematical) game theoretic
models can be put to good use here. Formal models have two virtues that lend them to this
task. First, models are useful isolating devices; that is, models serve as rigorous “thought
experiments” that control for causal noise through the use of idealizing or exaggerating
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assumptions with the aim of isolating the causal relationship of interest and placing it
in an environment where the causal connection is stable.15 Given that our analysis of a
proposal’s feasibility focuses on the effect of select conditions rather than the totality of
potential causal factors (however remote or indirect their effect), a model’s capacity to
isolate is helpful. Second, models are useful for investigating counterfactual worlds.16 The
modeller has wide latitude in setting the model’s parameters; thus, within certain limits
(e.g., the model must be mathematically tractable), the modeller can construct (models
of) counterfactual worlds by setting the model’s parameters to match conditions in the
counterfactual world of interest. This enables us to investigate a wide range of parameters
and determine necessary or sufficient conditions for a proposal’s implementation. We
can then compare these conditions to those we find in the actual world to determine how
closely the former resemble the latter. Clearly, I have said too little to make a persuasive
point; but I hope I have at least indicated a promising line of research.
15. Cf. Uskali Ma¨ki, “Models are Experiments, Experiments are Models,” Journal of Economic Method-
ology 12, no. 2 (2005): 303–315; Uskali Ma¨ki, “MISSing the World. Models as Isolations and Credible
Surrogate Systems,” Erkenntnis 70, no. 1 (2009): 29–43.
16. Cf. Robert Sugden, “Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economics,” Journal of
Economic Methodology 7, no. 1 (2000): 1–31; Robert Sugden, “Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mecha-
nisms,” Erkenntnis 70, no. 1 (2009): 3–27.
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